Issue 5.1 •

Spring 2001

Focus
2

Notes from the Fi d

The U.S. Pacific Command Humanitarian Demining Program

101

8

A National Mine Action Institution: The Cambodian Mine Action
Center by Ieng Mouly
13 Returning Life to Field and Forest: Mine Clearance by Villagers in
Cambodia by Ruth Bottomley
18 Mine/UXO Casualties and Casualty Surveillance in Cambodia

102
108
114

by Reuben McCarthy

26

Notes from: The United Nations Mine Action Service
Notes from: The Geneva International Center for Humanitarian
Demining by Robert Diethelm
The U.S. Army's Countermine Training Support Center and
Humanitarian Demining Training Center by Joe Donahue
The Mineseeker Airship: "Supporting the U.N." by Elizabeth A. Cramer
Koch Mine Safe and the Cordon Sanitaire Clearance Program

100

by Joe Lokey

by Henry Thompson

Korea United: North and South Set Aside Differences to Demine

The Direct Approach from Kosovo: Mine Awareness Education

120

by Keith Feigenbaum

by Philip Dive

Southeast Asia Air Combat Data by Tom Smith
31 Pakistan: The Landmine Problem in Federally Administered Tribal
Areas by Faiz Muhammad Fayyaz
38 Myanmar's Forgotten Mine Fields by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and
29

U.S. Office of Global Humanitarian Demining Works Toward
Demining 2010 Goals by Elizabeth A. Cramer

127

Andrew Seith

44

Vietnamese Ministry Tours U.S. Following Historic Agreement

Profiles

by Keith Feigenbaum
45

GERBERA Mine Action Activities in Vietnam and Laos
by Lisa M. Vonada

50
54

60
64
67
70
73
76
82

130

The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program: Engagement in
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand by Kela Morehead
The Childrens' Plight in Cambodia by Chris Horwood and MichelLe Pechoux
Thailand: The Land of Smiles by David McCraken
Bombs Away: A Proactive Approach by Lisa M. Vonada
Photographing Tragedy: Landmines and Victims by Tim Grant
U.S. Efforts Strengthen Pledge to Vietnam by Stacy L. Smith
Cambodia: A Country Profile by Rohan Maxwell
RHINO in Cambodia by Manfred Joehnk
Munitions and Mines: Peace Education for Laos by Titus Peachey

131
132
133
134
135

Afghanistan
Cambodia
China
India
Laos
Myanmar

136
137
138
139
140
141

North Korea
Pakistan
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam

Editorial
142 From the Director's Desk: Mine Action-A
Challenges? by Dennis Barlow

Model for Other Global

Features
Mine Detection Dogs at Work by Stacy L. Smith
88 The Challenges of Integrating Mine Dogs i nto Humanitarian
Demining by Margaret Buse
92 K9 Demining Corp to Aid Clearance Efforts in Lebanon
86

by Elizabeth A. Cramer

94

K-9 Dog Academy Takes its Training to the Mine Field
by Margaret Buse

The Journal of
Mine Action
The Mi ne Action Information Center
at James Madison University

Spring 200 I
Issue 5.1
ISSN: 1533-9440

February 2002

Global Mine Action Centers

Land mines in Africa

Version 6.3 O ctober 2002

Victim & Survivor Assistance

Version 7.1 February 2003

M anual Demining and

Version 7.2 June 2003

Landmines in Europe & The

Personal Safety
C aucasus

Version 7 .3 October 2003

Mechanically Assisted
Demining

The jounltll of Mine Action is an official publication of the Mine
Action Information Center at James Madison University. It is
published three times a year. The M ine Action Information
Center is a clearinghouse for infOrmation on landmine-related
issues and topics and is spo nsored by a contrac t from the
Departm ent of Defense. For additional informacion, please call

MAIC at (540) 568-2718, E-mail: hdic@jmu.edu or visit rhe
website at http://www.hdic.jmu.edu
Co"eCiion: Sarah Warren. former project manager for Save th e C hildren's Land mine Education Projl·cr in Kabul,
was rhe au thor of Tht Callmgn ofMini' A w~~rmeu Education for Childrm i n Ajghanista n. issue 4 .3, Fall 2000.

Version 6.1

Version 6.2 Ju ne 2002

Upco ming Issues
Version 5.2 Ju ne 200 1

Version 5.3 Ocr 200 I

Submissions a nd queries regarding The journal ofMine Action

should be submitted ro rhe editor at:
Mine Action I nforma tion Center
James M adison Un iversity

One Court Square, MSC 8504, Harrisonburg, Virginia 22807
Tel: (540) 568-2503 • E-mail: busems@jmu.edu
Requests for issues and/or calls for papers of The Journal of
Mint Action should be directed ro the ed ito r.

Editorial Board
Dennis Barlow
Margaret S. Bus<
Joe Lokey

Graphic Assistants
Kendra Hastings
Emily Smith

Chris Horwood
Manfred Joehnk
Michel Le l'et:houx
Rohan Maxwell
Administrative Support Reuben McCarthy
Edjtor
Christine Brawdy
David McCraken
Margaret S. Buse
Carolyn Firkin
Kela Moorehead
Yeshua MoserAssistant Editor
Design Staff
Puangsuwan
Keirh Feige.nbaum
Paul Groff,
!eng Mouly
Color Graphics Corp.
Titus Peachey
Editorial Assistants
Andrew Seith
Elizabeth A. Cramer
Contributors
Andy Smirh
Mike Monroe
Ruth Bo!tomley
Tom Smith
Mary Ruberry
Robert Diethelm
Crispin Stephen
Stacy Smith
Philip Dive
Henry Thompson
Lisa M. Vanada
joe Donahue
Faiz Muhammad Fayyaz Cover Photo
Asst. Graphic Designer lim Gran t
ICRC
lvey Lian

Landmines in Latin America

Land mines in the Middle
East

The journal ofMine Action reserves the right to alter articles
for readabili ty or space considerations. Every effort will be
made to mai ntain the integrity an d meaning of the text.

Views expressed in The Journal ofMint Action are those of the
authors and do nor necessarily reflec t the views of the M ine
Acrion Information Center, James Madison University or the

U.S. Department of Defense.

The U.S. Pacific Command
Humanitarian Demining Program
Under the direction of the U.S. Pacific Command, SOCPAC guides the deployment of Special Operations Forces to mine-affected countries throughout Asia
and the Pacific to teach clearance and develop indigenous capabilities.
By Joe Lokey, MAIC

T

he focal point for U.S. military
assistance in humanitarian
demining efforts in Asia and
the Pacific Rim is a small, two-person
office in an obscure wing of an old
building on Camp H.M. Smith in
Hawaii. It is from this office that two
members of the Special Operations
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) plan
and coordinate humanitarian
demining training and equipment
donations to Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia and Vietnam.
SOCPAC is a sub-unified
command under the direction of the
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
and is responsible for activities
covering two-thirds of the Earth's
surface and 15 time zones. The
training teams come from Special

•

Forces units both within the Pacific
theater and from units based on the
West Coast of the United States. EOD
personnel from other military units in
the Pacific also augment the reams.
Once they enter a country for a
training mission, they are under the
operational control of SOCPAC,
which coordinates their activities with
rhe host nation's U.S. embassy and
their home units. They are the ideal
capability tO use in this important
initiative because of the unique skills
they develop under Special Operations
Forces (SOF) training.

The Role of Special Forces
Although the humanitarian
demining mission is a collateral
training mission for the Special Forces
teams, it directly and substantially

U.S. soldiers
oversee the skills
development of
deminers.
c/oMA/C
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benefits their combat skills and
requirements in areas of Foreign
Internal Defense (FlO) and
Unconventional Warfare (UW) . These
unique capabilities and mission casks
led Special Forces ro be chosen to lead
the U.S. effort ro provide this kind of
training and assistance ro other
nations. Not only do benefits accrue
to those being trained, but U.S.
soldiers also receive a substantial
training benefit that increases their
effectiveness.
In this peacetime mission, as in
its wartime task, the role of Special
Forces focuses on using mission related
skills (FIO/UW) tO establish and train
a host nation organization. This occurs
at both the headquarters and
subordinate level, in a range of basic
to
advanced skills such as
communications, field and trauma
medicine, small unit leadership, and
logis t ics support skills . Support
training is also provided in demining
mission planning, as well as demining
and mine awareness teaching
techniques. This is all done with full
cognizance of the U.S. law that
prohibits U.S. forces from entering an
active mine field.
In the execution of these
missions, the benefits to the U.S.
military of deploying Special Forces
teams are clearly obvious. These
deployments benefit the troops in that
they provide: training opporrunities tO
practice mission skills; experience and
familiarity with the cultures in these
countries; an opportunity tO improve
already substantial language skills; and

•

the ability to enhance the coordination
and integration of the host nation and
NGOs' involvement in their activities.
These unique SOF skills and the
troops' considerable coalition building
assets make the use of conventional
forces in chis role less effective.

this concept and encouraging the
pursuit of donor support funding, a
long-term solution tO a country's
landmine and UXO problem can be
easily developed and initiated.

The U.S Goal

The SOCPAC role in humanitarian demining, like other U.S.
military involvement, operates to
enhance the regional U.S. military
posture in the Pacific, contribute to
peace and stability in conflict prone
regions, have a positive impact on
critical humanitarian situations
around the Pacific Rim, and foster selfsufficiency and interoperability.

The foundation for the U.S.
humanitarian demining training effort
in the Pacific, and all areas around the
globe, is the focus on eventual selfsufficiency and the use of the "trainthe-trainer" concept. This ensures that
the host nation is fully capable of
creating and sustaining their own
demining teams and the support
infrastructure, sooner rather chan later.
It is through this philosophy in the
Pacific and elsewhere that the United
States encourages host nation
ownership and understanding of their
own experiences and gained
knowledge. This is truly a way ro
ensure that, once fully engaged, a solid
foundation is provided for developing
local solutions to local problems.
By integrating NGO efforts inro

A civil affairs soldier
(right) works with a
Cambodian officer.
c/oMAIC

in-Chief's (CINC) regional
strategy for national and regional
security.
• Improve the readiness and quality
of training for the U.S. military
involvement.

SOCPAC

The goals of SOCPAC:
• Relieve suffering from the adverse
effects of landmines while
promoting U.S. interests.
• Alleviate the threat of landmines
to the innocent.
• Establish sustainable indigenous
demining programs.
• Encourage international cooperation and participation.
• Support the Pacific Commander-
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The U.S. military is specifically
funded for this mission through the
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and
Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation
provided yearly by Congress. It
provides the transportation, sustainment and equipment needs of the
units conducting the training, and a
limited initial equipment provision
that is donated tO the units being
trained at the conclusion of training.
These missions are coordinated with
the U.S. Department of State, which
provides more equipment and longterm capabilities to aid nations
through the Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related
Activities (NADR) appropriation.
It is the teamwork and coordination among the agencies working to
support a nation, in close cooperation
with the U.S. embassy in that nation,
that makes the U.S. humanitarian

demining program so effective.
Throughout the Pacific, SOCPAC is
recognized as the executive agent for
humanitarian demining assistance and
will coordinate all U.S . assistance to
the following countries that have
entered into a formal agreement with
the U.S. government:
Current Programs

CAMBODIA
T he U.S. assistance and training
program began in June 1994 with an
assessment visit that set the foundation
for mine clearance training and mine
awareness training. This was followed
by the deployment of a 27 -man team
in September of that year. There were
three separate deployments of similar
size and duration every year for the
next few years until the summer of
1997 when operations were suspended
because of the political situation in
Cambodia. An assessment team from
the U.S. Department of Defense
visited Cambodia in February 2001 to
review the situation and determine if
U.S. assistance could be re-engaged.
As a result, the United States is
planning to provide additional
training and support to CMAC in the
areas of medical training, munitions
storage and handling, and vehicle
•

maintenance through 2003. This
follow-on training has begun with the
arrival of a medical training team.
Approximately 50 to 90 people
continue to be killed or injured by
landmines each month in Cambodia.
Current "official estimates" place the
number of mines at approximately 4
million-6 million spread throughout
some 3,600 mined areas identified to
date. These areas are estimated to cover
about 2,900 sq. km. The Cambodian
Mine Action Center (CMAC), an all
civilian insitution, believes that the full
extent of t h e mine problem in
Cambodia is not accurately known.
Mine contamination is spread
throughout the country with heavier
concentrations in the northwestern
provinces. UXO contamination
appears to be moderate to high and
comprises mostly unsophisticated
munitions spread throughout the
country with possibly higher
concentrations in the central, southern
and eastern provinces.
In spite of the heavy focus on
Cambodia by the international
community, it is likely that mine
action operations will need to
continue at the current level by
CMAC for at least the next 5-1 0 years.
Beyond that, it is likely that a reduced
capability will be needed to deal with
smaller or lower priority clearance

U.S. soldiers
perform a
medical skills
training drill for
a CMAC advisor
in February
2001.
doSOCPAC

tasks and numerous individual mine/
UXO reports- perhaps as long 50
years.
The military engineers of the
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
(RCAF) have been involved in
"demining" (and bomb disposal) since
approximately 1994. Their contribution to the reduction in the mine/
UXO threat has been quite substantial:
according to RCAF data, their troops
have cleared approximately 26 million
sq. m (26 sq. km) and destroyed some
88,000 mines, 46,000 booby traps and
19,000 UXO. Given the magnitude
of the mine/UXO problem in
Cambodia and RCAF's contributions
to date, there is a strong argument to
continue their involvement in mine
and UXO clearance.
Though the use of national
military forces for demining purposes
is not unusual, their involvement in
human itarian and/or external ly
funded mine action activities is
presently contentious or an unpopular
option for some donors. As a
consequence of these sensitivities, the
Uni t ed Nations developed the
"United Nations Mine Action And
The Use Of The Militaries" policy.
This poli cy, which provides clear
guidelines on this issue, was approved
by the Inter-Agency Coordination
Group on Mine Action on 25 January
1999. For other reasons, the U.S.
assistance through both NADR
funding and SOCPAC will not be
through the RCAF, nor will training
activities engage RCAF members.
CMAC will remain the so le
governmental recipient of U.S.
assistance in the foreseeable future.

LAOS
The UXO and mine contamination in Laos led to a request for U.S.
assistance in early 1995. An assessment
team conducted a review of the Lao
situation and the National Security
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Council's Interagency Working Group
(IWG) approved U.S. assistance for a
comprehensive Ordnance Removal
and Community Awareness training
program in October 1995. The
partners in this endeavor with the U.S.
teams were the Ministry of Social
Welfare and U.N. Development
Program (UNDP).
Training of Lao humanitarian
deminers began in 1996 with a
clearance and awareness mission
coordinated by SOCPAC and the
United States. This helped to build
and establish the original training
center at Nam Souang. The Lao teams
assumed responsibility for their own
training in October 1999 after
certification and selection of trainers.
Over 104,000 items of ordnance have
been cleared since the creation of
UXO Lao and over 700 villages visited
with comprehensive mine risk
education messages.
Though U.S. military technical
assistance ended in 1999, UXO Lao
continues to train staff at the National
Training Center at Ban Ylai. Over
1,000 Lao nationals have graduated
with a variety of mine action skills.
UXO Lao is emerging from its
consolidation phase and is moving

into the sustai nm ent phase of its
growth as it seeks to reduce international support and become a fully
indigenous and sustainable operation.
In April of 2000, SOCPAC
conducted a technical assistance visit
to the national Training Center and
UXO Lao National headquarters.
Possible U.S. assistance in the future
will focus on training aids, explosives,
and some smal l unit leadership
tram mg.
Though the mine/UXO problem
in Laos is still large in comparison to
other countries in the region, the
political and security situation in the
country is stable enough for existing
programs to make a significant
difference in the coming years. A small
increase in Hmong rebel activity in the
north does not appea r to have a
landmine aspect to it and the teams
already trained are sufficient to engage
any further threat.

THAILAND
Though Thailand itself has not
been engaged in a major military
conflict for quite some time, the threat
of smaller cross-border insurgencies
and outside conflicts have resulted in
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Safety procedures
and st orage
requirements are
taught in the U.S.
training program.
c/oMAIC

a significant landmine problem for
Thailand along its borders with four
other neighbors. In 1998, a governmental survey indicated that
approximately 796 sq. km of land can
not be utilized in these border areas,
within which nearly 400,000 people
reside. Of these mined areas, 532 sq.
km are on the Thai-Cambodian
border, 124 sq. km are on the ThaiLao border, 53 sq. km are on the ThaiMyanmar border, and 87 sq. km are
on the Thai-Malaysian border.
The Lao border problem was
primarily the result of the Thai Army
conflict with the Thai Communist
Party that starred in 1964 with both
using landmines as a principle weapon
in a jungle war. The hostilities
concluded in 1989. The problem
along the Malaysian border was the
result of British/Malaysian military
fighting with the Communist Party of
Malaysia (CPM) from the early 1950s
through 1989. The military junta's
repression of minority groups in
Myanmar (Burma) have also led to
increased hostilities and defensive
actions along that border. The greatest
single use of APL and threat to
civi lians exists along the ThaiCambodian border. This legacy

remains from the Khmer Rouge and
other internal insurgencies.
From 1994-99, a total of 2,837
landmines were cleared and destroyed
by the Burapha Field Force in Sa Keao
province. Enhancing existing mine
detection dog (MDD) capacity at Pak
Chong by acquiring, training and
deploying 12 MDDs with handlers.
Four MDDs with handlers are
operational with Unit #1 and 10
additional dogs are undergoing
training at Pak Chong Military Dog
Center. The Asian Disaster
Preparedness Center (ADPC), an
international training center located
on the campus of the Asian Institute
ofTechnology in Bangkok, is working
in partnership with TMAC to increase
mine awareness in Thailand. ADPC
hosted a National Seminar on Mine
Action in December 1999 to
announce the launch of ADPC's
Landmine Awareness Program
(chaired by HRH Princess Galiyani)
to attendees, such as prominent
members of the Royal Thai
Government. As pan of the Landmine
Awareness Program, ADPC coordinates monthly mine awareness
seminars in Sa Keao province.
U.S. assistance began in 1999
with help in establishing a mine action
center in Ratchaburi and a community
mine awareness program centered in
Lop Buri. Several rotations of training
assistance began in August 1999, while
the seventh rotation of these teams
arrived in January 2001. To date, there
have been 300 deminers trained and a
cadre of the selected students assuming
instructor duties to support the live
mine clearance operations which
began in July 2000. It is anticipated
that sustainment rotations will begin
in 2002 with upgrade training and
component course training in specific
skills.

VIETNAM

Other Regional Concerns

Since the Vietnam War ended in
197 5, it is estimated by the
Vietnamese government and foreign
experts that more than 4,000
Vietnamese have been injured and at
least 500 killed in accidents involving
landmines and UXO. U.S. and U.N.
estimates put the number of mines in
Vietnam-a battlefield from rhe
1940s until the 1970s-ar 3.5 million.
The mine/UXO threat is varied
and many of the munitions are dated
and rusted-making many more
sensitive and more dangerous.
Vietnam itself produced as many as 18
types of AP mines in the past, mostly
as copies of U.S. or Eastern Bloc
mines. The only type known to have
been produced in the 1990s is the
"apple mine"- a recycled BLU-24
bomblet. A majority of the heavy
landmine and UXO threat is in and
around Quang Tri province in central
Vietnam
along the former
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between
north and south. Other heavily mined
areas were along rhe Sino-Vietnam
border. While China claims to have
cleared all of its mines from this area,
Vietnam says that it cleared more than
100,000 mines from the border
between 1992-97.
In July of 2000, an assessment
team briefed the U.S. Interagency
Working Group on the Vietnamese
request for U.S. assistance. As a result,
the IWG approved the inclusion of
Vietnam in the U.S. program. The
initial support package is anticipated
to support ongoing demining efforts
by providing equipment worth about
$1.7 million to help mine clearance
and mine action program management efforts. The Vietnamese have a
particular need for assistance with
demining and ordnance clearance in
shallow littoral areas, as well. The U.S.
assistance program is still under
formulation and will commence in the
summer of2001.

There are other landmine plagued
countries in Asia and the Pacific Rim.
At the top of most any list would be
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Philippines,
Korea, China, India, Pakistan and
Taiwan. Of course, there are very
specific guide! ines to be met and
procedures to be followed by a country
desiring to receive U.S. humanitarian
demining. In general, U.S. assistance
is predicated on (1) the host nation
submitting a formal request for
assistance through its U.S. Embassy,
(2) hostilities in the country having
ceased and a workable peace
agreement being in place, and (3) the
landmine hazards being clearly
present.
Not all countries that have
requested U.S. assistance have been
approved. Also, the demand for the
highly skilled Special Forces teams in
other areas around the globe is causing
a shortage of qualified trainers rhar
limits the availability of these teams.
In many cases, a periodic assessment
and support team visit, skills upgrade,
quality assurance review and analysis,
or other limited assistance may be all
that can be realistic for any given
request. The decision to support any
country with assistance rests with the
Interagency Working Group (IWG)
co-chaired by the U.S. Departments
of State and Defense.
Other countries in the Pacific also
have significant mine problems but are
either ineligible for U.S. assistance or
have not asked for assistance. In
Myanmar, 10 our of the 14 stares and
divisions are mined and had some
I ,500 landmine victims reported in
1999 alone. In the Karen state, it is
believed that one person is either
injured or killed by a landmine every
day. Information from within the
country is unreliable and what is
known comes from aid organizations
working along the Myanmar-Thailand
border. Myanmar also still manu-
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factures landmines th at are used
regularly by the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) to
fight the various armed resistance
groups barding with the mili ta ry
regime, including ethnic minority
groups from the Shan, Karen and
Karenni states in rhe east of M yanmar,
and Chin and Arakan stares in the
west. The two most common are
patterned after the Chinese Type 58
blast mine and Type 59 stake mine.
Another key Pacific country with
a significant landmine problem is Sri
Lanka. By the end of 1999, a small
U.N. demining ream in Jaffna
supported by the Australian and
Dutch governments had cleared about
68,500 sq. m of mined land, destroyed
577 APLs and unearthed 42
unexploded devices. Clashes with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) are increasing and ovenaking
land formerly held and controlled by
gove rnment forces. Meanwhile,
refugees' occupat ion of previously
mined areas is a major humanitarian
concern in a conflict that has killed
65,000 people since 1983. The LTTE
has become adept at using landmines
in addition to weaponry that is often
far more advanced and plentiful than
those used by government forces, as
evidenced by rhe their purchase of
SA14 m issiles from Bulgaria and 60
tons of high explosives from the
Ukraine. The consecutive losses of II
government camps in rhe Wanni in
November 1999 and Elephant Pass in

April 2000 demonstrated that this
conflict is likely to persist for some
ume.
A major new development in
June 2000 occurred with the report of
landmines in rhe Philippines. Guerilla
groups from the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the New
People's Army have been employing
landmines against government and
police forces, as have the bandit groups
from the smaller Abu Sayyaf who
kidnapped tourists in 2000. Of major
concern is rhar many of the radical
groups in the Philippines and
Indonesia may be developing
operational ties since a raid on a major
MILF base last July resulted in
Indonesian passports being discovered.
The national army appears to be fully
capable of meeting this threat and it
is not anticipated that the U.S.
government will become actively
engaged in assisting the Philippines in
the near furure. As bilateral military
exercises are conducted annually with
the Philippines, this threat is
recognized and dealt with to ensure
proper awareness and responses are
considered for the safety of all forces.
Ethnic unrest and uncertainty
must continually be watched as small
and poorly armed, bur devoted
insurgency groups seek to instill fear
and respect through the use of cheap
and easily manufactured weapons such
as APLs and other similar improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
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Police and Islamic activists with
homemade bombs clashed 111
Brahmanbaria, Bangladesh, on
February 6, killing six. A landmine
arrack in Kashmir, India, by the
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba militants killed two
soldiers on February 7. After a
relatively mine-free conflict in East
Timor, Indonesia, ended, the
government there now faces a growing
threat from others looking to follow
as the growing build up in West Papua
is being watched closely.
Finally, the Maoist insurgency has
been growing in Nepal. In September
2000, 14 policemen were killed when
the headquarters in the Dolpa district
were sieged. There were no reports of
APLs or IEDs being used in this
instance, bur the concern remains even
today.
As long as landmines and UXO
hamper post conflict reconstruction,
pose a significant threat to civilians
and cause imernal shifts in refugees in
Asia and the Pacific, there will be a
need for training assistance and
support that is ideally suited to the
skills, experiences and expertise of the
U.S. military units in the Pacific.
When it is called upon to provide this
assistance, SOCPAC will coordinate
and manage irs employment and
program content to ensure that the
highest quality training support and
assistance is given. The end result will
be a sustainable program and an able
host nation capability. •

A National Mine Action Institution

A National Mine Action Institution:
The Cambodian Mine Action Center
With peace and a new government in place in Cambodia, the country has turned
its attention to the debilitating mine situation. Leading these efforts is the
Cambodian Mine Action Center, an all-civilian national demining program.
by leng Mouly, Chairman,
Governing Council, CMAC

Background

C

ambodia is a country roughly
twice the size of Virginia. lt
shares borders with Thailand
to the northwest, the Lao People's
Democratic Republic to the north,
Vietnam to the southeast and the Gulf
of Thailand to the southwesr. The
country was plunged into a long
period of war and political uncertainty
when in March 1970 former Head of
State Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown. Following a five-year struggle,
in April1975, the communist Khmer
Rouge regime captured Phnom Penh,
the capital city. It ordered the
evacuation of all cities and towns.
Over I million displaced people died
from summary execution or forced
•

labor. In 1978 , Vietnamese troops
invaded Cambodia, inciting war. The
Vietnamese drove the Khmer Rouge
to the Thai border and installed a new
regime in January 1979 that touched
off 13 years of fighting. The "Paris
Peace Agreement" signed in October
1991 put an end to the conflict,
though the Khmer Rouge remained an
obstacle to the security, peace and
stability of th e country until its
downfall in 1998.
Cambodia has only recently
emerged from decades of conflictconflict that displaced millions of its
people and destroyed much of the
country's infrastructure. T he battles
that ravaged most of the country have
left Cambodia with a menacing legacy
of modern warfare: landmines and
UXO. These explosive devices,
particularly AP mines, are strewn
throughout the country.

Mud from heavy
rains can limit
transportation and
wash landmines
out of mine fields
and into the paths
of civilians.
c/oCMAC
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Landmine casualties are a fact of
life in Cambodia. More than 40,000
mine victims are struggling to survive,
many having paid the price of lost
limbs. Many are blind. About the same
number of victims have been killed by
landmines. More than 2,900 square
kilometers of the country are infested
by landmines, which continue to kill
and maim the innocent population. At
present, the full extent of the mine
problem is not accurately known.
However, current estimates approximate the landmine contamination to
number from 4 million to 6 million
landmines. During periods of conflict,
the military used landmines for
defensive purposes and civilians used
them to protect their private property.
The use of landmines was generally
widespread and no records were kept,
making the identification of mine
fields difficult.
In the ea rly stages of the
Cambodian mine action program, the
information about the quantity of
landmines and the location of mine
fields was obtained through interviews
with the local population, as well as
with former soldiers. The task of
determining the location and number
of landmines effecting Cambodia's
borders and fields was an uncertain
and daunting one for mine action
proponents. It was in this climate of
uncertainty that the Cambodian Mine
Action Center (CMAC) was created
under th e auspices of the U.N.
Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC). In Annex 1 of the Paris
Peace Agreement, one of the UNTAC

mandates called for assistance in
clearing mines, undertaking training
programs in mine clearance and a
mine awareness program to help
educate the Cambodian people. The
mission of CMAC was to achieve an
atmosphere in Cambodia where
people are free of the threat of mines
and UXO, thus allowing reconstruction and development activities to take
place in a safe environment. In this
respect, CMAC has defined and
executed four main programs: mine
awareness, mine field information,
mine and UXO clearance and training
in mine clearance. These programs
were carried out according to welldefined priorities. The highest priority
concerned humanitarian purposesthe resettlement of displaced persons.
The second concerned economic
purposes, including the expansion of
agriculture, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development projects.
The disintegration of the Khmer
Rouge's political and military powers,
and the subsequent formation ofa new
government after the general election
in 1998, created a political stability
that aids Cambodia's continued social
and economic development. In this
new era of peace, the Cambodian

•

CMAC official marks a mine field.
c!oCMAC

national mine action program is
becoming part of th e national
development plan. The result is a
national mine action program that will
grow as a function of social and
economic aspects that are being
assessed in the National Level One
Survey. This survey rook place last
year, with the generous support of
Canada. In 200 1, Cambodia will gain
a clearer picture of the social and
economic impact of landmines. On
the other hand, the planning process
and the priorities of the mine action
program are worked out in close
cooperation with other stakeholders in
development fields. Mine action in
Cambodia is no longer an isolated
operation. The benefits of mine action
in the realms ofcasualty reduction and
land use, as well as in socioeconomic
impacts on vulnerable factions of the
general population will be more
accurately measured in the future.

of 600 casualties in 1992. This • CMAC deminers
mark a portion of
reduction in casualties is the mine
the lush, but mineaction program's top accomplishment
filled Cambodian
as Cambodia emerges from the
countryside.
turmoil of a long armed conflict.
c/oCMAC

CMAC Achievement

Challenges and the Reform
Process

Since its inception, CMAC has
been a center of joint efforts between
the Cambodian people and the
international community to fight
against landmines. Thanks to many
generous contributions, the expertise
of the donor community and the
regular assistance of the Royal
Government of Cambodia, CMAC
has become a model of a successful
national demining program. At the
end of 1998, CMAC employed a
workforce of n early 3,000 wellqualified Cambodian deminers and
had formed an importan t national
landmine database- a precious
demining asset for the country.
Until 1999, the mine action
program worked to reduce the rate of
casualties. The latest report presented
by the Cambodia Mine Incidents
Database Project indicated a total of
60 casualties for November 2000,
compared with the monthly average

The rapid growth of CMAC
caused some difficulties. In 1999, the
organization was plagued by constanr
mismanagement. This led CMAC to
engage in an important reform process
in order to regain the confidence of
both donors and the Cambodian
government. The strategy for reform
cons isted of: 1. Change where
necessary and appropriate in order tO
increase the overall transparency,
efficiency,
effectiveness
and
productivity in humanitarian mine
action. 2. Retention of the many
positive elements ofCMAC that have
been dev eloped in the past. 3.
Emphasis of CMAC's core values of
safety, cost effectiveness, honesty and
integrity, appropriate technology, and
expertise.
T he result of CMAC's reform
process is a mission that is unwavering
in its efforts to save lives and support
development for Cambodia. However,
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A National Mine Action Institution

due to serious financial difficulties,
CMAC is not yet ab le to totally
complete the reform process. In the
meantime, a review mission and an
socioeconomic evaluation of CMAC
have been commissioned and assigned
by UNDP in order to assess the
structural reform and the socioeconomic com ponent of CMAC.
UNDP believes that CMAC's service
delivery and regulatory responsibilities
must be separated. There is a general
and commonly held assumption that
the current CMAC mandate is too
broad "to be everything to everybody"-national planning and coordination body, major provider of mine
and UXO clearing services, provider
ofsurvey and mine awareness, national
technical training center, and research
and development institute. As a result,
there is a consensus of opinion that
CMAC should focus on quality of
work over quantity of roles.

dissemination of mine action
information; and status as a focal point
for the implementation of the national
law. CMAA is not yet fully operational
as its stakeho lders' roles and
responsibilities in mine action are
being considered.
In the current refo rm process,
CMAC is prepared to transform itself
into a national mine action service
provider. The center will retain its
special status as a national institution
with a clear mission to implement the
four co re programs: mine awareness,
mine field information, training in
UXO and mine clearance.

A steering committee of donor
representatives was first established to
function as a review and advisory body
for the use of trust fund resources. The
committee convenes every six months
to review progress reports, work plans,
and consider new policy and
operational recommendations. Until
the end of 1998, the level of donor
funding was approximately $12
million (U.S.) per year. Given the
current state of Cambodia's economy,
donors are requested to maintain the
same level of funding for five to 10
years. It is suggested that long-term
commitments will help long term

CMAC: Mine Action Service
Provider and CMAA:Mine Action
Regulator
In September 2000, the
Cambodian government established a
new mine action authority called the
Cambodian Mine Action Authority
(CMAA). The new authority will rake
over from CMAC rhe responsibilities
of national planning, coordinating,
and monitoring of mine action in
Cambodia.
In addition, the authority will
undertake the following tasks:
accreditation and licensing of mine
action operators (principally those
involved in mine and UXO clearance);
advocacy work in relation to the
elimination of landmine stockpiles,
usage and reporting as required by
Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention;
development of national standards
(incl uding survey, clearance, EOD and
mine awareness); maintenance of a
national mine action database and

•

Children play perilously close to a mine field. c/o CMAC

Conditions
Conducive
Successful Mine Action

to

From lessons learned tn
Cambodia and other mine action
programs, there are rwo main factors
chat influence the establishment of a
mine action program: donors and the
government. Without the two, mine
action cannot be carried out successfully. For more than seven years,
donors have played a vital role in the
development of CMAC. They are
welcome to oversee the management
of their contributions within CMAC.
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planning. CMAC welcomes all
support (financial, equipment and
technical) from donor communities,
NGOs or private agencies either
through UNDP General Trust Fund,
UNDP Earmarked Trust Fund,
Project Management Unit (PMU), in
kind donations, or by contractual
arrangements.
In 1999, CMAC received
$8,594,491, of which $7,989,086
came from the UNDP Trust Fund. In
2QOO, CMAC received only
$6,298,000. The recently reconfirmed
and renewed commitment of donors

to maintaining capacity building and
financial support to CMAC is widely
considered by all deminers as a sign of
optimism and hope. The overall commitment of about $5 million to the
General Trust Fund for 2001 is a
positive outreach. Unfortunately, it
was still necessary and very painful for
CMAC to reduce irs staff by 1,937
people as of Nov. 13, 2000.
The Cam bodian government
exerts great influence on the mine
action program. CMAC needs
government support not only in terms
of financial co ntributions bur also for
political, diplomatic and legal support.
In 2000, CMAC received $700,000
from irs government. At the national
symposium on mine action in Phnom
Penh on Sept. 16, 2000, the prime
minister announced char the
government's financial contribution to
mine action for 2001 would be
approximately $780,000. CMAC has
also been aided in its mine action
efforts by Their Majesties the King and
Queen, the Natio nal Assembly, the
Senate, the Civil Administration, the
Royal Armed Forces, the National
Police and the general public .
However, since external donor funding
will likely diminish in years to come,
the government must be prepared to
increase its financial contributions to
C MAC. From CMAC to the
Cambodian government and donors,
the conditions most conducive to a
successful mine action program are
based on trust, understanding and
transparency.

Donor Community and Mine
Action Funding in Cambodia
When UNTAC withdrew from
C ambodia in 1993, the U.N.
D evelopment Program (UNDP) and
the U.N. Department for Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) jointly
launched a project entitled "Assistance
to Demining in Cambodia." The

•

project was funded by the UNDP
Trust Fund, which was established for
this purpose. The initial phase of the
projecr (Phase I) consisted of two
major components, both executed by
the U.N. Office for Project Service
(UNOPS). The first component
assured the administration of an international trust fund and provided the
framework through which donors
could contribu te military technical
advisors to assist CMAC in meeting
its operational objectives. The second
component was financed from UNDP
core funds. It provided technical
assistance to CMAC to allow it to run
as an efficien t and autonomous
national organization. The initial twoyear project, running from 1994-96,
was followed by a second two-year
phase of support (Phase II: 1996-98)
and by a third two-year phase of
assistance (Phase III: 1998-2000).
Leading up to 2000, CMAC
received $57.06 million from the U.N.
Trust Fund. The major donors
included Australia ($ 10.49 million),
the Netherlands ($9.36 million),
Sweden ($8.02 million) and Japan
($7.8 million). Other donors
inc! ud ed : Belgi urn,
Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Holy See, Norway,
New Zealand, South Korea,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
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the United States. In 2001, through
an UNDP earmarked rrust fund,
France will finance the demining of
an archeological site.
Australia is the biggest
contributor to the trust fund. In May
2000, former Australian Ambassador
Malcolm Leader made public that
CMAC has gone a long way to meet
the criteria for reform as set by donors
and that Australia wants CMAC to
continue as an organization. He said
Australia has faith in CMAC and
believes it has the capacity to perform
irs mine clearance activities.
The
current
Australian
Ambassador Louise Hand told a
national symposium on mine action
in September 2000, on behalf of the
donor community, that Cambodia is
a leader in the preparation of a vision
that aims to move mine action in this
country beyond an emergency or high
capacity phase and into a longer term
and ultimately sustainable development phase.
The Cambodian government has
also contributed financially to CMAC
through the trust fund. However, an
agreement between UNDP and the
government put this contribution into
a "sub-trust fund" titled the "Royal
Government of Cambodia's Contribution to the Governing Council and

Cattle graze
beside a marked
minefieid.
c/oCMAC

Returning Life to Field and Forest
Rouge regime, the safety improvements of the late-1990s and early-21"
century are symbols of significant
advancement. The hope for future
improvements in the realms of mine
clearance, safety and program management will lie in the alliance of government agencies and NGOs, alike.
CMAC and various NGOs have laid
the foundation for continued success
and improvement. The key now will
be the integration of the CMAA into
demining activities and the continued
support of donors-small feats when
one considers how far Cambodia has
come in the past 10 years. •

•

Continued
su pport is needed
for demining
efforts.
c/oCMAC

CMAC." The rules and procedures
governing this sub-trust fund are quite
different from those of the UNDP
Trust Fund. It is important to note
that Cambodia is the only country in
the world that has made a financial
contribution to the U.N. Trust Fund
under the custody of UNDP to
support its own mine action.
Aside from the trust fund, other
contributors to CMAC included the
European Union (EU), Germany,
UNHCR, UNICEF, CARE/UNDP,
NPA and some private donors. In
April 2000, a program initiated by the
U.N. Association-USA was introduced to Cambodia. Since the
beginning of the program, the United
States has a lso provided in-kind
donations to CMAC.

start of the mine action program. NPA
provided support for resettlement,
rehabilitation and commun ity
integration. Handicap International
(HI) provided support to landmine
victims with disabilities, the social
rehabilitation in provinces, and
capacity building of disabled people
to the Cambodian Red Cross's
database of mine victims. Other
NGOs included Jesuit Service
Cambodia, Marynoll and the
Cambodian Red Cross. Cambodia is
grateful to all governments and NGOs
that have aided its mine action efforts.
However, in order to attain a state of
zero victims and work towards the
eradication of landmines throughout
the country, Cambodia needs
additional external support.

Other Mine Action Operators in
Cambodia

Conclusion

NGOs have also combined efforts
with CMAC. Halo Trust and Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) are two
British NGOs who were actively
involved in mine clearance since the

The horrid legacy of landmines
and UXO in Cambodia will be
apparent for years to come as casualties
continue to mar daily life. Yet, in a
land hindered by years of political and
social instability under the Khmer
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Ieng Mouly is chairman of the
Governing Council of CMAC and
demining advisor to the Royal
Government of Cambodia. He served
as minister of information and
member of the National Assembly
from 1993 to 1998.
Contact Information

[eng Mouly
Office of the Governing Council of
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21A St. 302, Boeng Keng Kan 1,
Khand Chamcar Mon
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855) 23 218492
Fax: (855) 23 218493
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Returning Life to Field and Forest:
Mine Clearance by Villagers in Cambodia
Despite the dangers, villagers often resort to clearing mine fields, especially when
the use of valuable agricultural lands is at stake. This practice is a common topic
for discussion in the demining community, although it is far from being resolved.
Introduction

By Ruth Bottomley, Research Coordinator, Spontaneous
Demining Initiatives Study, Handicap International

P

rak Vann lives with his wife and young son at the
edge of Sung One village in Samlot district,
Battambang province, a former Khmer Rouge area
in the northwest of Cambodia. Their wood and bamboo
house sits on an 80 by 30 m plot ofland provided by authorities. Assorted vegetables and fruit grow in the fertile soil.
However, before Vann and his wife could begin to grow
their crops or build their house, he had to clear the land of
mines. It took him three months to clear away PMD-6
and M-14 mines using simple farming tools, such as a hoe
and a knife. He also cleared the mines from the land where
his mother-in-law now lives across the road. Vann has never
been trained in mine clearance, although he served as a
soldier with the Khmer Rouge for over 10 years, during
which time he was assigned to lay and clear mines. He
learned on the job. His left leg is amputated below the
knee from a mine injury obtained during the war.
Vann's story is not unusual in Cambodia. Almost 30
years of conflict and insecurity have left Cambodia with a
legacy of landmines and UXO throughout much of the
countryside. The heaviest concentration of mined land is
located in the north and northwest provinces along the
Thai-Cambodian border where most of the fighting
occurred. The provinces of Battambang and Banteay
Meanchey are considered to be the most severely affected.
Since the 1993 elections in Cambodia, mine clearance
has been undertaken by U .N. organizations, the
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), the military
engineers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and
NGOs. However, these organized demining operations in
Cambodia have not been able to keep pace with the need
for land (Roberrs & Williams, 1995: 144), and relatively
large sections of the population continue to live in areas
affected by mines and UXO. The response of these
communities has been ro try to deal with the problem as
best they can. One of the results of this response has been
the occurrence of mine clearance activities by villagers
themselves, a phenomenon that has been noted and
documented to a limited extent since the early 1990s.

•

Village deminer holding a PMN-2 mine that he recently cleared from
a path while harvesting bamboo. c/o HI-Belgium/Ruth Bottomley
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Informing the Debate
The fact that villagers are known to be involved in
mine clearance activities has led to considerable debate
among mine action practitioners in Cambodia as to how
this issue should be addressed. Some argue that since this
type of informal demining will occur regardless of the
opinion of professional deminers, it would be better to
give the village deminers training and equipment in order
to minimize risk. Others believe that such programs would
sanction activities that would not only be a risk to the village
deminers, bur would also be a risk to villagers who attempt
to use the unsystematically cleared land (Roberts &
Williams, 1995:145).
The 1999 Landmine Monitor Report provided
astounding figures regarding mine clearance activities by
villagers, drawn from the CMAC database. As of August
14, 1988, out of the total of 88,710,000 sq. m of land
cleared by the different operators, lo cal people were
reported to have cleared approximately 79 percent
(Landmine Monitor Report, 1999:402). This report was
supplemented with figures from the Cambodian Mine
Victim Information System, which was recording high
casualty figures resulting from tampering with mines and
UXO. The combined findings suggested that mine
clearance by villagers, regardless of the initial debate, was
continuing on a relatively large scale throughout Cambodia.
Since the early 1990s, Handicap International (HI)
has been concerned about the practice of mine clearance
by villagers and has been eager to learn about the issue in
order ro assess the viable solutions. HI stepped in to
instigate a six-month research project to investigate the
occurrence of mine clearance activities by vi llagers, or
"Spontaneous Demining Initiatives." The research, which
was conducted from July to December 2000, focused on
the heavily mine-affected provinces in the northwest of
Cambodia. The research aimed to assess the scope of mine
clearance activities by villagers in Cambodia, the social and
economic motivations that encourage the activity, the tools
and techniques used and the quality and risk of the work.
In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted by
the research team in the provinces ofBattambang, Banteay
Meanchey and Krong Pailin. Out of 45 villages, 94 village
deminers were interviewed. Other key informants included
village authorities, families of village deminers and general
villagers. Although such small-scale, in-depth research does
not allow for extrapolation beyond the sites surveyed, it
does give an accurate picture of the affected area and allows
for common trends to be drawn out of the case studies. To
provide a complement and cross-check to the qualitative
data collected th rough the in-depth interviews, a
questionnaire was also devised and sent out to 12 provinces
• 14.

with assistance from the Cambodian Red C ro ss data
gatherers.
No easy or straightforward answers to the issue of mine
clearance by villagers emerge from the research, and it is
likely that the subject will continue to be horly debated by
those involved in the mine action sector. However, by
allowing for a better understanding of mine clearance
activities by villagers, the research findings may encourage
a review of ex isting assumptions held by mine action
practitioners and instigate renewed consideration of the
subject.
Demining for Survival
Village mine clearance activities are generally rational
activities driven by livelihood needs. The extent of village
demining activities largely depends on the availability of
mine-free resources, alternative income-generation activities
and, increasingly, alternative mine clearance capacity.
Villager livelihoods in rural Cambodia depend on
agriculture, which is supplemented by secondary activities
such as fishing or the collection of forest products, including
bamboo, thatch, vines and vegetables. Mines often affect
the villagers' access to these very resources. In most
households in the northwest it is common for at least one
member to be involved to some degree in an activity in a
suspected mined area simply because there are few
alternative ways to make a living. The vulnerability of
people living in the northwest of Cambodia is increased
because of the effects oflong-term insecurity in the recent
past. A large proportion of the population has been
transitory due to the ongoing conflict, either as refugee
populations, internally displaced persons or as military
populations. They have few, if any, existing resources or
support systems to draw on. The high population density
in these border areas and the shortage of mine-free land,
exacerbated by the increasing incidence of land grabbing
by powerful people, means that many of these former
transient populations are now seeding in areas that contain
landmines.
Alternative income-generation activities may help
reduce community reliance on mine-affected resources.
Some villagers living close to the Thai-Cambodian border
have been drawn to this area for the very reason that
alternative income-generation activities are possible, and
many have been able to work as itinerant laborers in
Thailand. However, such work is notoriously high-risk and
insecure. Many have spent time in Thai prisons, and at
other times border crossings are closed, cutting people off
from this additional source of income and forcing them to
turn to collection and foraging activities in mined areas.
Mine clearance activities by villagers in the northwest

are ultimately a strategic response to these environmental
and economic conditions by a section of the population
that has the ability to draw on existing knowledge and skills.
The majority of village deminers are demobilized soldiers
who learned the rudiments of mine clearance or mine
breaching and defense tactics during their military service.
However, there are also villagers who have no military
background bur will move mines out of their way.
Demining is a necessary activity enabling villagers to
support their families, often through the clearance or
extension of farming land. It is also common for mines to
be cleared on paths to common property resources such as
forests, grazing lands and water sources, as these resources
are often vital for subsistence livelihoods, particularly
during lean periods when rice supplies are at their lowest.
According ro rhe findings of the research, village deminers
generally clear mines for personal livelihood needs rather
than as a means for alternative income. Relatively few village
deminers were employed to clear mines from the land of
other people, and fewer still were involved in the sale of
mine or UXO parts for scrap metal or other uses.
Priorities and Choice
Villagers often claim that they have to clear mines
because they cannot wait for the min e clearance
organizations to clear their land for them. T he resources
and capacity of organized mine clearance activities in
Cambodia means that it is, and will remain, impossible
for mine clearance professionals to respond to all the needs
of rural villagers living in mined areas. Villagers may have
to resort to clearing mines because they need to access land
and resources in order to support their families. Limited
alternative livelihood options present a decision over which
they feel they have little choice. As the wife of a village
deminer in Battambang province explained, "Today my
family earns a living by doing farming. As far as risk is
concerned, I think it is very dangerous for a man to work
as a village deminer. But if my husband does not clear
mines, my family will have no rice fields and we wi ll have
no way to make money to support the family." In terms of
access to resources, families who have a household member
capable of carrying out demining activities are perhaps at
an advantage to those families who do not have this ability
Village demining may still exist even where mine
clearance is operating because rhe prioritization of the
organized mine clearance does nor march the priorities or
expectations of the villagers. Clearance organization
priorities include land for settlement and agriculture, but
such is the extent of the demand that it cannot be
realistically met. Often the village land that is cleared by
mine clearance organizations is neutral community land

such as roads, school fields, watarams (land for the village
temple) or land around pump wells. Although these areas
are perceived useful as a whole to villagers, they do nor
respond to their individual livelihood requirements. Village
deminers are able to clear agricultural land for their own
individual needs and often help remove mines for others
who want to access land for farming. Village deminers also
clear land to access secondary resources or marginal lands,
such as forests, bamboo groves or grazing lands, that are
often viral to village subsistence livelihoods. Such areas are
notoriously difficult to access by demining reams and are
considered a lower priority in terms of cost effectiveness.
Similarly, mine awareness education often fails to
address the underlying livelihood needs that drive people
to clear mines by themselves. As Eaton, era! (1997:14)
argue, if it is the very means of survival that are affected by
mines "it is not tenable to assume that affected communities
can be cautioned of the dangers and asked to await the
arrival of mine clearance teams some subsequent years
hence." Although mine awareness education can help
promote safer behavior, it can never prevent villagers from
entering s uspect areas or from conducting high-risk
demining activities if mines continue to be an impediment
to their daily living. As a village deminer in Banteay
Meanchey explained, "I participated in mine awareness
education conducted by the organization. This has made
me sca red of digging the land and hitting mines
accidentally. I also don't know where the mines are deep in
the ground. However, I have no choice but to demine the
land."

•

A field "demined" and cultivated by a villager before official
mine clearance, Banteay Meanchey province.
c/o HI-Belgium/Ruth Bottomley
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•

Village deminer
demonstrating
how he dismantles
and neutralizes a
Type 72A mine,
Battambang
province.
c/o Hi-Belgium/
Ruth Bottomley

The Safety Question

Humanitarian mine clearance organizations operating
in Cambodia admit that they are unable to respond to the
needs of all the people living in mine-contaminated areas.
Villagers and local authorities often commemed that they
felt village deminers help make the village a safer place
because they removed mines from their own land, public
paths and tracks and assist other villagers, thus reducing
the risk of accidents.
However, in terms of Western standards of
humanitarian mine clearance, village mine clearance is a
hazardous, high-risk and inadequate practice. Village mine
clearance practices differ from professional demining
practices in several pronounced ways. The most obvious
difference is in terms of experience and training. Although
the villagers may have years of military experience and
knowledge regarding local mine deployment, most village
deminers lack professional mine clearance training. This is
reflected in their clearance methods, which, without doubt,
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place the village deminer in situations of much higher risk
than their professional counterparts would ever experience.
Unlike professional deminers, villagers generally clear
the land where they suspect mines are presem. Their mine
location knowledge is based on visible mines, military
experience or simply from observing accidents. In contrast
to professional humanitarian mine clearance, which
measures activiry in terms of area cleared with as close to
100 percent safety as possible, the work of the village
deminer is guided by a targeted approach with a higher
mines-to-area ratio. Because access to resources takes
prioriry over complete safery of land, relatively large areas
of land will go unchecked by village deminers.
Professional deminers do not touch the mines if at all
possible and prefer in-situ destruction. Village deminers
tend ro remove the mines from the ground using their
hands. Their mos t common method of mine disposal
involves burning the mine with firewood, although a large
number of village deminers interviewed during the research
said that they first neutralize the mines by dismantling
them. They said that this helped make the mines easier ro
handle and reduced the impact of the explosion when the
mines were burned.
However, it should also be recognized that, despite
conducting a high-risk activity, the majority of village
deminers do attempt ro practice a certain degree of selfregulation to reduce the likelihood of injury both to
themselves and to others. Village deminers frequently said
that they would not clear mines if they were drunk or felt
ill, and that they only clear devices they recognize and know
they can dismantle and burn. If they are unable to remove
or dismantle the mines, either because they are unfamiliar
devices or the pans are rusry and unstable, they tend ro
burn them in-situ. Village deminers usually clear alone to
prevent the risk of injury to other people and to avoid
distractions, and cleared mines are frequently burned in
the evening when other villagers have returned home. Such
practices are still far from the international safery standards
recognized for mine clearance and the risk undertaken by
the village deminers remains high.
Most village deminers are under no delusion that the
land they clear is 100 percent safe. Both they and other
villagers realize that using the eye or a hoe to detect mines
leaves mines in the ground. This realization is perhaps an
important one in terms of accident reduction. People are
still wary on land that has been demined by villagers, bur
the only way ro test the safery of their land is ro use it.
After clearance, in general, villagers will initially cultivate
their fields with spades, as it allows for more careful work.
If no mines are found in consequent years, they will begin
ro use cattle or even a rracror ro cultivate their land .

An awareness of mine clearance risks is also reflected
by some village de miners who have attempted to adopt
safer behavior in recent years. Several vi llage deminers said
that once they had cleared mines they would keep them
for professional deminers to destroy rather than dismantling
and burning them. Although village deminers realize they
put themselves at risk, they feel they are more likely to be
injured by unknowingly steppi ng on a mine tha n by
demining. T he paradox of th is is that in order ro clear
mines, the village deminer has to enter suspected mined
areas, rhus increasing their likelihood ofstepping on a mine.
Mine clearance is a coping strategy, but due ro the
high risk involved, most village deminers would prefer to
srop clearing mines and have mine clearance organizatio ns
clear the land for them. A village d emi ner in Banteay

wider coping strategies of comm unit ies. V illage mine
clearance appears to highligh t several inadequacies of
professional demin ing in response to local-level priorities
and need . T he questio n is, how can these needs be met more
effectively and promptly? More effective collaboration with
ongoing community development initiatives could alleviate
some of rhe econ omic and livelihood pressures forci ng
villagers into high-risk activities. At the same time, should
it not be considered that the risks that are inevitably taken
by these village deminers could be lessened through the
promotion of safer practice? If the capacity of professional
m ine clearance is really such that the needs of those living
in mined areas cannot be mer, it is inevitable that village
mine clearance will continue. •

~~village

deminers frequently said that they would not clear mines if they
were drunk or felt iLL, and that they only clear devices they recognize and
know they can dismantle and burn."
Meanchey province said , "I think that in the future I will
get injured or killed and so now I srop demining and leave
this work for rhe organization. Ifl continue ro clear mines
using only a hoe, I cannot escape from injury. Anyway,
now I have enough land to provide for my family."

*The information presented in this paper draws on the findings of
the Handicap International Research Study on Spontaneous
Demining Initiatives. However, the opinions expressed in the text
are the sole responsibility ofthe author.
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Conclusion

As stated earlier, there is no template answer to the
question of village r demining act ivities. M ine acti on
practitioners will continue to d ispute the pros and cons of
self-demining activities by villagers, but so long as vill agers
need to access resources and land and they have the basic
knowledge and courage to carry out the activiry, village
demining will continue. The realiry faced by villagers living
with mines every day perhaps needs to counter the moral
arguments of mine action in regards to the safety of the
practice. T he real issue is not one of village deminers versus
professional deminers, but one of the need to free minecontaminated land and resources fo r local community use.
Perhaps it is rime for the mine action co mmu nity to
reassess the situatio n and learn from the village deminers'
experiences, reasons for demining and needs. T he actions
of village deminers need to be seen as ind icative of the

Rurh Borro mley
Research Coordinaror, Spontaneous Demining Initiatives
Handicap International
P.O. Box 838, # 18, Sr. 400, Boeung Keng Kang 1
Chamcar Morn, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: 023.2 17.300 I 023.982.81 1
Fax: 023.2 16.270
E-mail: rurh@bigpond.com.kh
hi.mines@bigpond.com.kh
Bernard Hacourr
H andicap Internatio nal Belgium
67 Rue de Spa
B- 1000 Brussels
Tel: +32 (0) 2280 1601
E-mail: bernard.hacourr@handicap.be
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Mine/UXO Casualties
and Casualty Surveillance in Cambodia
Handicap International's Reuben McCarthy details the combined efforts of HI,
the Cambodian Red Cross and UNICEF in Cambodia. Putting faces with statistics,
he gives the how, when and where of mine/UXO incidents in the country.

•

Landmine victims
in Au long Veng,
Cambodia.
c/oAP

by Reuben McCarthy,
Project Advisor, Handicap International, Belgium

Introduction

ver the last five years Handicap lmernational (HI)
and the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC), with the
technical support of UNICEF, have been involved
in the collection, storage and dissemination of information
related to the human casualties of mines and UXO in
Cambodia. The following paper provides the background
to the activity, its rationale and history, along with an
overview of mine/UXO casualties in Cambodia from 1998
to 1999. 1

O
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Mine/UXO Casualty Surveillance in Cambodia

In countries heavily contaminated with mines and
UXO, mine casualty data2 is seen as an essential element
for fund raising and the effective targeting and prioritization
of often limited resources, particularly in the areas of mine
awareness, mine clearance and victim assistance. Depending
on the scope of the information collected, mine casualty
data may also provide a useful baseline for monitoring the
aims and effectiveness of different components of such
projects, establish mechanisms for the direct advocacy of
mine affected communities, while providing valued support
to national and international efforrs to achieve a global
ban on the sale, use and stockpiling of landmines.

Mine casualty data gathering was
initiated in Cambodia by the Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) in 1994. In
early 1995, the Cambodian Mine
Action Centre (CMAC) began a pilot
project for casualty data gathering.
Following the pilot project, the activity
was outsourced by CMAC to CRC
and HI. The two agencies were
considered appropriate for the task in
view of their work with the survivors
of mine accidents, because of the
national coverage of the CRC and its
extensive network of volunteer health
workers, and due to HI's ongoing role
in mine action in Cambodia and
experi ence in the development of
indigenous organizations.
Starting in September 1995, HI
and the CRC took full responsibility
for the project on behalf of CMAC,
in four provinces of Cambodia. The
partnership involved CRC undertaking data gathering in provincial
locations and HI providing training
and technical support in the establishment of the data gathering system,
database and the tools for data analysis
and dissemination. Initially, the Hl/
CRC project was conducted in
coordination w ith MAG's project,
enabling coverage of a total of 11 of
the most mine-affected provinces in
Cambodia. In its formative stages,
casualty data gathering in Cambodia
co mprised both a community and
hospi tal level survey of accidents
taki ng place during and prior to 1997,
and ongoing surveillance of current
incidents.
From 1995 to 1997, data
gathering conducted by HI/CRC
focused on a village level survey to
provide comprehensive baseline data
on the number and circumstances
surrounding mine accidents in
Cambodia, from 197 9 to 1997.
During this period more than 35,000
casualty reports were completed by
HI!CRC in heavily mine-affected
provinces.3 At the same time, MAG
established a mine incident surveil-

lance system, which concentrated on commune, district and provincial
monitoring ongoing mine incidents. level, as reported by MAG, CMAC
The intention was to provide up-to- and the HALO Trust. Additionally,
dare data on incidents and casualties the results of HIICRC's national
and to facilitate the prioritization, survey of mine victims have enabled
planning and evaluation of mine the division of Cambodia into
related activities.
operationally high and low incident
It was perhaps a unique feature villages, districts, communes and
of casualty data gathering in provinces, according to the number of
Cambodia that it combined survey casualties recorded by the survey.
with surveillance. The combined data Finally, an analysis of the history of
sets enabled a comprehensive picture the conflict in Cambodia, and areas
of the circumstances of mine incidents known to have exper ienced large
and occurrences offatal and non-fatal amoums of armed conflict, influenced
injuries caused by mines and UXO the choice of sites.
Following the recommendations
throughout
Cam bodia.
The
documented history allowed patterns of a Mid- Term Review of MAG and
to be traced in the rate and type of HIICRC's projects by UNICEF4 in
mine injuries and established means early 1999, MAG began to transfer the
for advocating the interests of an responsibility of its project ro HI/CRC
enormous number of mine accident to enable greater standardization and
survivors. At the same time, the use of the CRC volumeer network in
surveillance of ongoing incidents data gathering. By November 1999,
enabled the effective prioritization of the transfer was complete, and HI/
mine action resources and established CRC was conducting data gathering
a baseline for measuring the in all of MAG's coverage areas, in
effectiveness of different aspects of addition ro nine other provinces and
mine action programs, on a month- municipalities, bringing the total
by-month basis. Nonetheless, the dual coverage, by December 2000, to 20
system had certain weaknesses, not the provinces and municipalities.
least being the lack of srandardization
fn all of its aspects and phases of
between the information collected and operation and development, mine
the techniques for prioritizing data casualty data gathering in Cambodia
gathering. By th e end of 1997, has as its cen tral motivation th e
however, most villages in heavily mine- facilitation of a reduction and,
affected areas had been visited by HI/ ultimately, cessation of mine and
CRC and a national data set of UXO related casualties, th rough the
historical mine incidents was mostly collection and dissemination of timely
finalized.
and useful data on mine casualties to
Subsequently, in 1998, HI/CRC mine action agencies. Moreover, a key
and MAG agreed on a common motivation of the project has been to
system of data gathering, which provide support to survivors of mine
focused on the surveillance of currem and UXO accidents by disseminating
or ongoing mine incidents and their information on the location and
human casualties. Both data sets were condition of survivors to victim
later merged into a single database, assistance agencies. Thus far, the
established and managed by HI/CRC, project has established an effective
and a standardized data gathering organization dedicated ro the advocacy
form was used by both agencies. of the interests of mine victims and
Priority areas for data gathering were, mine affected communities. To these
and remain largely, determined by the ends, information provided by rhe
degree of mine contamination at a project has facilitated:
• 19 •

• The discovery and location of new
or unknown mined areas through
the village level identification of
mine accident sites.
• The design of appropriate mine
awareness curricula through the
identification ofbehavior leading to
mine accidents and the types of
devices causing the incidems.
• The ability to better help determine
priorities for different mine action
program componems in different
locations (mine awareness, survey,
clearance, explosive ordnance
disposal).
• The monitoring and evaluation of
mine action acnvmes.
• Increased awareness of the mine/
UXO problem facing the Cambodian people, among the national and
international communities.
• Fundraising among mine action and
victim assistance agencies throughout Cambodia in the interests of
mine victims and mine affected
communities.
To date, the primary end users of
the data have been MAG and CMAC
in the development of their mine
action programs; the Cambodian
Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL)
and the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL); and
Geospatial International in support of
•

their National Level One Survey of the
Mine and UXO situation in
Ca mbodia. Along with agencies
involved in mine action, the project
has provided information support to
numerous agencies involved in mine
victim assistance.
From June to July 2000,
UNICEF supported an external
evaluation of the HI/CRC's project.
The evaluation focused on an analysis
of the stated objectives of the project
and the system of data gathering
employed. Overall, the recommendations were highly positive and will
serve to guide the development of the
project over rhe coming years. As of
January 2001, the project continued
to receive the technical and financial
support of UNICEF, and gained
additional financial support from the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
and the U.S. Department of Stare.

Mine/UXO
Casualties
Cambodia: 1998-99

in

Cambodia is one of the most
mine-affected coumries in the world,
both in terms of human casualties and
land lost due to landmine and UXO
contamination. Following nearly three
decades of war, the military situation
in Cambodia began to stabilize from

1997-1998, leading to an overall
reduction in the number of human
casualties caused by mines/UXO.
Despite this, mines and UXO remain
one of the foremost obstacles to
development and are a present threat
to the lives and livelihoods of the
people of Cambodia, particularly as
they enter areas previously inaccessible due to ongoing conflict.
The following section provides an
overview of the situation of mine
accidents in Cambodia from 1998 to
1999. Throughout this period, HI/
CRC utilized 25 full-time data
gathering staff and a coordinated
network of volunteers, who reported
incidents and casualties to the fullrime staff. In partnership with MAG
and with the technical assistance of
UNICEF, data gathering was undertaken in an array of community
senings, hospitals and physical
rehabilitation centers. Information
was gathered on the number, location
and circumstances of mine incidenrs
and casualties in Cambodia through
direct interviews with casualties, their
family members, witnesses to an
incident, local authorities, hospiral
staff or other secondary sources.

recorded in Cambodia, by HI/CRC
and MAG.
• Throughout this period, there was a
strong relationship between political
violence and the total number of
mine/UXO casualties. During
periods of civil war casualties
increase; during periods of relative
peace, casualties decrease.
• Since the emergence of relative peace
and stability in Cambodia from
1997 to 1999, mine/UXO related
casualties steadily diminished,
following a peak in 1996.
• From January 1998 to December
1999, a total of 2,690 people were
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Casualties in 1998-99 by Age and
Gender
• Of all casualties Ill 1998-99, 91
percent were males, while 9 percent
were females.
• Among children, as among adults,
males made up the majority of
casualties. Nonetheless, girls suffered
at a higher rate (as co mpared to
boys) than did women (as compared
co men). Nineteen percent of the
child casualties were girls. Among
adults, only 6 percem of recorded
casualties were women.
• In general, adults were killed or
injured four times as often as
children. Children (under 18 years
old)5 made up 20 percenr of all
casualties.
• Adult males, 18 to 40, suffered the
most from mines and UXO.
• However, the casualty rate among
children as a proportion of total
casualties actually increased.

Occupation

Overview of Casualties: 1979-98
From 1979 to 1999, a total of
41,993 mine/UXO casualties were

A young boy who
lost his leg to a
mine blast.
c/o ICRC/Tim
Mayer

reported to be casualties of mine/
UXO incidents in Cambodia. Of
these, 1,685 casualties were reported
in 1998, and 1,005 in 1999.
• In 1996, an average of 253
Cambod ians suffered mine
incidents per month. In 1997, the
rate of casualties decreased to 137 a
month; in 1998 a slight increase was
recorded and an average of 140
casualties per month were reported;
while in 1999 the average decreased
significa ntly to less than 84
casualties per month.

•

Kreng Liep holds a photo of her son
who was killed when he drove his ox
cart over an AT mine.
c/o UNA-USA Debra Boyle

• The decrease in mine/UXO related
casualties may be attributed to a
multitude of factors, but the
cessation of conflict in 1998, a
stabilized political situation, a more
settled population with an increased
knowledge about the location of
mined areas and the mine situation
in general, and increased clearance
activities all play an important part
in a reduction of accidents, though
no single faccor can or should be
attributed to the reduction.

• In both 1998 and 1999, more
civilians suffered from mines and
UXO than did members of the
military. The last year in which
military casualties outnumbered
civilian was 1996, and civilian
casualties as a proportion of total
casualties (civilian and military) are
increasing dramatically.
• In 1999, the gap between civilian
and military casualties widened
dramatically.
• Though civilians suffered co a greater
degree (in absolute numbers) than
members of rhe military, in relative
terms (as a fraction of the toral
exposed population), members of
the military remained at a far greater
risk of becoming a casualty of mines
or UXO than civilians, though their
accidents were not always associated
with military activities.

Table 1
Men
Children <18
Women
Unknown
Total

Casualties
2,020
536
128
6
2,690

Table 1. Total mine/UXO casualties: 7998-7 999.

Injuries
• From 1998-99, rhe majority of mine
and UXO related injuries were
wounds (minor and major), while
the second most frequent injury type
was the amputation of one or more
limbs. (see Table 2.)
• Both mines and UXO are more likely
to cause amputation and/or wounds
to lower limbs than to any other parr
of the body.
• From 1998- 99, 20 percent of all
casualties were reported as dying
from their injuries, while 80 percent
suffered non-fatal injuries. Death
was more common among elderly
adults (less than 40 years), than for
infants, children and younger adults.
• From 1979-99, 34 percent of
incidents resulted in death. Though
total incidents varied due to political
and military factors, the fraction of
incidents that resulted in death

Table 2
Injury Type
Cases 6
Wounds
1,597
Amputation
944
(one or more limbs)
Death
550
Burns
265
Blindness
165
Deafness
164
Paralysis
16
Total
3,701
Table 2.1njuries sustained: 7998-7 999
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%ofTotal
75%
20%
5%
0.002%
100%

TableS.

steadily declined over the e n tire
period.
• From 1998-99, casualties suffering
amputation or death by mine/UXO
were geographically concentrated in
the north, northwest and southeast
provinces of Cambodia, with little
variation between the two types of
casualty.

Table 5

Medical care

• The majority of mine/UXO
casualties had their injuries treated
either in a provincial or district level
hospital (see Table 3.).
• A significant minority of casualties
received no medical assistance at all ,
indicating very minor injuries or
death at the site of the incident o r
enroute to a medical facility.
• The majority of casualties received
first aid/care within thirty minutes
of suffering their accident.
• Casualties whose access to medical
facilities was between 30 minutes
and two hours were more likely to
suffer amputation than those had
access in less than 30 minutes.
• Of the 835 cases of amputation,
requiring some kind of orthopedic
d evice, a total of 449 prosthetic
devices were received by casualties.
Table3
Medical Assistance
Provincial Hospital
District Hospital
None
Unknown
Army Hospital
Self-treated
Other
Private Clinic
Commune
Health Centre
Traditional octor
Wat/monks
Total

Casualties

%ofTotal

828
593
383
384
190
104
89
59
51

32%
22%
14%
14%
7%
4%
3%
2%
2%

5
4
2,690

0.001 o/o
0.001 o/o
100%

Ta ble 3. Medical assistance received: 1998-1999.

Incident
associated
activities:
1998-1999.

•

The numb er is not, howeve r,
n ecessaril y a reflection of the
effectiveness or lack thereof of
orthopedic services in Cambodia,
because many casualties may not
have been ready to receive a device
at the time of their interview.
Cause of Injuries

Device
• In 1998 and 1999, 70 percent of all
incidents involved mines and 29
percent involved UXO. (see Table 4)
• Since 1994, in cidents involving
UX:O have increased as a proportion
of total incidents, w hile those
involving mines have decreased.
• C hildren were more likely to be
injured as a result ofUXO than adults.
• In 1998 and 1999, both mines and
UXO in cidents varied with the
season: wet season and dry season.
More casualties were repo rt ed
during th e dry seaso n as rural
Cambodians travel more and as they
seek alternative sources of income to
rice farming. Fewer casualties were
reported during the rice planting
and harves ting seaso ns , w hen
populations are less mobile.
• In periods of conflict, mine incidents
rise and UXO incidents decrease. In
per iods of relative peace, mine
• 22.

Activity

Casualties

%ofTotal

Tampering
Military activities
Traveling
Farming
Collecting wood
Collecting food
Herding
Fishing
Unknown
Other
Trading
Total

762
514
498
364
264
134
55
49
32
17
1

27%
19%
19%
14%
1Oo/o
5%
2%
2%
1%
1%
Oo/o

2,690

100%

Cheap Chea points to a landmine that
he found in his field.
c/o UNA-USA, Chim Sereivuth

Table4
Device
Mine

uxo
Unknown 7
Total

Casualties

%ofTot

1,885
768
37

70%
29%
1%

2,690

100%

Table 4. Casualty causing device: 7998-7999.

inciden ts decrease , while UXO
incidents tend to increase.
Activities Associated With Incidents

• In 1998 and 1999, the three most
important activities that led to mine
incidents were: 1) tampering, 2)
military activities, and 3) traveling
(see Table 5.).
• However, if all activities associated
with o ne's livel iho od are taken
together, livelihood is the most
common associated activity leading
to mine inci den ts, followed by
military and tampering.
• Tam p e ring incidents almost
exclusively involved UXO, while
incidents involving mines were more
often associated with livelihood
activities.

• Children were more likely to be
injured whi le tampering than were
adults. 1 Adults were more likely to
be injured while undertaking
military or livelihood activities than
were children.
• Both tampering and livelihood
activities followed the same pattern
in 1998 and in 1999: they fell during
the rice growing and harvest season
and peaked during the dry season.
• Military activities led to far fewer
total casualties in 1999 than in
1998. At the same time, inciden ts
involving the military followed the
same seasonal patterns as those

involving civilians, largely because of
the "dry season offensives"
conducted by the military.
Locations When Injured
• As in previous years, the majority of
mine and UXO casualties were
concentrated in the northwest of
Cambodia. This is particularly true
for military casualties, while civilian
casualties covered a grea ter geographic area.
• From 1998-99, a greater concentration of mine and UXO casualties
were recorded on the Tha i-

Cambodia border than were
reported in 1997. This is partly
explained by a greater capacity of the
project to collect data in these areas
in 1998 and 1999, following a
cessation of conflict.
• Mine incidents (excluding UXO) are
more concentrated in the northwest
than UXO in cidents (exclud ing
mines). UXO incidents are more
geographically sp read out and a
greater number of casualties
invo lved in UXO incidents were
recorded on the Vietnam-Cambodia
border than mines.
• In 1998-99, Bat Dambang province
contin ued to rank as the province
recording the highest number of
mine and UXO casualties (see Table
6.).
• In 1998-99, Samlout District, in Bat
Dambang province, recorded the
highest number of casualties.
However, if the number of casualties
is taken as a percentage of the total
population, Veal Veaeng District,
Pousat province, is the most affected
district.
• For the same period, Traeng
Commune in Bat Dambang
province recorded the highest
number of casualties. However, if
the number of casualties is taken as
a percentage of the rota! co mmune
population, Sala Krau Commune,

Table6
Rank

Province

Total
Casualties

Cum Total

%ofTotal

Cum%

1

Bat Dambang
Banteay Mean Chey
Otdar Mean Chey
Preah Vi hear
Siem Riep
Pousat
Kampong Thorn
Kampong Cham
Krong Pailin
Svay Rieng

790
405
331
281
169
149
126
107
97
49

790
11195
1,526
1,807
1,976
2,125
2,251
2,358
2,455
2,504

29.4%
15.1%
12.3%
10.4%
6.3%
5.5%
4.7%
4%
3.6%
1.8%

29%
44%
56%
66%
72%
78%
83%
87%
91 o/o
93%

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Table 6. Ten most affected
provinces for mine/UXO
casualties: 1998- 1999.

Krong Pailin province, is the most
affected commune.
• From1998 to 1999, Ampil Village,
in Bavel District, Bat Dambang
province, recorded th e highest
number of c.'lsualties with incidents
raking place in villages.

Reuben McCarthy
Project Advisor
Handicap International
P.O Box 838
18 rue 400
BoengKeng Kang 1
Chamcar Morn
Pnom Penh Cambodia
Tel: 001-23-217-300
Fax: 001-23-216-270
Email: hi.mines@bigpond.com.kh

Terrain Type(1998-99)
• The overwhelming majority of mine
and UXO incidents (72 percent)
occurred in three types of terrain:
forests, villages and fields (see Table
7).
• Incidents raking place in fields are
seasonally based and occur more
frequently in the wet season, while
incidents occurring in forests occur
more freq uently in the dry season.
Incidents occurring in villages, on
paths and roads, or near rivers do not
demonstrate any major seasonal
vanattons.

Table 7
Area Type
Forest
Village
Field
Path/road
Near river
Mountain
Near milit ary
base
No answer
Oth er
Overgrow n area
Total

Casualties

%ofTotal

999
573
363
287
183
118
108

38%
21o/o
13%
11o/o
7%
4%
4%

43
10
6

2%
Oo/o
Oo/o

2,690

100%

Table ?.Incident
location by terrain
type: 1998-1999.

• Th e majority of incidents (35
percent) rook place within five
kilometers of village centers.
• For the same period, 39 percent of
all casualties were reported to have
visited the site of their accident often,
prior to the incident taking place.

Excerpts obtained from rhe report Mine &
UX O Casrlfl!ties in Cambodia: 1998-1999 ;

1

Contact Information

•

C am bodia Mine/UXO Vic tim Info rmation
System (ne. Mine Incident D atabase Project),
September 2000.
2 Un less o therwise specified, where rhe term
"m ine victim/casualty" is used alone it is taken
to include UXO casualties.
3 By September 2000 rhe number of casualty
reports reached in excess of 45,000.
4 Ar rhe rime U N ICEF was providing financial
and technical assistance for borh MAG and HI/
C RC. In 1999, Hl/CRC received additional
funding support from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland, and in 2000 from the U.S.
Department of State (Grant: S- PMHDP-00GG -0021 ) . The opinion s, find ings and
conclusions contained in this paper are those
of rhe author a nd do not necessarily refl ect

those of the U.S. Depa rtment of Stare, rhe
M inistry for Foreig n Affa irs of Finland o r
UNICEF.
s The definit ion of a child being less rhan 18
years of age follows from the definition o utl ined
in rhe Convention on the Rights ofChildren.
6 Th e numb e r o f in ju ry cases does no t
correspond ro rhe n umber of casualties because
many cas ualt ies suffered multiple injuries.
Injuries that led ro death are also included .
7 Unkn own: unidentified devices often repo rted
by rhird parries. Sometimes fuses.
8 lr was a shortfall of rhe survey questionnaire
and methodology during 1998 and 1999 that
people who may have witnessed another person
tampering with a device and were su bsequently
injured in an incident were also recorded as
tampering.

Mr. Phia lost his leg to a land mine. c/o UNA-USA Chim Sereivuth

Mine Incident Prevention
Mine Awareness Training

Mined Area Marking and Mine
Clearance at the Site of the Incident

• Eighry-rwo percent of casualties were
reported as not having received mine
awareness training prior to their
incident.
• The results indicate either a severe
lack in mine awareness training, or
the impression that people who
receive mine awareness training are
less likely to be involved in an
accident than those who do not.
• Both women and children received
proportionately more mine
awareness training than adult men,
even though adult men are a higher
risk group, suggesting a need to
refocus training on them.
• Assuming that a lack of mine
awareness among casualties indicates
the weakness of the activity, the
location of casualties not having
received mine awareness training visa-vis the rate of casualties indicates
a need to reconsider the concentration of mine awareness activities in
certain provinces of Cambodia.

• Only 2 percent of incident sites were
reported as being marked with
official mine field markings at the
time of the incident.
• Only four percent of incident sites
had any previous mine clearance.
• The results suggest that the majority
of incidents are raking place in areas
not known to be mined, not
surveyed, or not prioritized as being
high priority for clearan ce or
marking activities.
• The results do not tell us what mine
action or survey activities may have
been conducted following any
reported mine incident.
• The Mine Incident Database Project
is performing a vital and unique
function within the mine action
context in Cambodia and provides
valuable information that assists
different agencies and governmental
bodies in multiple areas of activity.

•

l\1\ine/UXC> Casualties in
Cambodia: 1 998- 1 999

D
•

Province Bomd1fies
Tonie Scp Lake

Dstrict Casualty Numt:Ers

D9_g

H

1o-s5
b l 35-78

•

79-160
161 -293
Handicap International & the Cambodian Red Cross

(Chris Horwood and Andrea
Crossland, External Evaluation of
UN!CEF-Supported Activities to
Prevent Mine Incidents, June-July
2000).
• 24.
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Korea United:
North & South Set Aside Differences to Demine
Following a historic summit between Leaders from North and South Korea, efforts are underway to clear a path through the DMZ. In the South, efforts are
also being made to clear the paths civilians use in areas outside the DMZ.
By Keith Feigenbaum,MA/C
n a land marred by over a halfcentury's wonh of fierce political
divisions and lingering suspicions,
agreemem and coexistence have come
to be as rare as the landmines are
plentiful. Such is the troubled state of
Korea-from the isolationist Communist North, through the neutral (and
heavily mined) demilitarized zone
(DMZ), to the revitalized rep ublic in
the south. Despite the troubled history
of this divided peninsula, steps have
been taken recently to pur aside

I

•

ideological differences and focus on
the estimated 1.12 million mines in
the 4 km-wide DMZ, as well as the
tens of thousands of mines in "rear
areas" situated outside the DMZ.
In June 2000, leaders from North
and South Korea met in a historic
summit in Pyongyang. The meeting
between South Korean President Kim
Dae-jung and North Korea's Kim
Jong-illed to efforts to reconstruct the
Kyongui (Seoul to Shinuija) railroad
and to create a four-lane highway that
would link the two countries. Based
on the leaders' desire to create this link,

Equipped with a mine detonation device, a South Korean K-1 tank drives across a mine field during
training to remove landmines. c/oAP
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the two sides' militaries set out in
September 2000 to address the unique
mine situation.

Efforts Underway
Un like many mine-affected
countries, the vast majority of mines
found in the Koreas have had minimal
affects on civilian populations. The
Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines
(KCBL) estimates that at least 1,000
civilians have fallen prey to mines
washed from the DMZ in flooding.
Conversely, Koreans have the DMZ
to thank for its role as a buffer against
the 95 percem of mines suspected to
be in Korea. Of South Korea's
estimated 1.2 million mines, only
about 68,000 have been located
outside the DMZ in rear areas.
Rachel Srohl, a senior analyst for
the Center for Defense Information,
writes, "The landmin e problems
facing North and South Korea differ
from those encounte red in other
countries afflicted with large numbers
of mines. For the most part, mines in
Korea are concentrated in welldesignated 'fields' along the DMZ and
surrounding areas and do not affect
farming, industry or other segments
of'normallife ... ' The enduring danger
from landmines in Korea, once the
known fields are removed, ought to
be much less than in countries such as
Cambodia and Vietnam."
Of course, while the landmine
situation may differ from that of other
affected countries, threats such as
unmapped mine fields, floods that

carry mines out of mapped areas (and
often outside the DMZ) and the
unknown nature of the mine problem
in North Korea add an a ir of
uncertainty to the overall situation.

Demining in Rear Areas
While the DMZ is widely known
to be a dangerous, mine-affected area,
rhe effects of mines on other regions
of the Koreas are less publicized.
Meanwhile, the effects on areas outside
the DMZ in North Korea are shielded
fro m the outside world. But, in South
Korea, landmines have been identified
in areas frequented by civilians. The
mines found in these areas, more so
than those located in the DMZ, pose
a definite threat to civilians as many
have been displaced through flooding
or are unmapped.
A November 2000 edition of The
Ko rea Herald reported that the
environ mental group Green Korea
Un ited (GKU) identified large
numbers oflandmines "planted in and
around Seoul and other large cities, as
well as national and provincial parks."
G KU has noted 21 mine-affected areas
in the following South Korean
provinces and cities (number of mineaffected areas in parentheses): Kyonggi
and South Kyongsang (4), South
Chungchong (3), Pusan and South
Cholla (2), and Seoul, Taegu, Ulsan,
Ka ngwon, North Kyonsang, and
Norrh Cholla (1 each).
GKU Secretary General Lim
Sam-jin told the Herald, "In most of
the mined places, mine warning signs
are easily found near villages, meaning
the safety of civilians is threatened."
In response to these threats, the
South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff
(]CS ) announced in February 2001 it
would remove all mines in rear areas
by 2006-the same year South Korea
and the United Stares plan to sign the
Mine Ban Treaty, contingent on the
devel opment of acceptable mine
alternatives. The JCS expects to begin

chis effort by clearing about 6,000
APLs (the only type of mine reported
to be found in rear areas) from these
locations: two former air defense bases
on Mr. Ch ungni in Pusan and in
Kumo-ri in Hadong County, South
Kyongsang Province, Haeundae in
Pusan, Mr. Kumdan in Songnam,
Kyonggi and Kwangju.
The J CS expects the upcom ing
demining efforts to puc a significant
dent in the already reduced number
of mines oucside the DMZ.
In a Herald article from Dec. 23,
2000, a South Korean Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) official said, "The army
completed the removal of some 1,100
AP mines planted on top of Mount
Kumho [sic] this year, where Nike
missile radar systems were located. We
have cleared a total of 6 ,800 mines in
seven spots [since 1996] to reduce the
number of landmines planted in the
rear areas to around 68,000."
To aid the military in demining
Korea's rear areas, GKU, KCBL and
the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) have also reportedly
agreed to begin efforts to map mine
fields. According to KC BL Coordinator Cho Jai-kook, the efforts will
include surveys of three mine-affected
areas that pose a threat to the lives of
civilians and soldiers: two of rhe 21
locations identified by GKU as mineaffected, U.S. Air Force bases
surrounded by AP mines and "civilian
passage restricted areas" located from
3 km to 30 km south of the DMZ.

Railroad-Highway Construction
Route
On September 18, a force of
about 2,800 South Korean soldiers set
our to rake on the difficult task of
ridding the train and highway
cons truction route of its estimated
100,000 mines. Of the 2,800 officers,
700 were dispatched from field
engineer battalions to begin mine
clearance work with a deadline of
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December 2000 in place (since
postponed to September 2001), an
official from the Sout h Korean
Defense Ministry told the Herald.
Meanwhile, the North Korean
military was also reported to have
begun clearance efforts on September
4, removing trees and other obstacles.
Adding complexity to the mine
s ituation is th e fact th at of the
estimated 100 ,000 mines in the
construction route, only 3,000 are in
confirmed areas. This, along with the
short timeframe allotted for clearance
efforts, caused demining to be
suspended in mid-December. South
Korean defense officials expect work
to resume following the spring thaw
in March 2001. Lt. Gen. Sun Youngjai of the South Korean Army told the
Herald on Sept. 19 , 2000: "Our
schedule for the mine clearance is
flexible as we are putting top priority
on the safety of soldiers. We have
prepared various safety equipment and
methods for our soldiers."

Demining the DMZ
A variety of demining methodsnoted by a variety of sources-have
been identified as potential clearance
methods to be used in creating a path
through the DMZ. The South Korean
Defense Ministry told the Herald in
August 2000 of its plans to initiate a
six-stage clearance program (see box
on next page for elements of this
program).
The equipment used by deminers
was expected to consist of a mix of
foreign and Korean tools and vehicles.
"We have designed remote-controlled
'armo red buckers' with thick steel
plates and bulletproof windows
attached to heavy equipment such as
excavato rs, bulldozers, cranes and
water sprinklers to be used for mine
removal," Lt. Gen. Sun said. "With
these safety measures, soldiers will be
able to do most of their work without
setting foot on the ground, thereby

Southeast Asia
Air Combat Data
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Tom Smith details the United State's
efforts to create an informational and relational database for mine/UXO identification in Southeast Asia and its importance in targeting landmines.

by Tom Smith,
Defense Security Cooperation
Agen cy, Office of Humanitarian
Demining
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Anticipated Mine Clearance Procedures:
• Use of water sprinklers to uncover mines.
• Insertion of 15-meter-long plastic pipes filled with dynam ite and
detonators into suspected areas (for mines up to 10 em
underground).
• Use of excavators and bulldozers to remove plants and dig up earth
(for mines 20 to 30 em undergro und).
• Final inspections by soldiers to ensure the removal of all mines.

g rea tly enh a nc in g th e safe t y of
deminers."
Another method reported to be
under co nsideration by the South's
D efense Mi ni stry was a "scorched
earth policy." This method would
involve spraying fuel alo ng the South
Ko rean po rtion of the DM Z berween
the Imj in Ri ve r and C hangda n in
Munsan and then burning rhe fuel.

More Help on the Way?

Alth o ug h mine clearance and
mine identification efforts in both rear
areas and the D MZ have thus fa r been
limited to the mili tary and civic
groups, in January rhe South's Sungdo
Co nstr u cti o n Co . crea t ed the
demining firm Specialist Demi n ing
Engineering (SDE) to aid rhe Koreas

and other mi ne-affected nauons 111
cleara nce efforts. The firm's vice
president, Koo Ja-ho, recently said the
SDE has formed a "technical assistance
agreement" with the U K's Specialist
Gurkha Services (SGS)-one of the
wo rl d 's to p -10 m ine and UXO
clearance companies. Koo expressed to
the Herald a des ire to aid the Korean
govern ments' demini ng efforts, saying
that private firms are at an advantage
over mi li tar ies when it comes to
insuring operations, gain ing fund ing,
and secu ring the most advanced
equ•pment.
To date, no formal agreement
between the private firm and t he
Korean governments has yet w be
ann ounced. H owever, JCS Bartle
Coordination Division official Lee
Kang-soo, head of mine affairs in the
d ivision, recently told the Herald the

continued on page 30
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ne of the greatest challenges
in the global effort to remove
the deadly debris of war and
conflic t is the collection of records
kept by the combatants from either
side in the conflict. In that regard, the
Unite d States has realized the
importance of, and is making
available, data from a variety ofsources
to assist with the survey and clearance
work in Southeast Asia.

Since 1994, the humanitarian
dem ining offices in the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
and U.S. Paci fi c Command, in
conj uncti o n with the Federal
Resou rces Corpo ration and MRJ
Tech nology Solu t ions, have been
developing an informational/relational
database derived from the separate
declassi fied rapes of allied air combat
and comba t s upport operational
activities conducted during the war in
Indochina. The output of chis analysis
will provide nations in the region with
accurate target and o rdnance data so
that host countries can set priorities
for UXO clearance operations and
assess the p robab il ity of UXO

contamination in areas identified for
economic development.
These combat missions were
conducted in Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The
original data system was developed by
TBM in the early 1960s and captured
daily air combat information on the
Vietnam conflict in the National
Combat Command Information
Processing System (NIPS). The data
(class ified Top Secret) was maintained
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in 1976
declassified and delivered to the
National Archives for safekeeping.
Four major databases are being
reviewed for information that will
assist host nations in determining the

scope and scale of air bombardment,
helping to prioritize bomb and mine
clearance operations:
Files Accessed & Data Period

Combat Activities File (CACTA)
October 1965 - December 1970
Southeast Asia Database (SEADAB)
January 1970- June 1975
Strategic Air Command's Combat
Activities report (SACCOACT)
June 1965 -August 1973
Herbicide Data Files- (HERBS)
July 1965 - February 1971
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Other databases to be reviewed
include the Combat Naval Gunfire
Files, Mining Activity Files, and other
files relating to friendly and opposing
force base camp and artillery data.
Data in the air combat files
includes specific mission numbers,
type and number of aircraft, location
of target, latitude/longitude coordinates, ordnance type, number of
ordnance dropped, and additional
information on downed aircraft.
The goal of this combined effort
is to provide host nation mine action
offices with geospatial information
(maps, digital, and other data) to
support humanitarian demin ing
surveys, setting priorities for demining
operations, training, and assessment of
the mine and UXO threat to economic
development activities. The recovered
data are being incorporated into
geospatial databases for analysis by the
host nation mine action centers using
Geographical Informacion Systems
(GIS).
Information for Laos has been
retrieved, in co rporated into a
relational database, and installed at the
headquarters of the Lao National
Unexploded Ordnance Program
(UXO LAO) in the capital city of
Vientiane. The air combat information is displayed with vector or raster
geospatial data and used to plan UXO
clearance operations and to assess the
probable impact ofUXO on economic
development projects.
Herbicide mission data has also

Southeast Asia
Air Combat Data
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Tom Smith details the United State's
efforts to create an informational and relational database for mine/UXO identification in Southeast Asia and its importance in targeting landmines.

by Tom Smith,
De fe nse Security Cooperation
Agency, Office of Humanitarian
Demining
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ne of the greatest challenges
in the global effort to remove
the deadly debris of war and
co nflict is the collection of records
kept by the combatants from either
side in the conflict. In that regard, the
U n ited States has realized t he
im portance of, and is making
available, data from a variety of sources
to assist with the survey and clearance
work in Southeast Asia.

0

Anticipated Mine Clearance Procedures:
• Use of water sprinklers to uncover mines.
• Insertion of 15-meter-long plastic pipes filled with dynamite and
detonators into suspened areas (for mines up to 10 em
underground).
• Use of excavators and bulldozers to remove plants and dig up earth
(for mines 20 to 30 em underground).
• Final inspections by soldiers to ensure the removal of all mines.

greatly enhancing the safety of
deminers."
Another method reported to be
under consideration by the South's
Defense Ministry was a "scorched
earth policy. " This method would
involve spraying fuel along the South
Korean portion of the DMZ between
the Imjin River and Changdan in
Munsan and then burning the fuel.

More Help on the Way?
Although mine clearance and
mine identification efforts in both rear
areas and the DMZ have rhus far been
limited to the military and civic
groups, in January the South's Sungdo
Construction Co. created the
demining firm Specialist Demining
Engineering (SDE) to aid the Koreas

and other mine-affected nations in
clearance efforts. The firm's vice
president, Koo Ja-ho, recently said the
SDE has formed a "technical assistance
agreement" with the UK's Specialist
Gurkha Services (SGS)- one of the
world's top-1 0 mine and UXO
clearance companies. Koo expressed to
the Herald a desire to aid the Korean
governments' demining efforts, saying
that private firms are at an advantage
over militaries when it comes to
insuring operations, gaining funding,
and securing the most advanced
equipment.
To date, no formal agreement
between the private firm and the
Korean governments has yet to be
announced. However, JCS Battle
Coordination Division official Lee
Kang-soo, head of mine affairs in the
division, recently told the Herald the
continued on page 30
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contamination in areas identified for
economic development.
These combat missions were
conducted in Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The
original data system was developed by
IBM in the early 1960s and captured
daily air combat information on the
Vietnam co nflict in the National
Co mbat Co mmand Information
Processing System (NIPS). The data
(classified Top Secret) was maintained
by rhe Joint Chiefs of Staff and in 1976
declassified and delivered to the
National Archives for safekeeping.
Four major databases are being
reviewed for information that will
assist host nations in determining the
DefEnSe SEcurity Coop«ratlon Agency

Since 1994 , the humanitarian
de mining offices in the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
an d U.S. Pacific Command, in
co njunct ion with the Federal
Resources Corporation and MRJ
Technology Solutions, have been
developing an informational/relational
database derived from the separate
declassified tapes of allied air combat
an d combat support operational
activities conducted during the war in
Indochina. The output of this analysis
will provide nations in the region with
accurate target and ordnance data so
that host countries can set priorities
for UXO clearance operations and
assess the probability of UXO

scope and scale of air bombardment,
helping to prioritize bomb and mine
clearance operations:

Files Accessed & Data Period
Combat Activities File (CACTA)
October 1965 - December 1970
Southeast Asia Database (SEADAB)
January 1970 -June 1975
Strategic Air Command's Combat
Activities report (SACCOACT)
June 1965 -August 1973
Herbicide Data Files- (HERBS)
July 1965 - February 1971
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Other databases to be reviewed
include the Combat Naval Gunfire
Files, Mining Activity Files, and other
files relating to friendly and opposing
force base camp and artillery data.
Data in the air combat files
includes specific mission numbers,
type and number of aircraft, location
of target, latitude/longitude coordinates, ordnance type, number of
ordnance dropped , and additional
information on downed aircraft.
The goal of this combined effort
is to provide host nation mine action
offices with geospatial information
(maps, digital, and other data) to
suppo rt humanitarian demining
surveys, setting priorities for demining
operations, training, and assessment of
the mine and UXO threat to economic
development activities. The recovered
data are being incorporated into
geospatial databases for analysis by the
host nation mine action centers using
Geographical Information Systems
(GIS).
Information for Laos has been
retrieved , incorporated into a
relational database, and installed at the
headquarters of the Lao National
Unexploded Ordnance Program
(UXO LAO) in the capital city of
Vientiane. The air combat information is displayed with vector or raster
geospatial data and used to plan UXO
clearance operations and to assess the
probable impact ofUXO on economic
development projects.
Herbicide mission data has also

been incorporated into the GIS at
UXO LAO. Herbicide mission data
was obtained from the U.S. Armed
Services Center for Research of Unit
Records (CRUR) that is also the
source for substantiation of veteran's
claims of herbicide contact. Data
includes the original HERBS tapes
plus m an-porta ble, truck, and
helicopter missions that were conducted during the conflict.
The partnership between the
DSCA and irs contractors is also in the
process of developing a user-friendlier
informational/ relational database and
look-up tables to better assist the end
user in planning for and prioritizing
bomb clearance missions in specific
areas of the country. A prototype
internet-accessible version of the
geospatial data is also in the developmental phase and will make it easier
for host nations to access the data
without a major investment in information technology equipment.
Maintaining the work on ch is

project is essential for continuing
assistance ro Laos and possible
expansion to the Cambodian Mine
Action Center (CMAC) and the newly
established Vietnamese Centre for
Treating Technology Bombs and
Mines. The project will continue to
support our government's engagement
strategy in the region.
In October 2000, a senior
Vietnamese military delegation visited
the United States to observe demining
training activities and discuss ways in
which the two countries could begin
engagement by sharing information
on demining issues. The del egation
was extremely impressed with the
bombing data retrieval project and, as
a result, former President C linton
offered to share the information with
the Vietnamese government during his
historic visit ro Vietnam in November
2000. Efforts a re underway to
coordinate the d evelopment and
support of this initiative with the
Government ofViernam.

The use of this kind of data, and
the integration wit h facilitating
technologies, is unprecedented and is
a clear demonstration of the value that
technology can play in enhancing
demining efforts, reducing costs, and
building cooperative efforts between
nations . The skills being learn ed
through this process and the
knowledge gained will most certainly
be of value in other countries and
other situations. This and other like
initiatives will help ensure that the
world will become mine safe sooner
rather than later. •
Contact Information

Mr. Tom Smith
DSCA (HA-D)
1111 Jeff Davis Highway - Suite 402
Arlington, VA 22202
Tel: (703) 601-3657
Fax: (703) 602-0075
E-mail: tom.smirh@osd. pentagon. mil

Korea United
continued from page 28
South Koreans are considering
cooperating with SDE in clearing the
estimated 20,000 mines on Mr.
Chungni.
The End in Sight ?

When the Korean soil thaws in
early spring and the demining effort
is continued, the Koreas will be en
route to clearing a path not just
through the DMZ, bur through years
of silence and conflict. Though we
may never know of advances in
clearance operations and mine
awareness on the northern side of the
DMZ, the North's pledged
cooperation with the South is a huge
step towards reconnecting the once

united peninsula. Even the People's
Republic of China has pledged
technical and personnel support to
both Koreas' efforts, according the
August 23, 2000 Yonhap News. It
could be said that the mine situation
in Korea pales in comparison to such
places as Bosnia-Herzegovina or
Afghanistan. Perhaps this is true from
a numerical standpoint. Bur when one
considers a country divided in two by
a guarded, man-made boundary and
by stark ideological differences, there
are few, if any, situations ro rival that
of the Koreas. If, in fact, the drive to
clear a path for railroad and highway
construction is successful in
September 2001 , the joint efforts of
enemies will be responsible for
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partially reversing in about one year
what rook over 50 years of animosity
to create. •
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Pakistan:

The Landmine Problem in
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
After a decade of fighting, the effects of conflict beyond Pakistan's bor~er wi~h
Afghanistan are seen everyday in border regions. With little governmen~ a1d a~all
able, agendes like HSD are taking the initiative in the country's battle agamst mmes.

by Faiz Muhammad Fayyaz, Executive Director,
Human Survival & Development (HSD)

T

he ravages of the decade-long art_Ued conflict i.n
Afgha nist an betwee n che Sov1ecs and annco mmunist forces were not co nfin ed to
Afghanistan. Rather, irs ill effects spilled over to neighboring countries. One effected country of note was Pakistan,
which was used as a base for war activities. Pakistan served
as a home to arms depots and camps for training guerillas,
and as a passageway for logistic supplies and other activi ties
for the coordination of the war effort. In addition, throngs
of refugees crossed the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in
search of safe harbor, rendering the border weaker and
weaker throughout the war.
.
One of the most detrimental effects of the Afghani
war o n Pakistan was the thousands oflandm ines left behind
in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Soviet
troops dropped mines and bombs in FATA border rowns
in order to intimidate the local population and prevent
any support of anti-com munist fo rces. Alchough the
Afghan war broke out in December 1979, it wasn't until
the early-1980s that the land mine problem surfaced in the
FATA. Of the seven tribal Agencies of the FATA, Bajaur
and Kurram were the most effected, counting an alarming
num ber of casualties.
Bajaur and Kurram have witnessed some of the worst
cas ualries, which affected not just soldiers bur women and
children, as well. An encire disabled population now
exists-a change chat has effected the socioeconomic fab ric
of the area. While the FATA was socially underdeveloped
previous to rhe war, it has regressed further as a result of
mines. The region's inadequate health services must deal
wi th a public heal th situa tion of tragic proportions.
Agricultural land has been rendered un-productive. Once
productive men responsible for earning livelihoods have
not only been rendered unproductive, but have become
liabilities. Children have been forced to perform hard labor
and beg on rhe streets.

Assessment

In order to assess the depth of Pakistan's landmine
problem, 1997 Nobel co-laureate Rae McG~ath, an
authori ty on landmines, visited Human Survival and
Development (HSD) in the summer of2000 at the behest
of the Swiss Federation for Mine Clearance and Swiss
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Shaima, 9, waits to have her prostheses adjusted at the
ICRC workshop. c7o ICRetAdrian Brooks
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Foundation fo r Landmine Victim Aid (H SD donors).
McG rath visited the affected areas, met with locals and
interviewed victims. H e compiled a derailed assessment
report that proffered suggestions and recommendations,
substantiated our assertions and initial research, and called
for support for a mine actio n project in response to che
humanitarian disaster in FATA.
Following McGrath's assessm ent, HSD initiated a
mine action program in Bajaur Agency through funding
from the Swiss Federatio n for Mine C learance and the Swiss
Foundation fo r Landmine Victim Aid. This program is

families and become reintegrated into che household ,
communi ty, and society.
To aid in rehabilitation effo rts, H SD h as installed a
min e victim da tabase. T he database is part of a larger
management informacio n sys tem (MIS) char incl udes,
besides the database fo r mine victims, a geograph ical
informatio n sys tem (G IS). In addition to that, it has a
package fo r H SD fi nance. A package for ad ministration
will also be developed, while a database for BMA and RA
education is being perfected. HSD has also proffered a progress
report on the conduction ofoperational activities commenced
on August 2, 2000.
FATA Breakdown

FATA is a collection of seven agencies, wh ich, unfo rtunately, have been neglected by successive governments
in Pakistan fo r the last 50 years. The policy of status quo
has prevailed in chese a reas, disall owing any concrete social
progress. FATA is geographically linked to the NWFP and
constitu tes these seven tribal agen cies (six of which share a
freel y passed border with Afghanistan): South Waziristan,
North Wazi ristan, Kurram, O rakzai, Khyber, Mohmand
and Bajaur. Located within the seven districts are six tribal
areas o r Fro ntier Regions, which constitute an area of
27,220 sq . km, or 2.6 percent of the total area of Pakistan:
Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki, Tank, and Dera Ismai l
Khan. T he region consists of 3.1 m illion generally
conservative, religio us people.
•

ICRC orthopedic
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Aklbar Khan.
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dedicated to the safety and integrated rehabilitation of mine
victims of FATA, functio ning apart from the humanitarian
mine clearance effort. Specifically, the program consists of
Basic Mine Awareness (BMA) and Risk Avoidance (RA)
education and physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation
of the mine victims. Locals are also interviewed throughout
the program to determine household data. At present, HSD
is engaged in BMA and RA and collection of household
data. It has recorded data for 599 mine victims and
educated about 25,000 locals.
Rehabilitation

HSD 's philosophy on rehabilitation goes beyond the
practice of mere physical rehabilitation , the provision of
means of mobility, and prosthesis/orthotics. It also involves
the integration of socioeconomic rehabilitation. For this
purpose, H SD has planned in irs project to provide the
victims with skill development training and micro credits
to establish and operate viable and profitable micro
enterprises. In this way, the mine victims will be able to
earn steady incomes to support themselves and cheir
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Bajaur Agency

Bajaur vall ey (a rea of 600 sq. miles) is a hilly area
located nort hwes t o f Malakand . T he approxim a te
populatio n of 364,000 comprises two main tribes-the
Tarkhanis and Utmankhels.

BMAandRA
BMA aims to red uce casualties by promoting safe
behavio r and facili tating appropriate respo nses to rh e
problem. In general, programs provide informatio n o n the
identi fication of mines and UXO and the dangers they
pose, and seek to reach safe behavio r to civilians living in
or moving into mine-affected areas. This incl udes guidan ce
on how to recognize a potentially mine or UXO-contaminated area, as well as what to do if someone accidentally
fi nds himself in che m iddle of a mine field. Instruction in
basic fi rst aid for mine victims is often a part of che program.
Teaching BMA a nd RA, especially to the most
vulnerable g ro ups, is impo rtant in Bajaur d ue to its
land min e situati on. Ab out two mine-related incidents

occur weekly in the area, generally as a result of a lack of
mine awareness training. Children and women are among
the most vulnerable groups that have become mine victims.
BMA and RA, which were instituted in Bajaur on August
2, 2000, are also an important pillar ofHSD mine action
strategy. I n the absence of these educational programs, the
magnitude of the mine threat is multipl ied.
In an area with an unusually high death ratio, the HSD
field ream prioritizes the teaching of first aid as part of its
mine awareness program. Measures taught include stopping
profuse bleed ing and learn ing to guard against infections,
shocks or other typical afflictions. HSD performs this
training in an arrempt to remedy the lack of first aid training
in the community and a lack of effective transport. In
general, casualties must be initially transported to the local
hospital fo r fi rst aid and then to the provincial metropolis
hospital fo r treatment. By the rime victims reach the
hospital, colossal amounts of blood are lost. HSD's training
would allow victims' initial treatment to be done on site.
To combat this problem on another level, HSD has
also secured two amb ulances through irs donors. T hese
will be stationed in close proximity to the community of
Bajaur to pass casualties to an equipped medical center.
One of them is ready to be sent from Geneva.
Since August 2000, HSD has educated about 30,000
comm un ity mem bers in schools, Madrassas (religious
schools), mosques, hujras (places for men to gather), and
bazaars. The community has now largely accepted the mine
awareness program and is cooperating with HSD teams.
Children, in particular, are displaying keen interest in the
class because of the easy and culturally appropriate medium
of communicario n-Pushro-the local language. Due to
the cultural practice of excluding women during mine
awareness sessions in the schools, mosques and public
places, the H SD team urges the audience co transmi t the
lessons to the females of the com munity, as well. After
several meetings between the HSD executive director and
other staff members wich comm unity elders and religious
groups, the ream has been allowed to gain access to the
female child ren in the schools and mosques for cond ucting
awareness classes.
Throughout the course ofHSD field activities, we have
observed that t he community has a few strange and
dangerous ways of responding to landmines and casualties.
Our team d iscovered char members of the community use
whey (yogurt beaten to liquid form) over a victim's wounds.
This is not an isolated occurrence, but a widely practiced
exercise-a fact bo rne by the household survey HSD
conducted. Admittedly, this is harmful practice. HSD is
attempti ng to raise awareness in the community against
the pote nti al harm held by chis practice. A second
dangerous practice widely seen in Bajaur is the shoo ring of

mines with a gun or stoning mines as a mine clearing
strategy, as determined by HSD surveys. Finally, a few of
the commu ni ty members have bought poor q uality mine
detecto rs from the black marker and used them in
inappropriate manners. With no formal training from a
mine action expert, the result has been a number of
accidents. The community is also not familiar with any
safe victim evacuation methods. Multiple casualties often
result from the presence of multiple mines in the vicinity
of the victim.
Mine Awareness Materials

HSD developed irs mine awareness material after
considering the needs and suffering of the local community.
It includes wooden mine models (appropriately painted)
of the common types of mines found and used in the
region. In addition, there are two kinds of posters-one
depicting common types of mines found and used in the
region and t he other showing landscapes with mine
problems. Both these tools are used for instruction in rhe
field. T he clear and simple message on the printed materials
appears to be assimilated by rhe community.
HSD is using places like mosques, schools and hujras
fo r conducting irs BMA and RA classes. Such locations
ensure maximum attendance of all age groups of the
community. Children and reachers are rhe target group in
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Womenmust
receive mine
awareness
education
separately from the
male population.
c/oFaiz
Muhammad Fayyaz

schools. In mosques, mullahs (rel igious groups) and other
male members of the community assemble for prayers fi ve
times a day. In hujras, the elders of the community and
youth commonly get together fo r entertainment. The aim
is to maximize the reach of the classes and ensure rhar rhe
composition is wide ranging.
HSD BMA and RA education team uses class teaching
methodology for instructions. As per the tenet of BMA
and RA education , H SD 's ream has made it a poin t not to
touch the dummy mines in presence of children who have
a proclivity to imitate and tamper with novel things. Mines
are laid before children are allowed to arrive in the class
and a wand is used to point to mines.
Child-to-Child and Child-to-Woman Technique

•

A father carries
the body of his
sonwhowas
killed in a mine
explosion. do AP.

HSD has empl oyed child -to-child and child-towoman techniques in o rder to spread irs BMA and RA
messages. C hildren have stron g learning faculties, as
co mpared to adults. T hey are active and energetic, hence
efficient and effective transmitters. C uriosity is a part of
their built-in behavior pattern. We have discovered that
the feedback from the children in Bajaur is mostly
encouraging. Push to serves as a very smooth, efficient and
effective vehicle of communication. Children are also
helpful in carrying our message ro women.
Children make up about 45 percent of the total subjeers H SD has covered so far. T heir vulnerability is apparent in that they co nstitute 27 percent of rhe recorded casualties (see Household Survey table). HSD is using child-towoman and male-to-female techniques to transmit and extend irs message to women. As the community is very touchy
on the issue of women, it is difficult to reach out to them.

Case Studies
Mohammad Zaman is one of six children of
Rehman of Bar Gabaray, Tehsil Mamund, Bajaur
Agency. On May 12, 1987, Mohammad brought
home a p iece of UXO. Due to a lack of mine
awareness education, he did nor foresee rhe danger
inherent in th e UXO. H e struck the UXO with
stones until it went off. It was at a rime when his
parents and si blings were busy with their routine
household chores. As a result of the explosion, he,
his mother and his sister died instantly, while his
fa ther and another sister susrained serious injuries.
O n Dec. 15,2000, a large, Russian-made UXO
exploded while children were p laying with it at the
res id ence of H ak im Khan of Gabaray. The
explosion claimed the lives ofsix in nocent children.
T he bodies of the children were badly mutilated.
Another ch ild was badly injured.

Database

However, HSD has managed to access some female
schools where female teachers received our message. These
reachers can also serve as effective transmitters. Moreover,
feedback we have received from rhe community indicates that
a child-to-women/ male-to-female technique is proving robe
fai rly effective. Meanwhile, H SD is attempting to devise an
efficient and effective way ro transmit BMA and RA messages
to women.
Household survey

The extent of rhe land mine problem in FATA warrants
significant concern- a fact that was ignored for years by
the govern ment at the wo rst possible time. Ir officially
recognized rhe proble m for rhe fi rs t rime in reports
subm itted to the CCW in December 1999.
H SD recognized the imperative need to address the
problems FATA. It formed a general theoretical perspective
of the problem , and laid it fort h nat ionally and
internationally. Fortunately, it has succeeded not only in
securing recognition for rhe problem, bur also in secu ring
funds fo r a project to rehabilitate the landmine victims of
FATA.
H SD aims to achieve comprehensive rehabilitation of
mine victims to help them return to normalcy. Th is will
be possible through their physical, social and economic
rehabili tation. Physical rehabilitation will involve the
provisio n of p rostheses and means of mobility, whereas
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socioeconomic rehabilitation
sha ll requi re provid i ng th e
victims with sup port to earn
steady, decent income.
T he HSD project provides
skills development training and
micro finances for this purpose.
T he victims are supported to run
viable, profitable micro enterprises that produce steady
incomes. T hey will be helped to
perform normal social functions
so that they will be accepted by
society. We required a large base
of knowledge and data for rhe
planning of t hese activities.
Obviously, an interview with
household survey was made to
collect all rhe data needed for
plann ing these activities.

Ir is imperati ve that rhe
planning and execution of the
database portion of rhe mine
action project include information on the physical and
socioeconomic rehabilitation of mine victims. Data has to
be gathered and wielded not only to ascertain the extent
and nature of physical disabilities, but also to determine
the socioeconomic status of the community. Only then
can rhe provision of prostheses, skill development training,
and micro credits be planned and executed. It is obvious
that H SD needs a database for the processing and analysis
of such a big volume of data. It would rake a great effort
o n the part of HSD staff to wield such a large volume of
data manually, ler alone process and analyze information,
without the database HSD has assembled on incidents from
August to October 2000.

Casualties (Tehsil)
Tehsil
Casualties
Death Inju ry
Khar
1
5
Mamund
220
63
Salarzai
5
2
Utmankhel
0
0
15
Nawagai
33
Barang
1
0
Total
260
85

Amputations
18
186
15
1
30
0

250

The table shows the distribution of casualties by death,
amputations, and injury. It is evident char Mamund Tehsil
of Bajaur Agency has been one of rhe most affected by
landmines. It has one of the most alarming death rolls:
220. There were also 186 amputations and 63 injuries.
Nawagai Tehsil has also counted 33 deaths and 3 0
amputatio ns. The death ratio would not have been so high
had rhere been efficient transports to carry the victims to
an equipped landmine casual ty medical center following
incidents. In Bajaur, it usually rakes one and a half to four
hours before a victim receives first aid . By rhe rime victims
reach an equipped medical center, they have lost large
amounts of blood and their injuries often become infected.

Total
Casualties
24
469
22

78

595

Percentage
Death Injury
4.17
20.83
46.91 13.43
22.73 9.09
0.00
0.00
42.31
19.23
100.00 0.00

43.70
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14.29

Amputation
75.00
39.66
68.18
100.00
38.46
0.00

42.02

•

Total
Percent

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

Statistics show that
males aged 12-1 8
form a particularly
vulnerable demographic group.
d o Faiz Muhammad
Fayyaz

Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand
the high death and amputation rates in Bajaur.
As seen in the previous table, the percentage offemale
landmine victims in Bajaur, as compared to other landmineaffected countries or regions, is on the higher side. This
could be a result of the local gender division in labor (that
excludes women) and the resulting significant role of
women in the local agrarian economy. Women generally
help in harvesting, collecting firewood, cutting fodder for
the cattle, and carrying water to the home. They are also
responsible for tending cattle. All of these activities increase
their vulnerability to mine incidents. Subsequent data on
this matter should help HSD in coming up with concrete
findings and conclusions to replace the current provisional
and hypothetical findings.
From the table, it is apparent that Bajaur became
infested with landmines after the breakout of the Afghan
war in late-1979. T hrough forthcoming data, HSD will
attempt to interpret the wide fluctuation of incidents in
the 1990s. The cause of this fluctuation from the 1980s
to the 1990s is currently unclear. HSD will refrain from
drawing any conclusions from this data until more
conclusive research is completed.
However, our hypothesis is that those who had
migrated to safer places in the 1980s returned to their
homes in the 1990s, when Soviet troops left Afghanistan
and the areas near the border came under the control of
the Mujahideen, who were struggling to gain control of
Pakistan.
The overall death and amputation numbers are also
on the high side compared to other mine affected countries.
According to Handicap International's 1997 report on
Cambodia, the rates of death, amputations and injury were
20, 22 and 58 percent, respectively. Our of the total 1,369
casualties, deaths, amputations and injuries numbered 271,
307 and 791, respectively. In Bajaur, the death and
amputation percentages for I 997 were 44.9 percent and
37.76 percent (our of98 incidents), respectively. The ratios
for death and amputation in Bajaur are double that of
Cambodia. Injuries accounted for 58 percent of casualties
in Cambodia, compared to 17.35 percent of casualties in
Bajaur.

It is highly evident that landmines interfere with daily
life in Bajaur. Mines and UXO have injured no one during
non-essential activities. The socioeconomic status of the
region has been altered immeasurably. Even some children
have been prevented from attending school for fear that
they will encounter mines while en route. This, in an a
place where the literacy level is already threatened.

Activity during Casualty

Methodology

It stands our from the data that the presence of landmines in Bajaur is impeding agricultural activity, as the
largest number (158) out of 584 accidents has occurred
during farming and the number of casualties (58) while
crossing agricultural fields is the third largest figure. This
is not surprising, as agriculture is rhe mainstay of Bajaur's
economy. Most people are engaged in farming and thus

Designing and Development of Interview Schedule

• 36.

orga nizations working for the collection of data on
landmine victims.

Victims by Gender (Bajaur Agency)

S#
1
2

Gender
Male
Female
Total

No.of Incidents Percent
389
65.40
206
34.60
595
100.00

run the risk of being injured by a mine. The second largest
figure is that of casualties during walking (1 07). People
fall victim to mines while going to mosque, fetching water
and during other routine walks for indispensable things.
Children have been hit by mines while playing (29). Others
have been crippled (25) while collecting firewood, an
activity very common in an agricultural, tribal economy.
While the number of incidents resulting from mine
tampering is not large (I 0), chis is a common occurrence
in the community. In some instances, though, parents may
have refrained from divulging the fact that an accident
occ urred during tampering due to a fear of losing
compensation from HSD.
Victims by Age (Bajaur Agency)

S#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Age Group
# of Incidents
0 - 10 Years
92
11 -18Years
81
19-30 Years
168
31-40Years
112
41-50 Years
81
51 - 60 Year
43
Above 60 Years 18
Total
595

Percentage
15.46
13.61
28.24
18.82
13.61
7.23
3.03
100.00

With the help of irs field staff, H SD developed a
suitable interview schedule after thoroughly studying the
landmine problem in Bajaur. Ir had help from the already
tested tools of Handicap International, the guidelines of
Physicians for Hum an Rights and other similar

Training and Orientation of Reid Staff
The HSD field staff was duly trained and oriented
before deployment in the field . Dr. Anwar Hussein,
assistant professor at NWFP Agriculture University's
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in Peshawar,
Pakistan, held sessions with field staff and trained them in
interview techniques. Dr. Hussein is also a member of the
HSD Board of Directors. Rae McGrath has continued to
aid HSD as a consultant, using his rich and versatile
experience to help the staff.
Initiating Volunteerism in the Community

HSD has initiated the trend of volunteerism in the
community and received a positive response from the
community. Various members of the communi ty, ranging
fro m farmers to students, have shown keen interest in
volunteering with HSD. They have offered their services
on a humanitarian and service basis for the noble enterprise.
Currently, HSD is working to train volunteers from
the community, common people, schoolteachers, religious

Victims by Year (Bajaur Agency)
Year
Casualties
Death Injuries Amputations
1980
0
0
1
4
5
2
1980
4
0
3
1982
1983
0
0
2
0
1984
3
3
11
1985
1
1986
16
2
2
1987
9
1988
18
2
9
4
1989
5
0
29
11
34
1990
1991
6
2
3
18
14
1992
1993
7
2
9
11
1994
19
8
7
27
1995
19
1996
13
8
22
37
17
44
1997
1998
28
7
23
14
1999
12
3
11
13
2000
6

teachers and leaders, and the youth to carry our
humanitarian jobs on a volunteer basis. This is particularly
essential when it comes to training people to treat fellow
citizens through first aid.
As a final note, it would benefit HSD's mine awareness
program to find women volunteers among the community
who could act as liaisons between other females in Bajaur.
As was earlier expressed, the female segment of the
population is effected on a daily basis by mines, bur is
prevented by their social standing from participating in
mine awareness training. This situation must be addressed
if the mine situation in Pakistan's FATA is to improve. •
Contact Information

Faiz Muhammad Fayyaz
Executive Director
Human Survival & Development (HSD)
154/B, Street 2
Shami Road
Peshawar-Pakistan
Tel: 0092-91-285680
Fax: 0092-91-271081
E-mail: hsdpsh@yahoo.com

Total
Casualties
1
11
7

5
15
18

13
29
9
74
11
33
18
38
53
43
98
58
29
30

Percentage
Death Injury
0.00
0.00
18.18
45.45
57.14 0.00
0.00
0.00
60.00 0.00
20.00 6.67
88.89 5.56
69.23
15.38
62.07 6.90
55.56 0.00
39.19 14.86
18.18
54.55
42.42 3.03
38.89 11.11
50.00 21.05
35.85
13.21
18.60
30.23
44.90
17.35
12.07
48.28
10.34
41.38
20.00 36.67
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Amputation
100.00
36.36
42.86
100.00
40.00
73.33
5.56
15.38
31.03
44.44
45.95
27.27
54.55
50.00
28.95
50.94
51.16
37.76
39.66
48.28
43.33

*All charts and
graphs supplied by
the author.

Myanmar's Forgotten Mine Fields

Myanmar's Forgotten Mine Fields
On the subject of Landmines, media attention is rarely focused on Myanmar.
Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Andrew Seith examine the country's manufacture
and indiscriminate use of mines and lEOs.
by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Andrew
Seith

long-running war between the Myanmar armed forces
and a number of narcotics-funded private armies. All
sides, however, found it difficult to obtain regular or
here are an estimated 120 million-plus plentiful supplies of modern munitions. This
uncleared anti-personnel (AP) landmines prevented the extensive use of commercially produced
around the world, scattered through more landmines and forced the protagonists ro rely more
than 60 countries. In all the literature produced on on IEDs. These still resulted in a large number of
this subject to date and in discussions of the problem casual ties, but they tended to be less effective and had
in international forums, mention is rarely made of more limited operational lives.
Myanmar (formerly Burma). This is despite the fact
After the 1960s, landmines became easier ro
that anti-personnellandmines have been, and are still obtain, and their rate of usage increased. The
being, manufactured and laid in large numbers in Tatmadaw was able to obtain supplies of AP and
that country. Indeed, the number of landmine (probably) anti-vehicle (AV) mines from its own arms
casualties now surpasses Myanmar's mine-affected facrories, established with German assistance during
neighbor, Cambodia, which has been the subject of the 1960s and 1970s. After the military coup, led by
much greater world attention.
General Ne Win in 1962, Myanmar still received
modest shipm ents of munitions from friendly
countries
like th e USA. These almost certainly
Landmine Use in Myanmar
included supplies of landmines.
Around the same time, China increased its supply
T he use oflandmines and improvised explosive
of
arms
(including landmines) to the Comm unist
devices (IEDs) has been a feature of armed conflict
in Myanmar since it regained its independence from Party of Burma (CPB) guerrillas on Myanmar's
the UK in 1948. Before the 1960s, fighting between northeastern border. Other insurgent groups were able
the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) and the to purchase landmines on the black market in
country's many ideological, ethnic and religions Thailand, and reportedly from members of the Thai
insurgent groups was bitter. There has also been a armed forces and police. The insurgents financed these
deals by selling precious stones, jade and narcotics,
or by taxing cross-border trade.
Myanmar's two paramount intelligence agencies,
the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) and the
Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI),
claim that landmines are no longer being used by the
Myanmar Army as there is no need for them.
The Myanmar government's website seeks to
portray the civil war as a thing of the past, stressing
that many of the armed insurgencies have collapsed
or that rhey have entered into a cease-fire agreement
with the central government. While the CPB did collapse in 1989, and notorious drug lord Khun Sa and
his Mong Tai Army (MTA) surrendered in 1996, other
armed groups have yet to secure more than a verbally

T
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AP land mines manufactured by Myanmar's
Defense Products Industries.
On the extreme left is an
MM 1 (PRC Type 59 copy)
and in the center is an MM 2
(PRC Type 58 copy). The MM
2 is flanked by the LTM 76
stake/fragmentation mine.
c/o Jane's Intelligence
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agreed and tenuous cease-fi re. Like the Mon National
Army, they keep their arsenals and maintain their
right to continue armed struggle if negotiations do
not work out.
Other groups like the Karen National Union and
irs armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army
(KNLA), which have never entered into a cease-fire
agreement with Rangoon , are porrrayed by the
government as weak and marginal with little capacity
for military operations.
Despite these official denials, rhe manufacture
and use of AP landmines in Myanmar has grown
significantly in recent years. The Tarmadaw appears
to be placing increasing reliance on landmines to
defeat insurgents. Perhaps capitalising on the greater
availability of modern AP mines from a new factory
built in central Myanmar with Chinese assistance
abo ut two years ago.
Mines are being used extensively against the
KN LA in its areas of operation in both Kayah State
and the Taninrhayi Division, against the Shari State
Army (SSA) within Shan State, and against the
Karenni Army in Kayan State.
T he Nasa ka, a special division of the Tatmadaw
engaged in operations along Myanmar's border with
Bangladesh, maintains an extensive mine field
virtually the entire length of the land frontier. This
mine field has claimed numerous civilian and military
casualties. Further north, along Myanmar's border
with the northeastern states of India, the Tatmadaw
has also laid mines as part of its counter-insurgency
operations against the C hin National Army
The insurgent groups are also using landmines
and IEDs more than before. In particular, the KNLA
is relying heavily on them in its operations against
the Tatmadaw, prompted in part by the fall of the
Karens' fixed bases at Manerplaw and Kawmura in
1995 and the KNLA's subsequent reversion to mobile
guerrilla tactics. Landmines also make up for their
inferiority in numbers and arms especially since the
split in the KNLA (which produced the pro-Rangoon
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army in 1994) and the
introduction by the junta of a mass ive military
expansion and modernization program.
Methods and Results
Landmines and IEDs have been used by all
military forces in Myanmar, for both offensive and
defensive purposes. As a general rule, the scarcity of
resources has not permitted the mining oflarge tracts
ofland but mines have been laid outside the perimeter

of both permanent and temporary camps to warn of
approaching enemies and to defend against attack.
They h ave bee n widely us ed along lines of
communicati on, such as ra ilways, roads and
pathways, to hinder the movement of troops and
supplies.
Landmines have been used to deny territory to
the other side and to prevent the use of routes across
the international border. Mines have also been laid
to encourage local villagers either to leave particular
areas, or to stay away from vill ages that have already
been cleared or destroyed. The latter policy seems to
be part of a deliberate and widespread campaign by
the Myanmar Army to resettle local populations in
an effort to deny insurgent groups food, funds,
recruits and intelligence.
As a result of all these developments Myanmar
has suffered a large number of casualties from
landmines over the years. Reliable stattstlcs are
•
difficult to obtain but, according
to the U.S. State Department, in
the early 1990s casualties from
landmines were thought to
account for about 15percent of all
India
military losses in Myanmar.
Combatants have not been
the only ones killed or maimed.
So have many local villagers,
particularly in the border areas
where the fighting has lasted
longer and usually been the most
vicious. In 1993 it was estimated
that each year in Myanmar over
1,500 people were fitted with
artificial limbs as a result of
landmine explosions. Many more
never received any attention. This
number has declined since the
negotiation of cease-fires among
most insurgent groups, but
casualties from land mines remain
high. According to an official
based in Rangoon , most landmine victims now come from
State or
Karen State.
Division
G reatly exacerbatin g this
with landmine
pollution
problem has been the poor
management of the mine fields
Highly
,....
mined
laid. Both the Myanmar Army
areas
and various insurgent groups have
failed to keep accurate or
comprehensive records of where

0
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Map c/o Jane's Intelligence

China

NON-STATE ACTORS IN MYANMAR

mines have been placed. Local villagers are often nor
informed of their whereabouts for security reasons.
During the fall of the KNLA's base at Manerplaw,
for example, the militant All Burma Students
Democratic Front revealed that all casualties resulted
from their own defensive mine field, nor enemy fire.
Even government soldiers often do not know where
their mines have been laid.
Proper maps are rarely produced and often, when
a military unit leaves an area, precise details about
the local mine fields are not passed on. Even when

•

Field surgery is carried out
on a mine victim in Kayah
State by the Backpack
Health Worker Team, an
ethnic-based emergency
medical non-governmental
organization based on the
border of Myanmar and
Thailand.

c/o Jane's Intelligence

this does occur, the smaller plastic mines now used
by the Myanmar Army can be washed away during
heavy rainfall to new, unknown locations.
One saving grace in the past was that the landmines used were made of metal and were liable to
rust, rendering them inoperable after one or two rainy
seasons. The batteries required for detonation by
some insurgent mines rarely lasted more than six
months. Also, the wooden stakes used ro set up some
kinds of AP fragmentation mines had a relatively
short life in areas where the climate was hot and wet.
According to one government source, some mines
used by the Myanmar Army during the 1960s and
1970s became unserviceable because the explosive
charge tended to be eaten by ants.
The more modern mines now being used by the
Rangoon regime, however, have much longer lives.
They are made from more durable materials, do not
rely on batteries and remain serviceable much longer
after being laid. Also, it appears that, where possible,
stake AP mines are being placed on metal spikes so
they remain effective for longer periods. Plastic
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lightweight mines are also being used by insurgent
groups- mainly Chinese Type 72 AP blast mines and
U.S.-made M-14 mines (or copies of the M-14 from
Vietnam and Singapore).

Mines Used in Myanmar
A wide range of landmines appear to have been
used in Myanmar over the years. Details are hard to
obtain, but it would appear that before 1988 the
Myanmar Army had access to common Eastern bloc
AP mines such as the POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M
stake-mounted AP fragmentation mines. It is highly
likely that Myanmar also imported (or was given as
part of military aid packages) a range of other AP
and AV land mines. These would have probably come
from countries like the United Kingdom, United
States, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, all of which
provided arms to Myanmar at one time or another.
For example, it is believed that the Myanmar Army
was familiar with U .S.-man ufactured M-18 Claymore
mines, M-16 bounding fragmentation mines, M- 14
AP blast mines and M-7 AV mines. It is also believed
that Yugoslavia provided AV mines to Myanmar in
the 1950s and possibly the 1960s.
During this period the insurgents bought U.S.,
Soviet and Chinese mines on the black market or, as
in the case of the CPB, were directly supplied by
China. The latter shipments appear to have included
large quantities ofType 58 AP blast mines. This is a
direct copy of the Russian PMN mine. The Chinese
probably also supplied the CPB with their own
versions of the POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M stake mines,
known as the Type 58 and Type 59 respectively. There
has been at least one report of a Chinese Type 59
"shoebox" AP mine (a copy of the Russian PMD-6
mine) also being used.
Since the Myanmar armed forces rook back direct
control of the country in 1988, the Rangoon regime
(known initially as the State Law and Order
Restoration Council, and after 1997 as the State Peace
and Development Coun cil ) has faced an a rm s
embargo at the hands of its traditional suppliers. As a
consequence, it has been forced to rely on a much
wider range of sources for its arms and mili tary
equipment.
Most mines have come from China, but
Singapore, Pakistan, Israel, Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
and Portugal are also known to have sold arms or
ammunition to Myanmar's military regime over the
past 12 wars. China and Singapore are the most likely

Producer? Stockpile?

political organization

Armed wing

Ceasefire?

AP mine user?

Arakan State
Arakan Liberation Party
Arakan Army of Arakan Land (eke NUPA)
Rohingya Solidarity Organization
Democratic Party Arakan (former NUFA)
Arakan Pohingys National Orgamzat1on

Arakan Liberation Army
Arakan Army
Rohingya Army
Arakan Peoples Army
Pohingya National Army

No
No
No
No
No

?

?

Likely
Yes
?
Command detonated

Likely
?

Chin State
Chin National Front

Chin National Army

No

Sagaing Division
Kuki National Front
National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(Khaplang)
zomi National Front

Kuki National Army
National Socialist Council
of Nagaland
Zomi National Army

Kachin State
Kachin Independence Organization
(former KIA 4th Brigade)
(former CPB 101 )
Shan State
Restoration Council of Shan State
(alliance SU RA, former MTA)
United Wa Organisation
Shan State Nationalities People's
Liberation Organization
Palaung People's Liberation Organisation
Wa National Organisation
(former CPB 815)

Karenni State
(former CPB ally)
Karenni National Progressive Party
Karenni National Democratic Front

Karen State
Karen National Union
Democratic Karen Buddhist Organisation
All Burma Students Democratic Front
All Burma Muslim Union
People's Defense Forces
People's Liberation Front
Mon State
New Mon State Party

Pegu Division
Karen National Union
Tenasserim Division
Myeik-Dawei United Front
Karen National Union
All Burma Students
Democratic Front
[KNU break-away]

Mines in territory?

No

?
Likely
Yes
?
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Command detonated

Claim no

Yes

Yes

No
?

?
?

?
Likely

?
Likely

Likely
Likely

No

?

?

?

Likely

Kachin Independency Army
Kachin Democratic Army
New Democratic Army

Yes
Yes
Yes

Not currently

Former

Likely

?
?

?

?

?
?

Yes
?
?

Shan State Army

No

Command detonated

Claim no

Yes

Yes

Yes
United Wa State Army
Yes
Shan State Nationalities
Peoples Liberation
Organization
Palaung State Liberation Army Yes
No
Wa National Army
Yes
National Democratic
Alliance Army

Likely

Former

?

?

?
?

Yes
Yes

?
?
?

?
?
?

?
?
?

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Likely

Likely

Likely

Yes

Broken
Yes

Yes
Likely

Yes
Likely

Likely
Likely

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Likely

Yes

Yes

No

Likely

Likely

Yes

No
No
No

?
Command detonated
?

?
Claim no
?

?
Yes

?

Yes
Yes
Yes

Men National
Liberation Army

Yes

Former

Former

Yes

Yes

Karen National
Liberation Army

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Myolk-Dawel United Front
Karen National
Liberation Army
All Burma Students
Democratic Front
God's Army

No
No

Command detonated
Yes

?
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No

Command detonated

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

?

Yes

Karenni National People's
Liberation Forces
Karenni Army
Karenni National
Democratic Army

Karen National
Liberation Army
Democratic Karen
Buddhist Army
All Burma Students
Democratic Front
All Burma Muslim Union
People's Defense Forces
People's Liberation Front

?

Yes

Notes for non-state actors chart:
.
Ceasef~re: Has verbally negotiated ceasefire agreement with SLOPC or SPDC (no written agreements extst).
AP mme use,. Is currently practicing mine warfare, either defensively or offens•vely.
.
..
ti
r onnel landmines
PrOducer: Ma~ufactures improvised explosive devices which have the characteristic of an anti-personnel landmme, or alter other mumtlons to serve as an -pe s
.
StOCkpile: Maintains a store of mines, or components, for use in wartare,
.
.
Mines m territory: Mines now in·the-ground in their province or division of activity, Could be laid by themselves, alltes or adversanes,
·
1
1 th 1
t included Revolutionary political organizations, which do not maintain an
There Is a variety of small, self-proclaimed armed groups ~hat. are dysfu~ctlonal or not cd~rrethnt y act ~~cs :.a~~e ,~; sell-perp~tuation rather than any real political activity. Several armed
armed wing, are not Included. Some of these armed organozat1ons are pnmarily Involve m e narco
groups are quite small and work only in alliance with other groups.
Ch an c/o Jane's Intelligence
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Myanmar's Forgotten Mine Fields
of these countries to have included landmines in their
arms shipments to Myanmar.
There is evidence that since 1989, when the BCP
collapsed and bilateral relations with China rapidly
improved, Beijing has supplied Myanmar with AP
landmines. In addition to those types noted above.
One source in Rangoon has suggested that these
shipments have included the Type 69 Chinese AP
bounding fragmentation mine, similar to the USmade M-16, popularly known as the "Bouncing
Betty." Both U.S. and Chinese mines of this type
have been used in recent operations by the Tatmadaw
in the Taninthayi Division. The Chinese Type 72 AP
blast mine has also been used against insurgents in
recent years, as well as an (as yet unidentified) Italiandesigned AP blast mine. Mines manufactured by
Singapore and Israel are also reported to have been
used in Myanmar, but this has not yet been confirmed.
The military regime in Rangoon, however, has
never been comfortable relying on foreign countries
for its military supplies. Since the mid-1950s it has
built up a network of its own defence industries,
capable of producing a range of arms and ammunition , including landmines. There is evidence that this
capability has recently been increased.
Mine Manufacture

For some years before 1988 Myanmar had been
able to produce its own landmines at a German-built
factory in the regime's heavily guarded defence
industrial complex on the western side of the
Taninthavi (Irrawaddy) River, near Pyay. Most appear
to have been copies of proven Eastern bloc stake and
pressure AP mines, known locally as lu-rhar (AP)
mines, bur some AV mines were probably also
produced.
About two years ago, however, a secret agreement
was reportedly signed with China for the construction
of a completely new factory near Meikhrila in central
Myanmar, solely to produce landmines. Although
sources disagree on the progress made on the factory
since then, it seems that serial production of some
mine types has begun.
From the limi ted information available, this
factory is believed to produce at least five types of
mines, designated MM-1 through to MM-5. The
MM-1 is essentially the Chinese Type 59 AP stakemounted mine, with slight modifications to the
detonator and weather cap. The MM-2 design closely
follows char of China's Type 58 AP blast mine. Two
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variants of the MM-2 have been confirmed. The
characteristics of the MM-3, MM-4 and MM-5
landmines are still unknown , although it is possible
that one is an AV mine.
Myanmar produces a shi-twe directional mine,
possibly a copy of the M-18 Claymore, which may
have been given a 'MM' designation. Following rhe
practice adopted by Myanmar's defence Industries in
the past, these designations probably mean Myanmar
Mine 1, Myanmar Mine 2 and so on.
Most informed Myanmar watchers believe that
China is still providing technical assistance and spare
parts for the Meikhtila factory, as well as some of the
key components used in the manufacture of these
mines. Singapore (which manufactures its own range
of plastic-bodied AP and AV mines, including some
under licence) may have assisted in the establishment
and operation of this plant. Singapore is secretly
assisting Myanmar in other areas ofarms manufacture,
such as the production of a new family of infantry
weapons. Claims that it is helping to produce landmines in Myanmar cannot be proved.
Most insurgent groups maintained workshops in
which to repair and manufacture weapons, including
landmines. After the collapse of the BCP in 1989,
Khun Sa probably had rhe greatest capacity of all
Myanmar's insurgent groups and narcotics-based
armies to manufacture and lay landmines. When he
surrende red in 1996 the Myanmar Army took
possession of, and reportedly destroyed, over 2,000
landmines that had been stored at his Ho Mong base
camp. Most appear to have been AP mines, bur Khu n
Sa also had a stock of large AV mines chat he claimed
was ro protect his camp from "external aggression."
It is not known what specific kinds of mines were
being manufactured or held in the MTA's inventory,
but they are most likely to have been copies of the
simpler, locally producedAP mines, like the POMZ2M.
Other insurgent groups have not had the funds,
expertise or facilities to make landmines of this kind,
or on this scale. Most have tended to rely on boobytraps and other lEOs. Explosives from quarries in
Myanmar or neighboring states have been obtained
and placed in any available container-usually plastic
pipes or bamboo links. Sometimes glass bottles have
been used as glass readily lends itself to fragmentation.
Metal waste and nails have been added as shrapnel to
make the mine even more destructive.
Electric detonators were obtained from the same
quarries. Trip plates were made of wood and wire, and
were linked to a common dry cell battery. These im-

provised mines are quite effective but usually have a
limited life, often no more than six months, as the
baneries tend to run our after that rime.
Insurgent groups like the Karen reportedly feel
that their limited funds are better used to buy guns
and ammunition, rather than components for
landmines. Because of the current shortage of
reso urces, they try to dig up and rake their landmines
with them when they move.
Such is the demand for landmines in Myanmar
that all stocks produced have been used in-country
There have been no reports of the Rangoon regime
or insurgent group exporting landmines to another
country or group.

with designs based on well-known models for sale on
the international marker. The nature of the terrain
around Myanmar's borders, however, would restrict
the use of such machines.
The Tatmadaw has seriously considered the use
of sniffer dogs to detect mines, bur how often this
method has been used, and with what degree of
success is unknown.
There have also been numerous confirmed
reports of rhe Myanmar Army using local villagers
and forced laborers as human minesweepers. These
people (including women and children) have been
forced to walk ahead of military units, detonating
any landmines or booby traps that lie in their path.

Laying, Detection and Clearing

Indiscriminate Use

The Myanmar armed forces rely mainly on
traditional methods to lay mines- by hand. The
army's Engineering Corps reportedly has some towed
mine-laying vehicles when large areas are to be mined,
but the difficult terrain in the insurgent areas of
operation would restrict their effectiveness.
Over the years, Myanmar Army engineers have
used a variety of means to detect and clear mines.
Manual methods, mainly using probes, have been
most common. Since the early 1970s, however, a
greater reliance has been placed on the use of
mechanical mine detectors. In the past, these have
included French DHPM-lA mine detection sets,
Wh ite's Electronics 6000 Di-PRO SL detectors from
the UK and UK-made NMD-9 equipment. There
have also been reports that Myanmar manufactures
irs own mine detector, known as the Tha-ma 93. This
detector, which consists of a circular search head,
carrying handle, battery-powered control box and a
set of attached headphones, seems to be a copy, or
maybe a modification, of an imported device.
The Myanmar Army has Bangalore torpedoes,
which can be used to clear pathways through mine
fields, and has also used mine detecting and detonating vehicles. These range from a jeep pushing a
weighted trailer to set off the mines in irs path, and a
tank-mounted mine roller designed to do rhe same
thing, to a specially designed mine clearance plough.
The latter seems simply to be a small tank with a
bulldozer blade on the front of the vehicle. It is not
known how many of these vehicles are in the
Myanmar Army's order of battle, how or from where
they were acquired. It is possible that some of these
vehicles have been built by the Myanmar Army itself,

At present there is no sign that the Rangoon
regime intends to reduce irs manufacture or use of
landmines in Myanmar. Indeed, the opposite is true,
with the increased use ofAP mines against insurgents
by the armed forces being fuelled by a new munitions
factory and imports from friendly countries like
C hina. In these circumstances, it is not surprising
that the military government has consistently refused
to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, stating to the U.N.
that "a sweeping ban on landmines is urinecessary
and unjustified."
The problem is the indiscriminate use of mines,
as well as the transfer of them. The opposition
National League for Democracy, in contrast, has
publicly stated that it would be prepared to support
Myanmar's accession to the Ottawa Convention. At
present, however, its activities (and those of its leader,
Aung San Suu Kyi) have been severely curtailed by
the regime and it has no scope to implement such a
policy.
The continuing manufacture and indiscriminate
use ofAP mines by the Myanmar armed forces seems
set to continue. The insurgents, for their part, will
also use mines and explosive booby traps in their
struggle against the central government, made from
whatever resources they can obtain. The inevitable
result will be further casualties, as combatants and
civilians alike are killed and maimed by these weapons
in a part of the world that has not known peace for
over 60 years. •

Reprinted courtesy of jane's Intelligence Review, October 2000.
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GERBERA:

Vietnamese Ministry

Mine Action
Activities in Vietnam and Laos

Tours U.S. Following Historic Agreement

In an attempt to help Vietnamese villagers resettle their UXO-contaminated homeland, Germany's GERBERA took the clearance initiative in 1998. As of July 2000,
it had successfully relocated 40 families and expanded operations to Laos.

Delegation of Vietnamese de mining experts visits James Madison University's Mine
Action Information Center as part of State Department-sponsored U.S. tour. Visit
follows the United States's provision of $3 million in landmine aid to Vietnam.
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Deputy Commander Quang
Khanh (second
from right) is
greeted by JMU
professor Helmut
Kraenzle (far
right). c/o MAIC

mine assistance in the coming years.
After visiting the U.S. Army's
Humanitarian Demining Research &
Development Center in Fort Belvoir,
Va., and leading U.S. demining
organizations in the Washington D.C.
region, the delegation made its way to
JMU for briefings organized by the
MAIC. The Vietnamese delegation
was led on a campus-wide tour of
JMU and was briefed by U.S . and
MAIC officials on demining
information managemenr. The MAIC
also provided the results of its mine
awareness campaign in Vietnam's
by Keith Feigenbaum, MAle
Quang Tri province (site of the former
DMZ).
five - man del egation of
Although the Vietnamese defense
Vietnamese humanitarian de- officials were concerned primarily with
mining experts recently mine clearance activities, they showed
toured the United States to gain an special interest in the MAIC's efforts
appreciation of the American view of to help the local populace in Quang
humanitarian d emining concepts and Tri province spot and avoid mined
operations.
areas. The delegation, led by Truong
The U.S. Department of State- Quang Khanh, deputy commander of
sponsored visit with the Vietnam Vietnam's Ministry of National
Ministry of D e fense included Defense, was addressed by JMU
meetings with top officials in the State professors Anne Stewart and Terry
Department and the U.S. Department Wessel, who ran the mine awareness
of Defense. The trip was highlighted program from October 1998 - March
by visits to training sites, corporations 2000.
involved in mine action, and the
Tom Smith, DSCA program
Defense Security Cooperation Agency manager for humanitarian assistance
(DSCA)-sponsored MAIC.
and demining programs, outlined the
The arrival of the Vietnamese program management role his office
Ministry of Defense followed close on will play in shaping the emerging U.S.the heels of the signing of a historic Vietnam landmine project.
agreement that will provide Vietnam
About the visit to the MAIC, a
with over $3 million (U.S.) in land- State Department humanitarian

A

By Lisa M . Vanada,MAIC

demining officer remarked, "The visit
to JMU was great. It shows that [the
United States] can do more than just
provide equipment and gear to the
Vietnamese mine action effort."
The visit came just months after
the United States and Vietnam signed
a historic bilateral agreement that will
allow the Vietnamese to receive
modern demining equipment and
other mine-related assistance through
the U.S. Humanitarian Demining
Program. The Vietnamese will receive
$1.75 million worth of demining gear
under the June 2000 agreement to aid
in the removal of the estimated 3.5
million mines, as well as vast amounts
of UXO that contaminates its
countryside and snarles its infrastructure.
The State Department also plans
to provide $1.4 million to conduct a
Level One impact survey which will
help the Vietnamese to prioritize those
areas which pose the greatest
immediate threat to civilians, arable
land and infrastructure. The DoD will
target $200,000 for technical mapping
of those selected sites, and $80,000 for
mine awareness education and landmine database support.
Following its tour of the MAIC,
the delegation visited mine actionrelated facilities at the Global Training
Academy in Somerset, Texas, the
Humanitarian Demining Training
Center at Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo., and
the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
and Asia-Pacific Network in Hawaii.

Overview of GERBERA

T

he GERBERA demining organization was founded
in 1994 to provide three main services: EOD
activities in Germany, where the organization is
based; international EOD and demining assistance; and

base; UXO contamination prevemed them from returning
to their homelands. A German NGO based in Berlin
recognized the need for a resettlement program and began
the process of preparing the land for the villagers' return.
In May of 1998, GERBERA began mapping the two
villages in the districts of Cam Lo and Ai Tu. After
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local and international special engineer services, which
include the surveillance and cleanup of any kind of
env ironmental waste. Although GERBERA often
cooperates with humani tarian associations and local
governments, it is equipped to deal with every facet of a
mine clearance project.
Resettlement and Relocation in Vietnam

Over 25 years ago, villagers in the Quang Tri province
ofVietnam were evacuated during the Vietnam War. These
villagers abandoned their farms and homes for a military
base situated in a nearby river valley. However, this situation
was far from optimal because the river floods twice a year,
limiting the agricultural success of the evacuees. In spite of
the poor farming conditions, the villagers remained on the

•

methodically clearing 171 hectares of over 5,000 UXO,
the villagers were finally allowed to return to their lands.
ln an attempt to escape the UXO contamination of
their land, villagers in Vietnam's Hue province migrated
south to the Cau Hai lagoon. Approximately 5,000 peasants
currently live on boats and attempt to make their living
fishing in the overcrowded lagoon. The area is
overpopulated and the constant fishing has expended the
natural resources. The fish they catch are pathetically small;
the biggest are only 5 em long and most of the local wildlife
was displaced. Vogt explains the situation as "not only a
social problem, but an environmental one." In 1999,
GERBERA began surveying land designated for the
relocation of the lagoon residents. It began removing UXO
in July 2000 and has presently cleared enough land for 40
families.
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....

Quang Tri province
demining team.
c/oGERBERA

•

Family boat in
Cau'Hai Lagoon.

c/oGERBERA

Potsdam Kommunkation, the
German NGO heading the relocation
project, hopes that a stable village
existence will allow families to send
their children to school for the first
time. In the past, many of the families
t raveled seasonally to follow the fish

Equipment and Clearance

In addition to the resettlement
and relocation projects in Vietnam,
GERBERA is involved with UXO
clearance in Laos. Since September
1996, it has destroyed over 34,000

IIGERBERA has a training advantage: Germany requires all
civilian workers in EOD companies to complete an EOD
training school in Dressen. All employees must receive
their licenses from this school, and Vogt describes this
license as a higher degree' for EOD workers."
1

and the shrimp migration. Relocated
families are given land where they can
build homes and cultivate small farms.
By working the land and earning a
stable living they will be able to build
a community with neighbors and
village support.

UXO in the Luang Prabang province.
GERBERA has not used heavy mine
clearing machinery in its Southeast
Asian projects for two primary reasons:
terrain and money. Heavy machinery
is rarely used in Vietnam or Laos
because of the muddy terrain and
heavy forests, Vogt clarified this

decision as one based on convenience
and environmental concern. "You can't
use heavy machines if you destroy
everything you want to preserve in the
area," he said. Paddy fields , for
example, are enclosed with small dams
to retain the water. Because the average
field is only 40 by 50 meters, large
mine detection or clearance machinery
taken through the area would destroy
the dam and most of the field itsel(
The expense of the equipment
also negates practicality. GERBERA
tested a computerized detection
program in Laos; the same program
has been used successfully in Germany.
Although this technology is feasible in
a stable economic environment with
high wages, the relatively low wages
in the developing countries in Southeast Asia make expensive technology
an unlikely option from a financial
management perspective. Mine
clearance organizations usually find it
more efficient to hire a larger number
of clearance workers than to use
expensive computerized systems. Local
workers are readily available, relatively
inexpensive to hire, and welcome the
opportunity to s uppl ement their
income and participate in clearance
activities that increase the safety of
their £'lmilies and villages.
Although few mines are found in
Vietnam, several types of UXO,
primarily different types of bomblets
and rifle grenades, contaminate the
countryside. The M -16 rifles used in
the war held a small device used to
launch 40-mm grenades. These rifle
grenades litter the region and present
a constant threat. Because the grenades
were intended to explode shortly after
they were launched, the fuses are very
sensitive. Vegetation often partially or
fully conceals these grenades, which
have caused more fatal injuries after
the war than any other types ofUXO.
Due to the terrain, expense and
type of UXO contamination,
GERBERA uses handheld metal

detectors to locate UXO positions and
depths. This simple technology is
reliable and well-suited to the projecr.
After using rhe metal detectors to scan
a plotted area, a detailed map is drawn
up fo r use in clearance and disposal.
According to Vogt, clearing the mines
is the most difficult step in their work.
Project supervisors personally inspect

UXO or clear a specific area ,
GERBERA's activities in Southeast
Asia require large tracts of land to be
entirely clear ofUXO and prepared for
human inhabitants. To ensure that rhe
designated land is completely minefree, GERBERA usually relies on two
forms of quality assurance: internal
quality control and external quality

GERBERA often asks village religious leaders for the best dates and times for major
project events, such as the opening of a project or the introduction of a new
building. This approach shows consideration for the village's cultural traditions.
eac h UXO to analyze the type ,
loca tion , and other factors th a t
determine if it is possible to move the
UXO. If it can be moved, the workers
carefully transport the UXO to a
designated demolition site. Most of
the mines GERBERA has encoumered
are very old and sensitive. If mines are
too unstable to transport, they are
destroyed in situ.
Quality Assurance

GERBERA places a great deal of
emphasis on the importance of quality
ass urance . Unlike some demining
organizations, who respond to a community request to remove a particular
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control. Because Vietnam and Laos do
not place external quality controls,
GERBERA's internal system has been
revised to provide several levels of
clearance checks.
A typical mine clearance ream
consists of several workers who are
given daily assignments of UXOcontaminated zones. Their goal is to
clear the entire area of any mines,
UXO or metal objects that could cause
a metal detector to sound its alarm.
At the end of each day, team
commanders canvas between 20-50
percent of the area their team has
cleared that day. He checks the area
without any consistent system, so the
clearance workers are never certain
which portions of their area or the
adjoining areas will be inspected. The
commander should be able to navigate
throughout the cleared areas without
hearing a single beep from the mine
detector. Any detected items are
removed immediately and the
commander restarts the inspection.
Because this quality assurance
system relies heavily upon the
functionality of the metal detectors,
these handheld devices are frequently
checked. Commanders test their
equipment every morning and after
every break to make sure that it is
working properly. In addition to daily
inspections of metal detectors,

Clearance worker in Quang Tri.

c/oGERBERA
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GERBERA designed a system
requiring each project to create and use
a test field. The test field begins as a
completely cleared piece of land; any
objects or minerals that will cause the
mine detectors to signal are removed.
Next they carefully map and create
defined signal sites where metal pieces
are inserted at different pre-
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determined depths. All metal detectors
must complete these test fields on a
weekly basis, and every detector is
graded for the detection accuracy of
every signal site.
This consistent rest for detection
and depth allows the handlers to
notice slight changes, as the grades are
compared for any alterations. Frequent
evaluation of tests and results allows
workers to determine even slight
technical aberrations. Vogt explains
the importance of this early detection.
"It's very easy to realize if a technical
instrument breaks down completely,"
he says, "but very often ir's not a
sudden breakdown but [it] goes slowly.
I r's a process. By using this test field,
we can realize very early if such a
weakness occurs."
Training

As a German-based organization,
GERBERA has a training advantage:
Germany requires all civilian workers
in EOD companies to complete an
EOD training school in Dressen. All
employees must receive their licenses
from their school, and Vogt describes
this license as a "higher degree" for
EOD workers. Even officers of the
Germany military, regardless of rank
and professional experience, are not
permitted to participate in EOD work

without obtaining this license.
GERBERA uses the material from this
German EOD school to train local
workers they hire for specific projects.
The training the workers receive
depends on the tasks they will be
assigned and the requirements of the
local government.
In Laos, all workers complete
basic UXO and landmine training in
UXO-Lao's National Training School
based in Vientiane.
The United States founded this
school. Special Forces reams from the
Pacific Forces train the local deminers.

•

to receive the advanced training, but
basic training is provided daily for the
lower-ranking Vietnamese officers and
soldiers. Basic training includes
instructions for removing the normal
technology, the difference in the
technology between mine clearance
and UXO clearance, safety procedures,
technical procedures, requirements for
quality cont rol inspections, and
standard GERBERA rules and
regulations. The high-ranking officers
receive special training on fuses,
ammunition and demolition work,
equipment handling and mainten-

GERBERA
training
group. do
GERBERA

GERBERA also provides training for
specific project assignments and tasks;
this specialized training often includes
regional Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and an introduction to the culture. The task has
been simplified over the years through
standardization. When the demining
activities began, every organization
had irs own SOPs that GERBERA
contractors needed to learn.
Eventually SOPs were standardized,
and they are currently unified for Laos.
In Vietnam, the training system
must accommodate the Vietnamese
government's regulations. Only the
higher-ranking officers are permitted

ance, and technical derails for repair
work.
Cultural Respect

Interactions between the villagers
and the professional deminers are
frequent and can be helpful, as the
villagers often provide crucial
information on UXO locations and
terrain. In return, the experts establish
mine awareness education programs
and attempt to accommodate local
customs. GERBERA professionals are
taught to respect the cultural and
religious traditions upheld by the
countries in which they work. Vogr
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related an event that illustrates the
importance of respecrfulexchanges,
particularly when cultural or religious
infractions are unknowingly made.
At the end of a workday in a
remote village in Laos, a GERBERA
team prepared to destroy the collected
munitions. The team leader visited all
the houses in the village to advise the
residents that they should leave. At one
of the houses, he called out to ask if
anyone was home. Hearing a muted
voice from inside the house, he
stepped over the flowers at the door
to en rer the home and asked the
woman inside to leave before they
detonated the munitions. He returned
to the project site unaware that the
flowers at the entrance of the home
signified that an occupant had died.
Custom prohibits anyone except the
wife of the dead husband from
entering the house.
After the detonation, the team
prepared to leave the village but was
stopped by the shaman. He told them
the unwelcome visitor had disturbed
the ghosts. To appease the ghosts they
must perform a very expens ive
ceremony, and the whole team must
remain in the village for three days.
After a lengthy dispute the German
commander paid the equivalent of two
dollars, the villagers were satisfied, and
the team was allowed to leave.
Vogt stressed that the most
important aspect of this transaction
was respect. He explained, "If you
negotiate with the peasants you have
to respect their feelings and their
traditions. It was impossible simply to
leave." Several GERBERA policies
reflect the value it places on respectful
exchanges.

UXO Lao classes on mine awareness
and safety education. Although some
of rhe members are already teachers,
rhey are all taught basic teaching skills
and methods for in creasing mine
awareness. Team members are taught
ro accompany their reaching sessions
with diagrams, pictures, illustrations
and puppet shows targeted at children.
In Laos, the GERBERA Commun ity Awareness Team found it
necessary to teach adults and children
alike not to make an open fire in the
woods without first checking the soil.
After the occurrence of several
different incidents involving villagers
who died cultivating new farmland,
the team incorporated lessons teaching
the villagers not to cultivate new land
before the area is cleared.
Mine education in Vietnam is
conducted with the cooperation of rhe
schools. The GERBERA Community
Awareness Team contacts reachers to
schedule mine education sessions.
Team members frequently revise
sessions to incorporate information
pe rtinent to local situations or
perspectives. Shortly after GERBERA
arrived in Vietnam, the Community
Awa reness Team developed an
educational program to address the
dangers of scrap metal collecting.
M any Vietnamese men gathered
grenades and UXO to sell as scrap
metal, but often their crude digging
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tools and inexperience led to injuries
and death. The teaching sessions were
most successful when they focused on
educating the women and children.
The women could often persuade their
husbands and sons to stop recovering
scrap metal.
Continued Diligence

Vogt emphasized that the adherence ro structured project assessments,
quality control regulations, equipment
assessments and promotion of mine
education and awareness is not limited to the projects in Laos and Vietnam. GERBERA personnel are required to complete advanced training
in services ranging from mine detection, mapping, and mine neutraliza-

Much of rhe contenr for rhis anicle has been
garhered fro m an imerview with Lurz Vogt, the
General Manager for GERBERA. Vogr is
responsible for GERBERA's demining and
UXO clearance activities and has panicipared
in the projecrs described in this arricle.

Contact Information

Lutz Vogt
General Manager
GERBERA
K-Liebknecht Str.1 B
D-15711 Konigs Wusterhausen,
Germany
Tel: 033.75.290.72 1
Fax: 033.75.201.580
E-mail: GERBERA@T-online.de

Expanding Mine Awareness

A complete GERBERA project
task force includes a community
awareness team. For the project in
Laos, the team members attended

tion and clearance, to mine awareness
education and local training. Because
they offer a wide range of skills and
knowledge, GERBERA personnel are
often called upon to provide specific
assistance for international demining
programs, in addition to entire project
assignments. As long as humanitarian
organizations and local and international governments and associations
continue to acknowledge and address
mine contamination problems,
GERBERA plans to continue their
mine action and their efforts to cleanse
the environment. •

•

The munitions pictured are typical ofthose littered throughoutVitenam's
Quang Tri province. c/o GERBERA
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A deminer uses a
hand tool to deal
with vegetation.
doGERBERA

The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program

The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program:
Engagement in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
The Humanitarian Demining Program is working with U.S. government agendes
and NGOs to provide mine awareness training, mine clearance, clearance training,
medical services and the latest in demining technology to mine-affected nations.
by Kela Morehead, U.S. State Department Fellow

T

he U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program administered by the United Nations, the Organization of
(USHDP) seeks to relieve human suffering while American States, or the U.S. Agency of International
promoting U.S. interests. The program's objectives Development (USAID).
are to establish and suppon sustainable indigenous
A mine-affected country in need of aid can request
demining programs, reduce civilian casualties, create con- United States assistance via the U .S. embassy in that
ditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons to country. The embassy reviews the request and forwards it
their homes, reinforce the stability of affected countries, to the IWA on Humanitarian Demining in Washington
and encourage international cooperation and participation. D.C. The IWA is responsible for approving, developing
USHDP is a comprehensive effort supporting mine
and coordinating U.S. humanitarian demining policy and
acrion initiatives including: mine aware-----~
programs. Its members include policy and
ness, the clearance of priority land, traintechnical experts from several government
ing host country deminers, reviewagenc1es.
ing and accelerating promising
The IWG is chaired by the U.S.
technologies, and medical and
Department of State and vicerehabilitative assistance to survichaired by the Department of
vors of landmine accidenrs. 1
Defense. Other members include
On Sept. 13, 1993, the Nathe National Security Council,
tiona! Security Council estabUSAID and the Central Inrellilished an Interagency Working
gence Agency (CIA). To date, the
Group(IWG)onlandminesand
United States has assisted 37
demining. The implementation
different country programs around
of this directive resulted in the esthe world, including demining efforts
in Kosovo and Somaliland. The United
tablishment of core concepts for the
States has contributed nearly a half a
USHDP. The IWG on Humanitarian
Demining is charged with identifying
billion dollars to the eradication oflandmines.
which countries receive U.S. demining assistance
and managing U.S. resources committed to the program. U .S. Activities in Asia
The United States seeks to tailor each program to the
needs of each nation and often works in cooperation with
There are 16 mine-affected nations in Asia. 2 The
inrernational agencies and host governments of mine- United States currently has four programs within South
affected states all over the world. The Un ited States supports Asia: Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and, most recently,
mine clearance operations and mine awareness programs Vietnam. Most of these South Asian demining programs
by providing training, expertise and equipment support have been established within the past five years, but are
through programs of the U.S. Department of Defense. al ready saving lives and improvin g what could be
Support also comes from funding, training and operations considered dangerous living condi tions. Southeast Asia
provided by commercial organizations or NGOs. In has an extensive UXO and landmine problem that the
countries where a direct U.S. military training mission is United States is committed to eradicating.
not necessary, the United States contributes to programs
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VIETNAM

The United States has supported the NGOs presence
in Vietnam for many years, building the framework for
improved U.S.-Vietnam relations. A formal demining
program for Vietnam was approved in June 2000, allowing
greater U.S. assistance and further demining initiatives.
USAID alone has provided Vietnam with over $5 million
(U.S.) used for various initiatives in order to assist with
the development ofVietnamese programs and insuring the
economic stability and indigenous support for the programs
created.
U.S. Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR) funds were allocated in 1998
and 1999 to Vietnam for the establishment of a mine
awareness and training center. The MAIC at JMU was
chartered by the State Department Humanitarian
Demining Program Office in 1999 to develop a mine
awareness program in Vietnam. The goals of the program
were to develop mine awareness education knowledge,
teach requisite management skills, and implement a
rudimentary min e awareness campaign with the
government and the people of Quang Tri province,
Vietnam.
The mine awareness program operations were
developed in accordance with Vietnam's National Plan for
Sustainable Development from 1991 to 2000. The overall
goal of the project was to influence the behaviors ,
perceptions and attitudes of families living in Quang Tri,
thus allowing them to escape or minimize the effects of
latent unexploded munitions by providing appropriate
knowledge and techniques to the children and families of
the region. This methodology was selected because it used
an iterative building block approach that utilized maximum
support of, and ongoing collaboration and cooperation
with, the People's Committe officials, the Women's Union
and the Committee for the Care and Protection of Children
representatives, and the people of the province. To the
extent that its goals were achieved, the project was successful
because each component activity was conducted within
the context of a working partnership with the host nation
populace.
In 2000, over $1.7 million was contributed to Vietnam for the start up of a humanitarian demining center,
in addition to demining and mine awareness equipment.
T he United States is also supporting a Level One Survey
in Vietnam to record the severity of landmine and UXO
infestation, and to better formulate a plan of action. In
2001, the United States plans to allocate more than
$2 million to support mine action in Vietnam.
The U.S. government is ready to continue to support
the large NGO population present in Vietnam, but is now

assisting with the start up of the newly approved U.S.Vietnamese Humanitarian Demining Program. With more
opportunities to help fimd landmine/UXO clearance, provide
mine awareness and victims' assistance, while building
cooperative relationships, Vietnam will soon be along the path
to saving lives and healing the wounds caused by past conflict.

LAOS
Intense combat from 1964 to 1973 in Laos led to the
extreme UXO situation present there today. The primary
threat to civilians in Laos is UXO, not AP mines, though
both are present. Two million tons of ordnance were
dropped on Laos, of which 30 percent is unexploded. Over
half of the country is plagued with UXO today. The most
contaminated areas are northern provinces like Houaphan
and Xieng Khouang and the eastern border, which had
been heavily bombed. These weapons continue to kill
people more than 25 years after the original conflict.
The United States has been assisting Laos since 1995.
Over $14 million has been provided for humanitarian
demining projects, mine awareness programs and victims'
assistance, via th e Department of Defense, State
Department and USAID. The United States is the largest
contributor to the UXO/ landmine relief in Laos, providing
over 25 percent of its total contributions. The United States
has had an active role in UXO Lao programs since 1996,
and has also been its single largest donor. Funds contributed
by the United States maintain mine/UXO awareness in
eight provinces, mine/UXO clearance in seven others, and
created rapid response teams in the remaining five. In 1996
and 1997, U.S. money helped established UXO Lao and
fund training for UXO clearance, community mine
awareness and medical care for UXO Lao personnel. The
Nam Suang UXO Training Center was also supported by
the United States and staffed by Lao instructors. This center
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JMU staff prepare
Women's Union
members to
conduct a mine
action survey.
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The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program
offers courses in community aware ness, clearance
techniques, medical training and leadership development.
By the end of 1999, U.S. military contingents had trained
more than 815 indigenous personnel and created a selfsustaining training capaciry. The U.S. trained deminers
have destroyed more than 100,000 pieces ofUXO and 43
landmines.
.Through international donations and support, 300
medt~a.l st~ff personnel have received training in emergency
rehabdaauon and laboratory services. One provincial and
five district hospitals have received medical equipmenr and
supplies. The United States and others within the inrernarional humanitarian demining communiry will continue
to support the well-rounded and effective U XO Lao
program.

CAMBODIA

•

CMACMine
Awareness
class in session.
c/o USHDP

Cambodia's land mine and UXO problem was caused
by two decades of war. Four million to 6 million landmines
on 3,000 km 2 of land compose the t hreat that 23
Cambodian provinces suffer. There is a minimum of 50
casualties a monrh attributed to landmines. In addition to
the devastating physical and medical problems landmine
and UXO accidents cause, socioeconomic ramifications are
also increasing. War C hild has reported that without this
landmine problem "agricultural production could increase
.. . 135 percenr in Ca mbodia."8
In 1.997, the United Nations train ed 537 Roya l
Cambo~t~n Armed Forces (RCAF) engineers resulting in
the demmmg of800,000 sq. m of viable land along a major
htghway. Cambodia has received equipment from the U.N .
Development Program Trust Fund and over $23 million
in NADR funds from the United States. The United States

• Two mines found
within a mine
clearance lane.
c/oUSHDP

has pr?vided trainin~ for I ,200 personnel in basic demining
techntques, leadershtp, medtcal skills and mine awareness
Mine clearance operations led to the reco nstruction of~
r?ad and bridge, opening access to a chief city for the first
ttme tn 20 years.
The Cambodian Red C ross Mine In cident Database
has been a huge project initiated by the NGOs. The
information entered into this database will further help
the humanitarian demining cause of Cambodians. Further
initiatives by th e Rural Planning Committees and the
RCAF, with the contributions from the United States led
to the establishment of the Cambodian Mine Action Center
(CMAC). CMAC, with the help of the United States and
other international donors, has reduced the casualty rate
from landmmes by 90 percent. Still, o ne in 45 Cambodians
ts an ~mputee, presenting a new problem facing this
landmme-scourged society.
USAID has invested over $6 .8 million in the
Cambodia Prosthetics and Rehabilitation Program since
1 9~2. USA! D. money also goes to support the Disability
Acuon .Counctl ~~d ~AF, to assist landmine victims by
expandmg rehabt!ttatton and job training programs, and
by strengthening the institutions that Cambodian society
needs to sustain such programs. These programs have
produced an d fined 635 multi-axle fee t and 1,300
thermoplastic prostheses and treated 8,000 patients.

THAILAND
.

Th~iland 's landmine problem is the result of past

mr~rnalmsurg~ncies, as well as armed conflicts with neigh-

bonng countnes. There are an estimated 100,000 landmines located along Thailand's borders with Cambodia,
Burma, Laos and Malaysia. T hose mines are on approximately 900 sq. km of land and affect 18 provinces.
The United Stares first provided Thailand with a
provisional $ 1?. million in 1999. T he provisional money
funded a demtnmg school for mine awareness classes in
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Lop Buri, a facility for basic demining in Ratchaburi, while
also providing essential demining equipment. Since 1999
the United States has provided nearly $5 million to
T hailand's humanitarian demining efforts. U.S. Special
Fo rces conti ngents have trained more than 100 Thai
dem iners to international standards. Thailand's Mine
Action Center (TMAC) was officially dedicated in January
2000 and demining activities actually began later that year
in July. TMAC will become a key instrument to further
human itarian demining assistance and mine clearance
initiatives in Thailand. Within the past year the U.S. and
T hai governments have d ecid ed to initiate a Mine
Detecting Dog Program. RON CO Consulting Company
has been co ntracted to provide support for the Dog
Program in Thailand beginning in 2001. Mine detecting
dog programs have been successful in many other countries,
increasing mine clearance productiviry while also insuring
greater safery for both deminers and demining dogs.
Fut ure for Demining
T he future for d emining e fforts looks bright fo r
Southeast Asia. International cooperation, NGO support
and U.S. assistance supports productive work within Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. More equipment, funds
and mine action is planned for 200 I within each of these
countries, saving more lives and eradicating the dangerous
evidence of conflic ts from the past. T he U nited States plans
to assist NGO projects in Cambodia, help provide more
equipment and protective gear for demining efforts there,
and co ntinue to support (via UNDP) the work done by
CMAC. Laos is continuing irs demining efforts and the
United States will make equipmenr provisions and support
the Lao Trust Fund. Thailand's dog program wi ll have the
backing of the United Stares, while Sa Kaew and HMAU
put new demining equipment to positive use. Vietnam has
continual NGO demining assistance, bur since irs approval
for a formal demining program s upport and future
demining efforts will accelerate.
The Uni ted States has never been more committed to
rhe land mine and UXO scourge in Southeastern Asia. The
United Stares will continue to support the indigenous mine
action efforts of countries already receiving U.S assistance,
and will review new requests for assistance from neighboring UXO and landmine infested nations. Remarkable
successes have been achieved in mature programs like
Cambodia and Laos, and the new programs in Thailand
and Vietnam. Hopefully, one day in the future, stabiliry
and cooperation can reign over the whole Southeast Asia
landmine crisis. •
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Mine clearance project in Cambodia where mine
fields are often in t he paths of civilians. c/o USHDP

• 53.

The Children's Plight in Cambodia
UNICEF's mine action initiative in Cambodia puts victim assistance, risk education
and community awareness at the forefront. Efforts have helped produce a national
mine incident database, which aids in planning and evaluating fundraising.

by Chris Horwood, Team Leader of the External
Evaluation, and Michel Le Pechoux, Children Affected
by Armed Conflict Project Officer, UNICEF Cambodia

these findings in context, the more sobering overview of
mine action in Cambodia should be presented.
Official Mine Action

A Sobering Context

M

ine action agencies in Cambodia continue to
face a major challenge. In the past decade they
have only been able to partially address the vast
mines and UXO problem. This article seeks to show that
despite this soberi ng context there are positive and
important lessons to be learned from the Cambodian
experience that need to be shared with the global mine
action community as models for progress. Specifically, this
article represents some lessons learned from UN ICEF's
mine action involvement in Cambodia, as highlighted in a
recent external evaluation conducted for UNICEF.
UNICEF Gets Involved

UNICEF Cambodia first started assisting mine victims
as part of its support to disabled persons in 1992. Direct
support of mine action activities began in 1994 and has
increased over the years toward the present more
comprehensive multi-action support. UNICEF is now
involved in a range of programs in the field of mine action,
victim assistance and provision of basic social services, as
well as community development in mine-affected
communities.
UNICEF Cambodia is unusual in that it has been
closely involved with mine action initiatives beyond irs
usual role of mine awareness in other countries {l). To
assess its progress to date and as a guide for future direction,
UNICEF commissioned an exrernal evaluation in mid2000 to assess activities supported for the prevention of
mine/UXO accidents. A selective summary of the external
evaluation (2), containing important lessons for other
country programs are presented below. However, to put
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Cambodia is considered to have one of the longest
running and most comprehensive mine action programs
in the world. Over 3,750 people are direcrly involved in
the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), along with
the two demining NGOs, Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
and HALO Trust. Commercial demining groups have had
very limited involvement in the last decade. T he overall
operational profile includes mine clearance, mine field
marking, survey, mine awareness, EOD rapid-response,
mine detection dogs and mine incident data gathering.
Bur in the eight or nine years of operation only a
fraction of the mined areas and a n extremely small
proportion of the millions of mines and UXO have been
successfully addressed (3). There are still very large numbers
of large, identified mine fields awaiting marking and
clearance, and probably many more small ones that have
yet to be identified. A national Level One survey was only
started in Cambodia in 2000, eigh t years after the
international response had begun.
Estimates of the total number of mines in Cambodia
have been reduced from 10 million to 4 million-6 million
(and many millions of UXO) (4). Some claim rhe true
figure of abandoned mines may be much lower(5).
Numbers, however, are not the key issue: the vital issue is
where they are and whom they affect through injury, death,
land denial and socioeconomic debilitation. Despite the
significant decrease in the past two years, the number of
new mines/UXO accidents remains one of the highest in
the world. Since 1979, an estimated 40,000 persons have
lost limbs as a result of mine/UXO accidenrs and will
require physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation for the
rest of their lives. Mines and UXO still constitute a threat
for thousands of families and an obstacle to the
development of these communities. In 1998, civilians

represented 50 percenr of all casualties
and soldiers 50 percent. In 2000, as a
result of the end of hostilities and the
return of the population to former
conflict a reas , the proportion of
civilian causalities has risen to 93
percent with 30 percent of these being
children under 18 years of age.
The efforts and efficient use of the
res ources of mine acrion greatly
depend on effective prioritization and
targeting. Also, the end-use of cleared
land and who exactly benefits from
mine action is of central importance.
In C ambodia, a community-level
request approach is being formalized
and empowered through the new
provincial land us e planning
mechanisms.
The number of mine incidents is
now dropping significantly. From
1996-98 the average monthly casualty
rate was 202 incidents. However, from
1999-2000 there was a d ramaric
decrease to an average monthly rate
of 77 incidents. In October 2000,
there were just 36 casualties reported.
T his is a very hopeful trend.
In terestingly, the statistics do nor
indicate that the declining figures are
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beneficial impact on levels of injury
and death as well as on the socioeconomic development of communities living in mined areas.
Unofficial Mine Action

In numerous communities of
subsistence farms, people have no
choice bur to live, travel and work in
high-risk areas. In many cases people
have taken it upon themselves to

of land cleared by unofficial demining
is far greater than that accomplished
by professional mine action agencies (7).
To some degree the prevalence of
village demining and the number of
people living in mined areas so many
years after conflict has ceased to be an
indictment of the use oflandmines as
well as the shortcomings of the international response to the landmines
CriSIS.

Villagers who demine are unprotected, unofficial and wo~k
with inappropriate equipment and no safety backup. It wlll
never be known how much land has been cleared by locals,
how many villagers have been killed while attemp~ing
demining by themselves or by using land only part1ally
cleared by other villagers."
11

directly linked to mine action in most
areas (6). Other factors seem to be
more important: the end of armed
conflict and population movements,
a nd possibly the widespread
prevalence of "village demining. "
Although the trend is very encouraging it also suggests that planners
need to understand the context in
more detail to establish when, how and
what type of mine action has a direct

American Red
Cross rehabilitation center.
c!o ICRC I Darren

address the problem independently.
Villagers who de mine are unprotected,
unofficial and work with inappropriate equipment and no safety
backup. It will never be known how
much land has been cleared by locals,
how many villagers have been killed
wh ile attempting demining by
themselves or by using land only
partially cleared by other villagers. The
number of mines destroyed and area
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Findings and
Lessons Learned

The following are
projects supported by
UNICEF for the
prevention of mine
incidents, which are
highlighted in the
recent external evaluation:

1. The Cambodian Mine Incident
Database with the Cambodian Red
Cross (CRC) and Handicap
International (HI).
2. Community Mine Marking (with
CMAC).
3. Mine Risk Education (with MAG
and World Education).
4. The Integrated Mine Database
(with CMAC)(8).

Mine Incident Database (MID)
UNICEF is supporting this
important initiative, which it first
began in 1994 in partnership with
MAG. The Mine Incident Database
(now implemented by the CRC /Hl)
charts, in derail, the changes in
monthly accident rates throughout the
country. Addi tiona! information
collected through the victims' questionnaires provides imponant keys to
understanding the dynamics of how
and why certain groups and communities in Cambodia continue to sustain
mine accidents. Addressing mine
problems in a post-conflict/rehabilitation or development comext is never
straightforward and this database
provides an excellent tool for analysis,
evaluation and, more importantly,
strategic planning through prioritization.
When mine action starred in
1992 there was, as in all mine-affected
countries, a great information
deficiency concerning mine incidents
and derails of accidents. Initially,
UNICEF supponed MAG to gather
mine incident data in the five most
affected provinces in Cambodia,
which was used to develop mine
awareness messages, monitor the
severity of the mine problem and
•

advocate a global ban on their
production, sale and use. Only later
was it recognized as a strong planning
tool for mine clearance.
Looking for a sustainable national
partner, UNICEF pushed for CRC to
be the main implementing agency
instead of international NGOs.
Unlike the international NGOs, CRC
had a strong national presence with
volunteer networks throughout the
country, which could be harnessed to
assist with data collection.
The current project structure uses
24 CRC staff data gatherers and the
CRC communication network to
cover the country. The data gatherers
are deployed in the most affected
provinces. In less affected provinces
networks of communication have
been created in order to remain costeffective. Data gatherers all have
motorbikes for transport and remain
in constant contact with a range of
local authorities and community
centers (schools and health posts/
hospitals) in order to ensure that every
incident is reported. They individually
visit every reported mine or UXO
victim and complete a mine victim
report form, which is sent ro Phnom
Penh for processing every month.
The village level incidents are
collected nationally, compiled and

Population having
settled in a
suspected area.
c/o Chris Horwood

processed in a database able to generate
reports for dissemination or respond
to specific queries. The rota! incident
figures are processed with a breakdown
of information that assists analysts to
understand sociological details of mine
victims, location of accidents, the
activity, age and sex of victim, whether
the victim knew they were in mined
areas or not, whether it was a mine or
UXO, ere. The detailed breakdown
proves to be important information
for mine awareness and clearance
teams.
Monthly reports are distributed
in both Khmer and Eng lish to
government ministries and provincial
departments, mine action agencies,
disability organizations, embassies,
donors and advocacy groups inside
Cambodia, as well as internationally
(9). Over 600 copies per month are
printed and distributed. A bi-annual
report for the 1998-1999 period was
recently released. By July 2000, the
whole country was covered in the most
comprehensive and only national mine
incident database in the world.

External
Findings

Evaluation Central

• The MID is performing a viral and
unique function within the mine
action context in Cambodia and
provides valuable information that
actively assists different agencies and
government bodies in multiple areas
of their activities: program planning,
evaluation, monitoring and fundraising.
• Considering the MID's contriburion
to the mine action community in
Cambodia, the evaluation judged
the MID to be cost-effective and
inexpensive and giving great added
value to the national mine action
effort.
• The focus has to be on the quality of
the product (i.e. the monthly report)

• 56.

and irs effective use. As CRC
de p e nds more and more on
community networks and volunteer
networks it needs to work hard to
establish, maintain and moniror the
system. Stra tegies ne ed to be
developed on monitOring, testing
and evaluating these emerging
networks. This deals with the issue
of developing quality control.
• If the currently occurring incident
reduction continues, there may be
reduced need for an MID in coming
years. Such a situation should be
welcomed by all stakeholders in the
mine action secror. The role of an
M ID should be finite.

Lessons Learned Of Use to the
Global Landmine Community
1. An information vacuum in an
a ffected country can lead to a
simplistic understanding of the
mines/UXO problem and a severe
lack of planning and monitoring
tools. Mine action agencies need
authoritative and detailed information for strategic planning. It is a
false economy to bypass this baseline
information system.
2. Once a database is established, it
needs ro be promoted and end users
shown how it can serve them in their
work. The database project should
be seen as a service provider to
enhance the added value it offers the
mine action end users. Central mine
action authorities should expect
mine action agencies to be actively
using such a tool for resourc e
targeting and accountability.
3 . It is important that certain
information be broken down
beyond the province, district and
commune level, right down tO the
village level as well as provide a
service to end users for customized
and targeted data breakdown. For

certain agen cies only th e most
derailed and specific breakdown will
assist their targeting.

Community Mine Marking (CMM)
In 1996, confronted wi th the
limitations of mine awareness and the
shortcomings of traditional mine
clearance, UNICEF became involved
in the start up of the Community
Mine Marking (CMM) project within
CMAC. CMM consists of small
mobile teams engaged in survey and
high priority limited clearance
accompanied by long term marking to
indicate safe and/or suspected areas.
Despite irs small size, CMM
provides valuable service. With 12
small teams (of five men with two
detectors) it has performed over 300
tasks in three years. The tasks CMM
selects for marking or limited clearance
are targeted and prioritized to
maximize benefit from each task. One
UNICEF technical advisor was
attached to the CMM from July 1997
to October 2000. The project is now
managed by national CMAC staff
These de facto "mini - mobile"
units of CMM fill a gap in CMAC's
operational profile as CMAC has no
other mobile ream capacity.
Comprising only 60 workers out of a
total CMAC staff of over 2,750, they
represent a very small unit. Large
demining reams are very inflexible to
smaller community needs and can
only conduct a few tasks each year.
Largely for logistical and administrative reasons, CMAC deploys platoons
in large numbers to work on large
mined areas. In addition, its top
priority is to clear land for resettlement, whereas the primary goal of
CMM is to decrease the risk in already
mined communities.
Hundreds of communities need
clearing and marking of safe passages,
access and facilities in village areas that
are mined. Most of rhe 300 tasks
completed have provided safe access
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and/or construction of wells, schools,
health centers, pagodas, roads and
bridges. In all cases they have been
prioritized directly by the
communities th e mselves or by
development agencies working in the
areas. CMM is hence contributing ro
reduce the mine threat to mineaffected communities and enabling
the development of basic social
services, which these communities
often lack.
When CMM mark the areas to
be cleared they use permanent
concrete markers, which are designed
to indicate both the area that is
guaranteed safe and the suspected area.
In this respect, irs marking system
differs from the standard marking
process that seeks to identify the
boundaries of a suspected mined area,
which is often imprecise. CMM is
assisted by the CMAC mine awareness
teams (posters, TV spots, meetings,
etc.) to inform the villagers of the role
of the long-term markers and the
villagers' need to maintain them.

Central Findings
External Evaluation

From the

• In the absence of mobile teams
within CMAC, CMM fulfills a
critical function of response to
requests in high-risk mined areas.
• CMM is flexible, highly responsive
and efficient when deployed for
appropriate tasks. It is also housed
and based close to its area of
operation to minimize daily transportation etc.
• The impact of CMM's work benefits
a disproportionately high number of
people when considering rhe
relatively small areas where CMM
has cleared/marked. The impact in
terms of facilitation of NGO/IO
intervenrion, community access to
essential needs and access for larger
CMAC demining platoons Is
evaluated as highly positive.
• CMM can be very effective In

facilitating rehabilitation a nd
development work by NGOs and
other U.N. agencies in terms of well
drilling, school and health clinic
building, etc.

community presentations, nigh t
shows, day shows, special presentations to children and women, school
presenrarions and training sessions for
reachers. These activities were carried
our by MAG staff- raising quesrions
abou t the susta inabil i ty of th e
interventions.
Based on rhe ass umption that
mine risk education in schools would
be needed for many years as long as
children were growing up in mined
environments, UNICEF sought to

Lessons Learned for the Global
Mine Action Community
1. T he profile of any national mine
action capacity should include small
mobile rea m s that are able to
respond with speed and provide
limited clearance and m a rking
serv1ces.
2 . T he effi cien cy of such teams is
high es t when working on very
limited clearance and marking tasks.
3 . The CMM concept should be
avai lable in as many mine-affected
areas as possible both in Cambodia
and other affected co untries. The
recommendations of the external
evalua ti on a re th a t CMM be
expa nded in terms of number of
reams and in to o t her high-risk
provinces as soon as possible. It may
be noted that as a concept it would
prove to be very attractive to various
donors who may wish to fund
individual teams etc.
4. CMM is effective but mus t be
s uppl eme nted by la rge r-scal e
clearance and mine awareness. It is
a damage limitation concept to offer
villagers at-risk safer options, bur it
is by no means a full solution to a
community's mine problem.
5 . Limited clearance in a min ed
environment requires long term
marking both for indi cating to
people the safe and suspected areas
and for recording the area cleared in
preparation for large scale clearance.

Mine Risk Education (MRE)
Since 1994, UNICEF has worked
in partnership with MAG to develop
m ine awareness education with a
specific child focus using various
differe nt ap p roach es, such as

all primary schools of Cambodia. A
more inrensive program for schools
lo cated in the 30 most affected
districts will reach more than 1,000
schools in 130 clusters (10).
The activ i t ies of t h e MRE
program go beyond mine awareness
and rh e simple transfer of knowledge.
The training of teachers emphasizes
rhe use of participatory approaches,
which are essen tial for skills, qualities
and competencies that aim to affect
behavioral and attitudinal changes.

economic groups with greater d aily
risks to min e accidents. As a result,
World Education is purring a greater
emphasis on the develop m ent of
techniques to reach out to school
ch ildren.
• U NICEF 's cu rrent strat egy of
developing a school-based education
program in mine awareness IS
contributing to what is becoming a
sustainable program for all primary
school students in which rhe MoE
n ew ly enjoys a high sense of
"ownership. "
• T he MRE program is at an early stage
b ur has benefited from lesso n s
lea rned from the previous
approaches of mine awareness.

3 . Any program focusi ng on a schoolbased education approach needs to
develop a complementary, parallel
approach to ensure that our-ofschool children also receive mine
awareness education.
4. The link between mine awareness
and actual impact on children and
their ri sk-taking behavior is still
unknown. It is not poss ibl e to
establish a direct correlation between
min e awareness (as with mine
clearance) and incident reduction
anywhere in Cambodia. This,
however, should not reduce efforts
to maximize awareness and mine risk
education.

Endnote
Lessons Learned for the Global
Mine Action Community

•

Community Mine Marking teams cola borate with local communities to set up long
term markers indicating both safe and suspected areas. c/o Chris Horwood

support and promote mine awareness
that was more sustainable, and where
the Ministry of Education (MoE) had
greater ownership of the approach and
activities. The currenr MRE program
was established and funded in early
1999. The new approach required rhe
development of a close partnership
with the MoE. Since 2000 UNICEF
h as been working with World
Education (an ed ucation -centered
NGO) to implement this program.
T hrough its funding of World
Education, UNICEF is contributing
ro what is becoming a sustainable and
fo rmalized mine awareness program in
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UN ICEF ex pec ts rhat the whole
primary education system will benefit
from the improved reaching methods.

Central Findings from
External Evaluation:

the

• The evaluation found that children
rece ive the MRE well and th e
teachings are effective in terms of
being able to identi fY safe and unsafe
behavior in mined environments.
• Children not attending school in the
areas targeted by MRE had limited
information on mine risk behavior
and were from the most vulnerable

1. T he key lesson learned for UNICEF
is that irs close involvement with the
M o E in the MRE s hould have
happened some years earlier and that
it is problematic develop ing a
national and child-based program
without the MoE having a strong
involvement and in the initiative.
2. The MRE program is no longer
being implemented by a mine action
age n cy, but instead by an
educational NGO. The evaluation
found this to be an appropriate
switch for UNICEF to make in
terms of working towards a
sustainable educational impact and
should be noted by other donors
who have previously only considered
mine action NGOs for such a role.
C learly mine awareness education
do es nor require mine-related
technical expertise, bu r ins t ead
education-related expertise.

Contact Information
Micheal LePechoux
Tel: 855-23-426-2 14 Ext. 146
Mobile: 855-12-804-820
Fax: 855-23-426-284
E-mail: mlepechoux@UNICEF.org
UNICEF is the designated fo cal point
responsible for mine awareness education
within the United Nations structure.
2 "External Evaluation of UNICEFSupported Activi ties to Prevent M ine
Incidents" report (by Chris Horwood and
Andrea Crossland) can be obtained from
Michel Le Pechoux, Ch ildren Affected by
Armed Conflict Project Officer, UNICEF
Cambodia.
3 Approximately 2 percent of "regist ered
mined land."
4 " Hidden Killers: Global Demining Crisis."
U.S. DepartmentofState Publication 1998.

5 120 Million Landmines Deployed Worldwide:

Cambodia and Afghanistan were
the first countries to alert rhe world
to rhe critical need for humanitarian
mine action. The learning curve for
these and many other national mine
action programs has been steep and
sudden. Mine action is still a new
sector in humanitarian intervention
and rhe challenges it faces are still
immense. Although it has nor been
possible so far to show any direct
correlation between any type of mine
action and accident reduction due to
rhe multiplicity of factors involved,
various approaches to mine action
should continue to be developed. Iris
very important to establish mechanisms to allow the most promising
elemems such as the ones in this article
ro be considered for potential implementation in other affected countries.

•

The opinions reflected in this article
are those of the authors and not
necessarily those ofUNJCEF
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ract

or Fiction. Ilaria Bonigliero 2000.
The evaluation analyzed data in detail crossreferencing accident location with specific
mine field clearance location as well as mine
awareness education. Almost no direct
correlations could be made between mine
action and accident reduction.
7 Handicap International is cu rre ntly
com pl eting a study of " village" or
"spontaneous" demining in Cambodia. The
report should be available in early 200 I.
8 This section will not be included in this
article due to limitations of space.
9 Reports can be obtai ned from the C RC
office at crc@camnet.com.kh and through
t he H an di cap International mines
coordinator at himines@bigpond.com.kh.
l 0 A group of schools around a main school

6

equipped with a resource center.

Thailand: The Land of Smiles

Thailand: The Land of Smiles
(Until you take your first step)

The remnants of conflicts along the Thai-Cambodian, Lao, Malaysian and Myanmar
borders affect the Livelihood of about 400,000 residents. The Thailand Mine
Action Center Looks to reverse 40 years-worth of Landmine contamination.
By Dave McCracken,
TMAC Mine Action Technical Advisor

Nations. Preliminary survey reports by expert witnesses
indicate that as many as 35 provinces are mine affected.

Four Borders in Conflict
Cambodian Border

T

he four borders of Thailand have been prey to
perpetual conflict, leaving a legacy of shanered
limbs and lives. Landmines have been plamed in
Thailand over the past 40 years by both conventional and
guerilla armies. Some combatants are long forgotten, but
the morbid legacy of landmines remains where the mines
were left years ago to defend borders, depopulate areas and
deny the use of infrastructure, including roads and bridges,
resulting in unusable land.
Initial surveys made by the Royal Thai Army and Navy
in 1998 indicated that approximately 796 square kilometers
of! and is unusable, rhus affecting the livelihood of 400,000
residents. Mine-infested land includes villages, agricultural
lands and parts of national forests. Of these mined areas,
there are 532 sq. km on the Thai-Cambodian border, 124
sq. km on the Thai-Lao border, 53 sq. km on the ThaiMyanmar border, and 87 sq. km on the Thai-Malaysian
border.
The exact number of mines in Thailand is unknown.
Moreover, information on areas suspected to be
contaminated is dated and lacks accuracy, although the
duration of several conflicts indicates that contamination
could be severe in some areas. In order to quantify
Thailand's mine problem, the National Mine Action
Committee commissioned a Level One General Impact
Survey in the late-1990s through the support of Norway,
the United Kingdom, the United States and the United

•

Preah Vihear, a
former battlefield on
the Thai-Cambodian
border.
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From 1979 to 1998, the Thai-Cambodian border was
an arena for intense conflict. The combatants used
landmines as a weapon of choice for denying access and
preventing the movement of people in and out of
Cambodia. The Cambodian Peoples' Armed Forces and
the supporting Vietnamese Army developed special units
to lay mines under the K-5 Operations Plan. The K-5 code
name became synonymous with the entire border area with
Thailand, focusing on the use of landmines to interdict
Cambodian resistance groups entering Cambodia from
Thailand.
Initially, Cambodian troops mined all of their country's
border passes or ingress routes, as well as general border
areas, as a protective measure. In the process, these troops
often strayed unknowingly into Thai territory to plant
mines along the perceived border. In response, Cambodian
resistance groups would plant mines as a protective measure
around Thai sanctuaries. The net result was numerous
groups laying landmines for different purposes, rhus
compounding contamination over a prolonged conflict
period. The O 'Smach border area served as a prime example
of the effect of mined border area on civilians. Fighting in
this area in May 1998 resulted in a high level of mine
contamination and significant casualties among refugees
attempting to flee across the border. Thai medical facilities
along the border continue t o provide assistance co
Cambodian landmine victims seeking emergency medical
attemion.

1964 w hen the T C P began operations in northern
Thailand, Khun Nam Chan Village, Borklua District, and
Nan province. The insurgencies expanded into Nakorn
Phanom province and, in 1965, open warfare between
governmem forces and the guerrilla movement began. The
conflict expanded to include border provinces of Chiang
Rai, Payao, Nan, Uttaradit, and Phirsanulok.
The act of warfare in Laos included laying landmines
in border passages to restrict movement and as protection
around guerilla and government military bases. Tactically
important features such as dominant hills were also a focal
poim of the fighting. Military conflict continued with
considerable intensity from 1968 to 1989.
Thai-Laos border units are currently cooperating to
demarcate the border. This operation has resulted in 425
km of previously disputed border areas being marked as
delineated. Unfortunately, the survey teams have suffered
mine casualties during this operation.
Malaysian Border

Conflict along the Thai-Malaysian border between the
British/ Malaysian military forces and the Communist Parry
of Malaysia (CPM) began in the 1950s, ending in 1989.
T he CPM considered mines an important part of its
strategy. It used factory-manufactured mines and locally
produced, improvised mines/booby-traps to support irs
operations. Both British/Malaysian and CPM forces used
mines to protect units operating in border areas in Sonkhla
and Yala provinces. These operations included th e
pro tection of patrol and staging bases for counter
insurgency and guerilla operations. Mine laying activities
by all parties peaked during the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
T he CPM also established tunneled base areas in
re mote jungles along the border. These areas were
inaccessible by road when initially establi shed.
Infrastrucmre development in past years, including road
construction in these remote areas, has brought the
population in contact with mined areas.
The CPM ceased hostilities in 1989, formally signing
a treaty. The use of land mines has ceased on both sides of
the border since implementation of the peace treaty. The
C PM has claimed that most of the landmines and boobytraps were removed in the 1980s. However, landmine
accidems continue to occur in border areas.

Laos Border

Myanmar (Burma) Border

A long insurgency conflict was waged along the Laos
border between the Thai Communist Parry (TCP) and the
Royal Thai Army. Landmines and booby-traps were used
as principle weapons by both sides. The conflict started in

In 1945, Burma gained independence from the British
government. However, in 1948 minority groups claimed
independence from the cemral Burmese government and
set up resistance groups. Fighting among resistance groups

and the Myanmar governmem continues today in border
areas, frequently spilling over into Thai territory. Currently,
the federal governmem's State Law Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) military units are engaged in an ongoing
conflict with minority groups. The intensity of this conflict
significantly changed in 1995 when some of the minority
groups joined with the governmem and increased military
activities. Meanwhile, there have been frequem clashes in
the border areas opposite Kanchantaburi, Rarchaburi, Tak,
Mae Hong Song, and Chiang Mai provinces.
As in other border countries, mines produced in
Myanmar are used ro deny access to both border passes
and residential areas. With military conflicts raging on,
high numbers of ethnic minorities are fleeing for sanctuary
in Thailand. Many of these refugees, along with animals
such as elephants, have become casualties of mines laid by
Myanmar government forces to interdict ethnic minority
guerilla groups. In addition, mines and improvised devices
are causing casualties in Thai agricultural areas, seriously
affecting farming communities.
The conflict along the Myanmar border will continue
for the foreseeable future as mine laying has increased. A
record of the past and present mine situation is needed to
ensure that these hazardous areas are identified for future
humanitarian clearance operations.
Mine Action in Thailand

The combination of terrain and mine threats challenge
mine action efforts in Thailand, especially with the
country's combination of three-canopy jungles, mountains,
laterite soils, the monsoon season, and a host of tropical
diseases. The scattering oflow-metal content AP pressure
mines over a 30-year period also provide for a very
dangerous environment for mine clearance operations. The
solution to these situations is integration of the latest
technology and techniques to safely deploy deminers and
equipment.
The Royal Thai Army and Navy began demining
border areas in 1987. Field units clear an average of2,500
to 3,000 mines each year along all four borders. The First
Army's Burapha Field Force (responsible for the security
in Sa Keao province) is making one such effort. Abom 63
sq. km of Sa Keao are suspected to be mine-infested. From
1994-99, a total of2,837landmines (including AT mines,
AP mines, and UXO) were cleared and destroyed by the
Burapha Field Force in both general EOD and small
clearance tasks, which are normally conducted using tactical
methods.
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) recognizes that
landmines are and will continue to be a major obstacle to
development and economic growth in rural border
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communities. Thailand acknowledged the importance of
the mine threat along its own borders by signing the Ottawa
Convention on Dec. 3, 1997. The country has readily
demonstrated its will to prohibit the use, stockpiling,
production and transfer of AP mines, and to destroy all of
its stockpiled AP mines. Thailand has also undertaken to
identify, demarcate and destroy all AP mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction. On Nov. 27, 1998, Thailand
deposited its ratification instrument at the United Nations,
becoming the 53 nation, and the first in Southeast Asia, to
ratify the Ottawa Convention.
The National Mine Action Committee

In August 1998, an order from the Office of the Prime
Minister ofThailand was issued forming the National Mine
Action Committee (NMAC). The prime minister directs
and chairs NMAC, which was formed to address landmine
issues. NMAC membership consists of al l major
government ministries and departments of the RTG.
NMAC monitors the obligations set forth by the
Onawa Convention and develops policy for the monitoring
of national strategic objectives, including:
Implementing laws prohibiting the use of APLs;
Overseeing demining operations;
Establishing a minimum quantity of APLs in the
country for the purpose of education and clemining
only;
Coordinating overseas and international community
support; and
Disseminating information and providing assistance
to the population and improving the environment
for those people affected by APLs.
NMAC established the Thailand Mine Action Center
(TMAC) on Jan. 18, 1999, in Don Muang, Bangkok.
TMAC serves as the central control over all APL issues
and operations in Thailand.
TMAC

On Jan. 18, 2000, TMAC was officially declared a
working facility under the authority of the Thai Supreme
Command and with Royal Patronage provided by Her
Royal Highness Galiyani. This unique bestowing of royal
patronage demonstrates the level of com mitment and
concern the problem of land mines has stirred in the Thai
people.
TMAC serves as the center for the full range of mine
action issues in Thailand, including coordination with all
international organizations and donors. TMAC operations
encompass mine/UX:O awareness, mine/UX:O clearance,
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mine/UXO s urvey, and v ictim assistance act iVIties
throughout Thailand. The mine action organization
monito rs the timelines set by the Ottawa Co nvention and
has developed a mine action program to meet t he
convention obligations, includingAP stockpile destruction.
The first bulk demolit ion of 10,000 landmines occurred
on May 1, 1999 at a military base in Lop Buri, Thailand,
followed by a second bulk destruction on January 18, 200 I
of I ,000 M14 AP Blast mines.
TMAC is responsible for preparing and coordinating
the implementation of a national mine clearance plan.
Thailand d eveloped an initial "Mas t er Plan on
Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand" for a four-year
period (2000-2004). Seven Humanitarian Mine Action
Units (HMAUs), each with 99 personnel, will be
established along the problem borders. TMAC has trained
personnel to work in the HMAUs. HMAU #1 H~ which
is partially supported by U.S. comriburions to the FY200 1
program, is deployed at Wattana Nakon, Sa Keow province.
This demining unit includes a mine awareness ream,
technical survey team, mine detection dog (MDD) team,
manual demining team and a mechanical assistance team.
The units are stationed in Nong Ya Keaw village on the
Thai-Cambodian border. The duties of each HMAU
include local coordination of mine action activities such
as public relations, mine awareness, information collection,
technical survey and demining.
Humanitarian Mine Action Funding

The funding for humanitarian mine action in Thailand
has come from a number of international sources, as well
as from within the country. The RTG passed a
supplementary budget in March 2000 of 1.6 million Thai
Baht (THB) (about U.S.$32,000) to initiate mine action
by HMAU #1 in Sa Keaw province. An additional16.246
million THB (about U.S.$325,000) was added to TMAC
operational capacity for mine action efforts in July 2000.
The total mine action budget allocation for FY200 1 is 44
million THB (about U.S.$880,000). In addition, the U.S.
government has provided funding and support in:

deployment of two mechanical systems for trail evaluation:
TEMPEST and SDTT (Survivable Demining Tractor and
Tools). TEMPEST, a remote-controlled machine, clears
vegetation in support of de mining operations, while SDTT
also clears vegetation, but requires "hands-on" control.
Meanwhile, the Canadian Center for Mine Action
Techno logies (CCMAT) will provide a BRM48
(P ROMAC) for trail evaluation. The BRM48 is an
attachment mounted on an armored tracked excavator.
Canada will also contribute explosives that are specially
des igned for humanitarian demining operations, called
FlXOR.
Mine Awareness

TMAC recognizes that mine awareness is a priority
fo r reducing the number of landmine/UXO accidenrs in
Thailand. TMAC works closely with other organizations
in developing accidenr-reducing, mine awareness curricula
at both the local and national level. To date, a total of about
46,000 civilians in some 40 border-area villages have
received mine awareness education from HMAU #1.
Overview

There is a commonly held view of T hailand as a
vacationer's haven with spectacular beaches, exotic animals,
and Buddhist temples. All of these attractions can be found
in Thailand. However, it is important to note that within
a few hours driving distance, Thai people are living in mineaffected co mmunities, watching neighbors lose life and
limb. Thailand recognizes the importance of a strong
com mitmenr to ridding it self of landmines, teaching
people to avoid landmines and in assisti ng mine victims.
Initial efforrs by the RTG to mobilize its national assets
for dealing with this problem are noteworthy. Scarce fiscal
resources and technical challenges are clear indications that
no poor country can handle mine problems alone. TMAC
has started effective mine action coo rdination and
operations. Although TMAC's efforts are modest in size
compared to the min e problem, th e mine action

Other International Funding:

No rway U.S.$320,000 (1 6 million THB)
* Level 1 Surve y (TMAC)
United Kingdom U.S.$400,000 (£273,000)
* Leve ll Survey (TMAC)
Ja pan U.S.$400,000 (¥48 million)
* United Nations Vo luntary Trust Fund
organization's work has formed a basis for future mine
clearance and awareness efforts. Thailand faces decades of
challeng ing work to rid landmines from its soil. All
assistance to jumpstart this indigenous program is received
with gratitude and enhances Thailand's determination to
make strides in this long process. •
Contact Information

Dave McCracken
Mine Action Technical Advisor, TMAC
Phanpit Court- Suite 616
160 Piput Soi 2
Silom Road
Bangkok, Thailand 10500
Tel: +66-1-805-8108
Fax: +66-2-266-0279
E-mail: ubique@loxinfo.co.th
Sources

Col. Ni ran Pipithkul, H MAU # 1
Landmine Monitor Report 2000
Landmine Monitor Researcher 2001, Siriphen Limsirikul
Asia Disaster Preparedness Center
Handicap International Thailand
Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines
TMAC- NPA, Ll Preliminary Report, Sa Keao province,
October 2000

Infrastructure development and technical advisory
support;
training support;
equipment acquisition and operational support;
regional capacity development; and
TMAC capacity training ("train the trainers" and
mine detection dog team training)
U.S. mechanical assistance to demining (namely
HMAU #1) s upport has been provided through the

•

(far left) TEMPEST operates in
thick brush on the ThaiCambodian border.

•

TEMPEST clears a lane. Ban Nong
Ya Keaw village, Thai-Cambodian
border.

All photos courtesy of the author.
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Born bs Away:

A Proactive Approach

UXO clearance in Guam and the Pacific Islands is considered mostly ~~emergency
removal." The Journal examines how improper disposal, fatalities and a lack of
survey or accident data compounds the problem for this region.

by Lisa M. Vanada, MAIC

I

n 194 I, Japanese forces invaded Guam, making it the
only populated U.S. territory to endure foreign
occupation. Three years later the United States
recovered Guam and drove the Japanese from the island.
The bloodshed from the conflict continues throughout
Guam, Saipan, Tinian and Palau over 50 years later, due
to the U:XO and landmines that still pollute the islands.
Although the United States provides mine clearance services
to the area, Paul Murray, president of Bombs Away, a U:XOspecializing firm primarily servicing Micronesia and
Southeast Asia, expressed his concern that this mine action
may not be sufficient.
The U.S. military EOD teams participate in over 225
emergency U:XO/landmine clearance operations in Guam
every year. Unfortunately, this figure only reflects situations
where emergency assistance was specifically requested. The
Navy EOD unit stationed on Guam sends a six-man EOD
detachment as a response team only; they are not authorized
to locate and clear mines under their own initiative. This
means that hundreds of undetected mines lay in wait.
Murray demonstrated his frustration with a question: "How
do you think most of these mines are found?" The minerelated death and injury statistics provide the answer:
children and construction workers frequently find these
mines, often with fatal results.
The U.S. military estimates that 25 percent of all
ordnance used during World War II failed to detonate as
intended. In spite of ongoing clearance, mines still litter
Pacific Island battle sites. Murray believes the demining
process could be greatly accelerated with a proactive mine
clearance approach that encompasses thoroughness,
historical research and initiative.
Background

As a former member of U.S. Navy EOD teams, Paul
Murray has extensive military demining experience. He
was awarded the Navy Commendation for Valor after
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disarming over 60 Iraqi sea mines, demolition traps and
anti-shipping mines, and he was deployed on numerous
diving and demolition exercises throughout Asia. After
being stationed in Guam, Murray decided to settle there.
In 1994, a friend asked him to help with mine clearance in
the southern tip ofSaipan. The friend had taken a team to
survey the region, which was used as a munitions dump
after World War II. Although a B29 explosion destroyed
many of the munitions in a 1946 crash, the team found an
overwhelming amount of UXO, for which it needed
demining assistance.
This was the start of Bombs Away, Inc., a multi-service
firm specializing in U:XO, diving and geophysical testing
technologies. The UXO services encompass historical
research, which is used to determine potential UXO
locations and contamination levels; site assessment and
surveys; U:XO clearance and disposal; U:XO safety and
awareness training; and the developm ent of policy and
procedure manuals for U:XO response. Murray's opinions
regarding inefficient demining techniques are substantiated
by his experiences and observations in Micronesia and
Southeast Asia.
Past and Future Problems

Mine clearance activities in the Pacific Islands are often
unregulated or loosely regulated. The lack of government
support frequently correlates with improper U:XO disposal.
Without a designated disposal site, cleared materials are
simply dumped in a convenient location, which is often
an empty neighboring plot that will be developed at a later
date. When a company or individual decides to develop
the neighboring plot, the mines will need to be moved
again. This system wastes time, increases danger and could
easily be avoided with better disposal choices.
There are no government policies in Palau for the
disposal of bombs, so contractors find it easy to cut corners.
Murray related a situation clarifYing that bomb disposal is
not simply a matter of carelessness, but is one of
convenience. A Bombs Away team was hired by a civilian

contractor to clear bombs from a channel. The contractor
wanted to dredge the channel through the mangroves, but
it was contaminated with 500-pound bombs. Bombs Away
divers placed slings beneath the bombs and used diving
regulators to fill lift balloons and float the bombs to the
water's surface. It would have been simple to discard the
bombs in a nearby uninhabited forest. Instead, rhe team
took the time and effort to transport the bombs across the
rown to a remote munitions dump.
UXO disposal problems also exist in Guam.
Construction companies are rapidly developing the island
to clear the land for businesses and homes. Because there
are few regulations, many construction companies focus
primarily on immediate profit, and little concern is given
to the next developer. Murray said that the workers "dig
up U:XO and throw it on the next piece of undeveloped
property." This method may remove the danger from a
specific area but it adds to the UXO problems in the
remaining land. Government regulations and professional
standards must be altered to consider the long-term affects
of mine action.

the government infrequently initiates clearance operations
on major battle sires known for UXO contamination. The
beach es on the west coast of Guam near Agar were stormed
frequently during World War II. As a known area of
conflict, the risk for UXO contamination in that region is
high. After a heavy rainstorm, a C hamorro (native) boy
found a hand grenade in the sand. Although it was
compromised by moisture, the grenade began smoking
when he picked it up. He immediately threw it 20 feet
away, but the weak explosion injured his foot. Most
government and military mine operations are formed as a
response to a recenr call, not a response to the problem
that was created 55 years ago. Emphasis should be placed
on initiative, and the governmenrs should use historical
records and Chamorro repons to proactively clear mines
and prevent accidents.
Cooperation and Support

Although successful demining projects rely on
technical expertise, training, experience and extensive

Initiative with Historical Research

History and statistics indicate that the Pacific Rim is
heavily contaminated with UXO, but many of the
governments lack solid policies and mine action support.
Guam was the site of some of the heaviest pre-invasion
bombardment in World War II. The island endured heavy
bombing and shelling for several weeks prior to the U.S.
military's land invasion, and millions of ordnance items
were scattered throughout the Pacific Rim. Dud rates
conclude that 25 percent of the ordnance failed to detonate,
and these abandoned items present a high risk to local residents. If the governments and existing mine clearance
organizations would adopt a proactive stance, the risk for
children and civilians would decrease.
Some of the existing safety policies produce negativity
among the workers, who consider some of the policies
extraneous and contradictory. Demining workers are
exasperated by safety inspections that involve citations for
workers without a plastic hat or steel-toed boots; they think
that a government concerned with these types of details
should focus on the life-threatening potential of the mines.
M urray thinks the overall safety of the islands could be
increased if the deminers applied proactive methods. Job
specifications could be improved with research and should
include history, terrain and prior mine activity. Reliable
safe ty precautions, such as UXO sweeps prior to
earthmoving, should also be incorporated.
Murray emphasizes the role history plays as a UXO
indicator and admitted that he has yet to understand why
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Photographing Tragedy
research, the overall success of mine action hinges on
community support and cooperation. Mine action is a
humanitarian and life-preserving effort, but if demining
projects infringe on a resource valued by the community,
support for demining will be diminished instead of
increased . The public voice plays a crucial role in
government decisions and regulations: If deminers seek a
balance between public opinion and mine clearance
acrivities, the resulting positive publicity can only benefit
the global mine action community.
The significant role of public opinion was
demonstrated by an incident in Sonsonaya Bay, Rota. As
part of the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands
(CNMI), Rota currently flourishes from the diving
industry. Tourists and divers form a substantial economic
force that the island depends on for profit. Divers swim
around sunken ships that have nearly been enveloped by
coral, bur unexploded depth charges are still partially
visible. The ships and depth charges are remnants from
World War II, when two Japanese submarine chasers
anchored in the bay. Allied forces flying over the bay
dropped leftover bombs on the Japanese ships before they
landed at Tinian. These wooden Japanese ships were
unoccupied when they sank, and as submarine chasers they
contained the depth charges, which Murray describes as
similar in appearance to a 50-gallon drum.
The government of Rota sent a removal request to
the Navy EOD unit, fearing the depth charges presented a
risk for the local diving community. The Navy EOD team
that arrived to survey the depth charges also observed a
few bombs in the sunken ships. They were authorized by
Rota to return and blow up the bombs. The Navy returned
with 25 team members; they destroyed the bombs bur also
devastated the coral gardens and killed a rare hawksbill
turtle. The resulting public furor was immense: the diving
community was outraged and protested the return of the
Navy EOD team. Unfortunately, six depth charges
remained on the ships.
Murray contacted the governor of the CNMI and,
after providing his qualifications, informed him that if the
ships were unoccupied and at anchor when they were
bombed there would be no fuses. Murray relies on historical
and military research and experience. He knew that
unoccupied ships at anchor never store fuses with ordnance.
After diving and confirming the absence of fuses, the
Bombs Away diving team chipped rhe depth charges out
of the reef using rebar with a filed edge. The six bombs
were then rolled onto a tuna net and hauled to the surface
for disposal.
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Interestingly, the Sonsonaya Bay project received a
great deal of nororiety not fo r the actual demining effon,
but for the methods used to extract the depth charges and
preserve the underwater environment. Environmental
supporters and the diving community lauded the Rota
government for revising its clearance effort. By cooperating
with the community and endorsing a mine clearance
method that maintained the natural tourist attraction, the
government succeeded in alleviating a known risk while
promoting env ironment-fri endly demining. Local
newspapers and journalists further publicized the project
and the cooperative demining effort raised public UXO
awareness in a positive way.

Photographing Tragedy:
Landmines and Victims
Tim Grant recounts his experiences capturing the images of landmines and the
stories of their victims on film. From buckets of AP mines to victims on the
operating table, Grant sees and tells all about the images that have shaped him.

Mine Action for the Pacific Rim

The lack of government regulations and widespread
concern for mine contamination in the Pacific Rim leaves
a problem without a clear solution. The islands and
Chamorro people are left with a World War II legacy that
is dissolving slowly, for although mine action is offered as
a response to injuries and unprofessional discoveries, little
initiative is taken to locate and clear most of the islands.
Without efficient UXO removal, Murray's pointed
question remains, "How do you think most of these mines
are found?" Hundreds of injured or surviving civilians attest
to the risk these islanders face every day. To change the
answer to this question, mine action in the Pacific Rim
must be proactive, thorough and cooperative. Active
collaboration between the government and demining
organizations could promote effective long-term mine
clearance. By consolidating effort and resources, they could
accelerate the process of eradicating the remnants from a
history of unwelcome invaders. •

•

Contact Information

Paul Murray
President
Bombs Away, Inc.
415 Chalan San Antonio Road
PMB 387
Tamuning, GU 96911
Tel: (671) 789.7887
E-mail: murray@ite.net
Website: http://www. bombsaway.net

By Tim Grant, Landmine Photographer
andmines are insidious devices. A landmine can be
any munition placed under, on or near the ground
or other surface area that is designed to be detonated
o r exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a
person or vehicle. Their main purpose is to inflict severe
injury on the "enemy" so as to hinder advance and
undermine the morale. Only a few mines are designed to
kill outright. For every combatant injured it takes another
two soldiers to carry them, effectively taking up to three
fighters out of the battle.
My initial experiences with landmines came as an

L

employee of the Land Mine Awareness Programme (LMAP)
that started in 1990 on the Thai/Cambodian border. After
testing rhe education materials we had produced, it was
found that the people wanted to see photographs of real
mines and of landmine victims. The mines reproduced in
the photographs were always shown as close as possible to
their actual size. After several years of working in mine
awareness, we found that photographs were very popular,
generating much more interest than illustrations because
people can relate more to them, especially when the images
are taken in areas familiar to them.
Photographing my first mine was an experience I shall
always remember. At that time, it was illegal for foreigners
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Borey and his
friends. Khoa+
Dang rehabilitation center.
c/o Tim Grant

Photographing Tragedy
to enter Cambodia. As we were based
in Thailand, a neutral country, there
were no mines readily availab le for
photographing and measuring. We
needed photographs for the education
materials, so we had to rely on viewing
mines collected by the Thai military
from their side of the border.
The Thai soldiers brought out an
old bucket crammed with a variety of
AP devices. It was a strange feeling ro
finally see these objects that we had
heard so much about. For a second or
two I forgot all the terror and sadness
they cause and was eager to examine
them closely. My colleague, who had
just arrived from four years of teaching
landmine awareness to Afghan
refugees, was quire nervous and kept
reminding me of situations where
experts had blown themselves up by
mishandling mines.
The soldiers were quite relaxed
around the live ammunition, wanting
to show us how "brave" they were and
how much knowledge they possessed
about ordnance. One of them started
to puli, prod and turn anything that
sruck our. He then proceeded to
unscrew the top off an AT mine,
prompting my colleague w rake refuge

•

A 16-year-old monk injured
by stepping on a landmine
on his way back from a
wedding ceremony.
c/o Tim Grant

behind a filing cabinet. In hindsight,
this action seemed useless since, had
the mine exploded, the whole building
would have been destroyed. I also
realized that I was too crusting of the
soldier's ability in handling these
devices. It rook a few more visits to
hospitals and operating theatres before
I formed a realistic view and healthy
dislike for any landmine or UXO.
Photographing the Victims

Photographs make the plight of
mine victims more meaningful to
viewers and starkly reveal the horror
associated with mine injuries. As the
program's media coordinator, it was
my job ro capture these images.
The first time I photographed a
landmine victim is still very vivid in
my mind. It was in the Sire II refugee
camp on the Thai/Cambodian border
in 1986. I was being shown the
different programs that were operated
by one of the local NGOs. We came
to the Disabled Skills Training Center,
which was run by a Jesuit priest. A
photo opportunity quickly appeared in
front of me as I entered the facility: a
wheelchair bound, double leg amputee
with his baby sining on his lap. I was
initially reticent about taking this
photograph. However, th e center's
resident priest realized my dilemma
and assured me it was OK, so I went
ahead. As I snapped the shot, the man
smiled and told me he was honored
that I had chosen he and his child ro
be photographed-the first of many
surprises.
To facilitate the production of
teaching materials I made many
excursions to the camp hospitals and
rehabilitation centers to take photos.
The power of these experiences in dirtfloor, bamboo walled rehabilitation
centers and cold concrete floored
operating rooms was overwhelming.
Most of the victims were young men
in their late teens or early 20s. Despite
their suffering and traumatic amputa-
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tions, most were quick with a smile and
a joke. Th is made being there and
taking photos a mixture of pleasure
and pain. Here in the hospital,
surrounded by fellow victims, they
started to come to terms with their
dramatic change oflifestyle. I worried
about what would happen when they
returned to their villages, where they
would be without free medicine,
adequate medical attention and, more
importantly, the moral support of their
new friends.
Upon arrival at rhe International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in-patient section one day, two new
victims from Cambodia drew my
interest. One of them was a woman
who had had her right leg blown offfortunately below the knee. She was
very frightened as it was all so new to
her-sealed rooms with concrete
floors, white-skinned people with
dangling objects around their necks,
plastic covered furniture, and, above
all, life with only one and a half legs.
The other victim was a man having
an old wound checked. He seemed
flattered to have a foreign nurse attend
ro him and show an interest in his
recently sown stump , which now
looked like rhe fluted edge of a
ptecrust.
Soon, a busy doctor came in and
thoughtlessly tugged on a piece of
gauze that was deeply embedded in the
wound. The man jumped, then sm iled
and made a joke with the nurse. "How
can he still find humor in this
madness?" I asked myself. He was like
a brave young boy with a grazed knee
who didn't want to show his friends
his pain. She was like a terrified little
girl waiting her turn for an injection,
twitching and wringing the sarong she
clasped rightly in her hands. I was so
distracted by their dilemmas that I
didn't take any photographs.
After awhile, I started to enjoy my
visi ts ro the hospital, as I received such
a great welcome from the patients,
who really appreciated a foreigner

caking such an interest in their welfare.
It was hard at rimes to remain
impartial and I had to "turn-off" many
rimes to enable myself to cope with
the tragedies before me. The victims
were generally so young and now their
lives had been torn apart, more than
they could possibly comprehend at
that rime.
I had received permission from
ICRC to photograph mine victims in
Khao-1-Dang Hospital, so I made my
way there, most days equipped with
my photographic gear. The head nurse
knew me well and would greet me.
One day, I arrived at rhe hospi tal
and was instantly taken by the arm and
hustled into the theatre, not knowing
what to expect. A mask and hairner
were thrust into my hands as I was
pushed through the doorway. A 17year-old boy had been wounded when
a landmine exploded nearby. They
already had his stomach laid out on
the operating table, expertly searching
for shrapnel pieces. This was the first
rime I had wi rnessed an operation, and
I wondered how I would handle it. I
trained my camera onto the surgical
scene. Here in front of me was this kid
with his insides spilled out, and all I

could feel was fascination as I viewed,
through a lens, the skilled hands of the
surgeon as he probed his way into rhe
open cavtty.
The surgeon eventually located a
tiny piece of metal, smaller than a 5cent piece. I glanced at the cut, which
started at the top of his chest and
finished just above his navel, then to
this tiny inuuder and pondered the
inhumanity of it. They roughly threw
his guts back in and stitched the
wound. "We will just close this up and
do a routine check of his leg, then he
should be okay," the doctor informed
me.
Following the surgery, I was
starting to feel that 1 must be fairly
brave. But in spite of this sentiment,
when they sentime nt, when they
brought in rhe next victim I began to
think I had chosen the wrong
vocation. The second surgery was not
as easy to handle. This man's wounds
were older and had become infected.
The surgeon had to cut off more of
his stump and dress the wound. I took
a few images and decided that this
time I couldn't stay any longer.
Several days after the surgery, I
returned to the hospital to follow up

with the photo stories of both victims.
I found the older man, hi s wife
dutifully fanning his body as he slept.
She was lost in her thoughts and hardly
noticed my presence. The nurse
informed me that the 17-year-old,
Phon Phea, was in bed no. 45. I
couldn't believe what I saw as I
approached. He had only one leg! A
feeling of shock hit me. When I had
left him in rhe surgery there was no
indication that an amputation was
necessary. He was, after all, only hit
by rwo small pieces of shrapnel. I
called the nurse over and asked the
reason for the amputation. I was told
that apart from the chest injury, the
second piece had severed a main leg
artery. As I drove back to town I saw
groups ofThai youths, about the same
age as Phea, enjoying a football
march-it just didn't seem fair to the
victims. •
Contact Information

Tim Gram
E-mail: pictim@iinet.ner.au
Website: www.pitt.edu/ -ginie/lm/
cambodia.html

How to Help ...
Those interested can help the
plight of landmine victims by
generating publicity. This can be
achieved by wri ring a sto ry for a
magazine, sending a letter to the editor
of a newspaper, or writing an opinion/
editorial piece for your local
newspaper to express your concern.
One could also make a website,
organize an event/exhibition, design
•

The first land-mine vict im I
photographed at Site II Refugee
Camp.
c/o Tim Grant
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a poster, go on the radio, raise funds
or appear on television programs to
discuss the landmine issues.
Supporters are also welcome to
visit my website (www.iinet.ner.au/
-picrim) and use the photographs for
advocacy purposes.
-Tim Grant

U.S. Efforts
Strengthen Pledge to Vietnam
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund estimates that 2,000 Vietnamese are killed
each year by mines and UXO. In response to this, the U.S. government, VVMF
and Clear Path International are focusing on the country's Landmine victims.
By Stacy L.Smith,MAlC

I

n November 2000, former
President Bill Clinton traveled to
Vietnam to celebrate the 25 th
anniversary of the end of the Vietnam
War. At a ceremony honoring efforts
to clear an estimated 3 million landmines and 300,000 tons ofUXO scattered throughout Vietnam, Climon
vowed to help remove mine threats in
Vietnam, Africa and the Balkans. He
said: "You will have America's support
until you have found every landmine
and every piece of unexploded
ordnance. This is a tragedy for which
peace produces no answer."
In June 2000, the U .S. government allocated $3.1 million (U.S.)
to support humanitarian demining
efforts in Vietnam. Of this total, $1.7
million will go towards the purchase
of equipment such as vehicles,
personal safety gear and landmine/
UXO detectors; $1.4 million will be
designated for a level one national
survey to determine the scope of the

landmine problem and make recommendations for resolving it; $200,000
will be allotted to develop a computer
system to record the locations and
types of ordnance used during the
Vietnam War; and $80,000 will be
used for a computer system to assist
the Vietnamese in managing their
demining program.
Following Clinton's promise ro
rid Vietnam of landmines, two nonprofit organizations, Vietnam Veterans
Memorial Fund and C lear Path
Imernational, introduced projects
in te nded to stop the death s of
innocent civilians from escalating.
Currently, an average of six deaths
occur daily in Vietnam as a result of
landmines/UXO.
Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund

Project RENEW
On Dec. 4, 2000, the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF)
revealed a plan to form the first-ever
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comprehensive program targeted at
saving lives and preventing injuries in
V ietnam. The two-year pilot project
in Trieu Phong District of Vietnam's
Quang Tri province is designed "to
restore the use of lands of th e
Vietnamese through education and
neutralization of the effects of the
Vietnam war." The non-profit organization's model for landmine/UXO
clearance is called Project RENEW.
According ro Jan C. Scruggs, VVMF
president, Project RENEW combines
the efforts of several international
NGOs, including PeaceTrees
Vietnam, Catholic Relief Services and
Counterpart International, with the
Quang Tri Province People's Committee in Vietnam. "We plan to show
that a comprehensive approach
benefits the people of Quang Tri
province," Scruggs said, "and also the
organizations that are assisting with
this effort. We also hope to show that
govern ment agencies and non-governmental groups can work successfully
together."

Assessing the Situation

Projections

Accordi ng to a Dec. 4, 2000 ,
VVM F press release, Vietnamese
officials estimate that approximately
2,000 civilian deaths result each year
fro m landmines/UXO. Since the end
of the war in 1975, approximately
40,000 civilian deaths have been
caused by lan dmin es/UXO with
nearly 1,500 of those occurring in
Trieu Phong District. VVMF hopes
that Project RENEW will reduce the
risks that landmines/UXO pose to
civilians.
In the early planning stages of the
program, VVMF mer with officials
from international NGOs, the
Vietnamese government, and the U.S.
De partment of State to discus s
Vietnam's landmine/UXO problem.
"We were told time and time again
that a single comprehensive effort was
needed," Scruggs said. With the help
of international NGOs and the Quang
Tri Province People's Committee,
Project RENEW will accomplish irs
all-inclusive goal through mine
education and awareness, mine
clearance, land rese ttl eme nt and
victim assistance. "We feel that by
several different groups helping with
this effort, we will be able to make
significant progress in a shorter
amount of rime and the people of
Quang Tri will benefit significantly
from the collaborative system,"
Scruggs said.

With marching $250,000 grants
from the £*TRADE Group, Inc., a
global leader in online personal
financial services based in Menlo Park,
Calif., and rhe Freeman Foundation
in Stowe, Vt., an office of international
cooperation will be established in
Quang Tri province as a center for
information exchange between all
parties. T he center will also address
potential problems and obstacles
arising during rhe pilot project. If
successful, VVMF hopes to implement Project RENEW in other mineaffected co untries such as Laos and
Cambodia. "We have a lot of work to
do in Vietnam before we move on to
other countries," Scruggs said. "What
we hope to have after two years is a
useful approach that can easily be
implemented in other affected lands."
Clear Path International

Current Projects
In December 2000, Clear Path
International began a two-year project
in Vietnam rhar will clear 125 acres of
land for later construction of housing
in Dong Ha Town, Quang Tri
province. During the Vietnam War,
the clearance site head-quartered rhe
U.S. 3rd Marine Division and was
known as Dong Ha Combat Base.
According to Martha Hathaway,
project director for Vietnam, this
project will eliminate the fears oflocal
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children and their families. "For 30
years, the people ofVietnam have lived
with the threat of landmines and
bombs in their co mmunities," she
said. "Clear Path International hopes
to remove these obstacles that stand
in the way of the health and safety of
children in Vietnam." The project
hopes to rid the area of the threat of
landmines/UXO on two levels: mine
clearance and victim assistance.
Mine clearance will be executed
with the help ofUXB International, a
commercial humanitarian demining
company in Ashburn, Va. UXB
International will provide management, technical supervision, equipment and accommodations for
demining teams. It will also train local
Vietnamese deminers to carry out the
clearance of landmines and UXO
using safe techniques and procedures.
Hathaway believes that a methodical
demining process is key to a successful
clearance project. She said, "Clear Path
International believes that rhe most
paramount co ncerns are safety and
quality, and in order to ensure safety
and quality the process of clearance is
time and resource intensive."
In addition to the clearance
project, Clear Path International is also
working to facilitate accident survivors
in the area. While the organization
primarily benefits children who have
sustained debilitating injuries as a result oflandmine or UXO explosions,
the program also provides monetary
compensation to the families of affected children. With the support of

the Committee for the Care and Protection of Children, Clear Path International is able ro give injured children emergency medical treatment,
surgery, long-term health care, nutritional support and special scholarships. Funding for chis project was received from a grant from the Freeman
Foundation and contributions from
individuals and foundations such as
the Francis Finlay Foundation.
The Mission

Clear Path International is a nonprofit organization founded in September 2000. Its efforts are concentrated in the war-torn countries of
Southeast Asia. The goals of the organization include raising awareness of
the landmine/UXO problem, providing money and resources for demining
and victim assistance projects, and
sponsoring programs to remove landmines/UXO and assist victims oflandmine/UXO explosions. Through these
goals, Clear Path International hopes
to accomplish its mission: to clear obstacles that stand in the way of the
health, safety and development of children and their families.
A Plan for the Future

Clear Path International hopes ro
empower local residents and agencies
in mine-affected countries by creating
"an in-country capacity that can
sustain the demining and victim
assistance activities well into the
future, independently or with minimal

support from the international
community. " By involving local
residents and agencies from the start,
"a handover of management and
implementation of the project(s) to a
team of qualified domestic deminers
with only periodic technical
monitoring from the contractor, but
with the presence of a full-time Clear
Path International representative" is
possible. For the time being, Clear
Path International's efforts on behalf
of the health, safety and development
of mine-affected children and their
families will be limited to Vietnam and
Cambodia. In the future, the
organization hopes to expand its
project scope to Laos and Thailand.
Conclusion

While President Clinton's pledge
to the Vietnamese government has led
to dedicated efforts to rid Vietnam of
landmines/UXO, the Bush administration has yet to make a statement on
the future of U.S. involvement in
landmine policy. Before leaving office,
Clinton commented on the progress
of his administration and encouraged
the Bush administration to maintain
U.S. efforts. "While I am proud chat
we have made substantial progress
towards eliminating the threat
landmines pose to innocent civilians
around the world," Clinton wrote on
Jan. 19, 200 l , "there is work yet to be
done. I urge the next administration
to build on our progress and take the
steps necessary to allow the United
States to eventually sign the Ottawa

Convention, while still meeting our
security needs and protecting our men
and women in uniform." •
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RHINO in Cambodia
RHINO, a Large and powerful demining tool geared towards Large clearance operations, has been put to the test-both on testing grounds and in the field. The
result: a Level of performance and operability that alleviates the concerns of critics.
By Manfred Joehnk, Program Manager
Background

T

he mechanical demining system RHINO was
developed internally by Rheinmetall Landsysteme
GmbH (RLS) in Kid, Germany, to provide a more
cost effective and safe demining tool. It is superior ro
existing systems in terms of efficiency, safety and clearing
capacity and is especially well suited for large area de mining
operations. RHINO is large (9.5 m long, 3.1 m wide and
3.5 m high), powerful (660 kW caterpillar engine), robust
(weighs 58 metric tons) and is fully remotely controlled.
RHINO is a serious demining machine, as opposed to a
mechanical machine whose purpose it is to assist the manual
deminers.
This article summarizes RHINO and the user
experience during a field test and subsequent demining
task conducted in Cambodia from August 1999 to May
2000. The test and the accompanying demining task in
support of CARE took place in two remote areas in
Battambang province. The main objective of the task was
to accelerate the demining process ro help accommodate
the need for land for returning refugees. This was a major
two-year project involving the resettlement of aproximately
4,000 families.
The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), asrate
run organization, is responsible for the conduct of mine
clea rance actions. The CMAC staff is assisted by
international advisors from the United Nations and NGOs,
as well as soldiers from countries such as Canada, Australia,
Belgium and the Netherlands. The test and subsequent
demining action were managed and performed by CMAC
with the technical assistance of two RLS employees. After
the initial training, their role was mainly to provide further
trai ning on the job for tasks such as unscheduled
maintenance. Mine clearing in Cambodia represents a
serious challenge. The environmental conditions are
tropical and severe. The infrastructure is typical of a
developing country. The mine problem itself is funher
complicated by the fact that there are numerous types of
mines and UXOs, and poorly marked mine-infested areas.

•

Operation by Indigenous Personnel

Training on RHINO began when it arrived by barge
at Sihanoukville. The RLS technicians trained three
mechanics and two electricians in the operation and
maintenance of RHINO. While lacking theoretical
knowledge, the trainees were skilled workers and eager to
learn. In a few short days they could handle the day-roday operations and, soon after, maintenance of the vehicle.
In a few weeks, they operated the system without the
oversight of the RLS technicians. The five trainees were
organized in two operation/maintenance teams of two, each
with the fifth being responsible for supply operations.
The challenge of leading the demining platoon was
given to a CMAC technician who was assisted by a former
leader of a mine marking team. They were initially trained
and supervised by a French technical advisor. Manual
deminers, drivers and guards rounded out the team. The
platoon not only clearly demonstrated that indigenous
personnel could operate and maintain RHINO, but that
they also work hard and perform in a highly proficient
manner throughout the initial test and subsequent tasks.
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RHINO with dozer
blade is transported to the test
area, just bypassing
a bailey bridge.
c/o RHINO

Infrastructure

•

RHINO bogged
down before selfrecovery.

There is no question that
mechanical demining machines are
huge.The concern is that they are too
big to be transported and will damage
the infrastructure of developing
nations. While the RHINO is a big
machine, ingenuity will go a long way
to solve most transportation problems.
The infrastructure of Cambodia
is especially weak from our point of
entry (Sihanoukville) to the test area
(approximately GOO km) and another
80 km to the operational site. The
vehicle made the trip to the test area
mostly on board a trailer and by rail.
The critical parts of the roadway and
undersized bridges were by passed
through use of the Cambodian railway
and by driving the vehicle under its
own power. RHINO traveled some
140 km of the trip at about 4 km per
hour. The tiller unit, which weighs 14
tons but is easy ro remove, was
replaced by the dozer blade. As a result,
the trip was made without damage to
roadway and bridges. RHINO was

able to row a truck that had been stuck
in the road and upright a huge truck,
which had overturned because of
overloading and very large potholes in
the road.

RHINO track formed the second
base of the vehicle. Stones and
wooden blocks were placed
underneath to provide RHINO with
traction to allow it to be driven our
of the mud.

Self-Recovery

RHINO was bogged down twice
in muddy, swampy terrain. Two
methods of self recovery were:
• In the first case, the vehicle was
bogged down in a mine-infested
area. In accordance with regulatory
procedures, two manual deminers
had to clear the surrounding area
before the recovery work could
commence. An anchor was built by
means of a steel plate and long iron
rods. A rope was fixed on the anchor
as well as on an iron bar, which was
fixed to the track plates at the rear
of each track. With this arrangement
RHINO was able to tow itself out
of the mud.
• In the second case, the tiller unit was
forced downwards in the ground to
elevate the system while the rear of

Operation in a
Tropical Environment

RHINO was designed to operate
in a tropical environment, so the high
temperature and humidity, dust and
very heavy rain in Cambodia did not
have an adverse impact on it. RHINO
proved irs ability to work through
huge term ire hills as well as dense
vegetation including any kind of
bamboo. Trees up to 20 em in
diameter were processed by RHINO.
All materials are ground between the
two tilling drums. Some of the
vegetation was worse than anticipated,
almost inaccessible due to thick vines
and trees up to 30 em in diameter.
RHINO was slowed down but not
stopped. The grinding process
continued. While our customer in
Croatia clears 20,000 m 2 per day,
RHINO was able to clear 4,000-6,000
m 2 per day in a very challenging
environment. This is significantly
more than a platoon of manual
deminers can clear in a week. We
learned that RHINO's level feelers,
which control the clearing depth,
needed stronger protection for driving
in revers e in such a challenging
environment as Cambodia.
Quality Rate

The situation in Cambodia confirmed the operational results of our
customer in Croatia who has cleared
some 2 million m2 in just over a year
without a single mine found intact in
the treated soil. PMN mines without
boosters were used in the Cambodian
test to get information regarding the
size of residuals of mines, which could
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not detonate. All mines treated during the special rest were destroyed completely. All parts in rhe treated soil are
passed through the small gap between
rhe rotating drums. After successful
completion of the test, CMAC's Risk
Assessment Committee agreed to place
the system into operation.
After RHINO cleared the first
area, the area was checked completely
by manual deminers in accordance
with regulatory procedures. As a result
of this first recheck and test results,
the manual recheck was reduced by 50
percent. Only harmless mine residuals
and fragments were found by the
manual deminers.

the system is used as intended and is
operated in a day-to-day demining
operation, its clearance speed is
outstanding. Our cost study can
demonstrate the cosr effectiveness of
RHINO when compared to a manual
demining operation. RHINO is
superior in that it:
• can be operated and maintained by

Conclusion

RHINO is a real demining machine. In the Cambodian operation,
it has proven to be both safe and cost
effective. If the world is going to make
serious progress in solving its mine
problem in a reasonable time frame,
cost effective and efficient demining

•

Survivability

RHINO got a chance to demonstrate its survivability characteristics
early in the severe conditions in
C ambodia. During the first week of
operation, a booby trap consisting of
two AT mines detonated at
approximately 30 em under RHINO's
left track. Later, a single AT mine
detonated between the two tiller
drums near the bearings, and another
AT mine detonated under RHINO's
right track. In less than two days, the
detonations from the single mines
were repaired in rhe field by the
CMAC maintenance personnel. The
double mine explosion caused more
severe damage to mechanical parts and
was repaired in rhe field in about a
week.
There was no threat to human life
with these explosions because RHINO
is unmanned and remote controlled.
An operator sitting in the cab of any
manned clearing system would have
been severely injured or killed by the
double mine explosion.
Too Costly to Operate?

RHINO's deployment tn
C ambodia has demonstrated that if

•

•

•
•

•

•

indigenous personnel after a
qualified training on the job.
can be transponed without
damaging the infrastructure, even
under rhe conditions of a
developing country, by smart and
flexible use of the available
resources.
disposes of sufficient self recovery
means even in real swampy
ground.
is working reliably also in tropical
environment.
is one of rhe first reliable demining
machines, which is much more
efficient than manual deminers ,
and which makes manual
rechecking of the ground
unnecessary.
has an outstanding survivability
against AT mines, UXO and
booby traps and offers excellent
safety due to its remotely
con trolled operation.
will speed up the demining process
and reduce the costs per cleared
square meter.
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RHINO and crew
emerge from
typically dense
vegetation found
in Cambodian
mine fields.

systems such as RHINO must be part
of rhe solution.
The crucial . reg uirements ro use
RHINO are an open mind, good
planning, logistic as well as sice
management, and the international
will to sec up a long lasting demining
project with multinational sponsorship. •
Contact Information

Manfred Joehnk, Program Manager
Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH
Falckensceiner Str. 2, D-24159
Kiel,Germany
Phone: +49 431 3999 2292
Fax: +49 431 3999 3278
Mobile: 0171 7217649
E-mail: Birgic.Baumgart@rheinmetalls.com
Website: www.rheinmecall-ls.de
All photos courtesy ofthe author.

Cambodia: A Country Profile
Through the efforts of CMAC, Mines Advisory Group and HALO Trust, Cambodia is
working to eliminate the hundreds of contaminated areas within its borders.
Rohan Maxwell proposes changes in these operations to sustain removal efforts.
By Rohan Maxwell, Officer, Canadian Army

million Cambodians died of starvation, disease and murder.
Approximately 5 percent of the mines were laid under the
Background
Khmer Rouge regime, mainly in the Thai and Vietnamese
border regions.
n the late I960s, communist insurgems known as the
The second civil war began at the end of 1978 when
Khmer Rouge began operations against the central Vietnam, goaded by border provocations, drove its erstwhile
government of Cambodia, launching three decades of ally back into guerilla warfare and installed a more
nearly continuous warfare. Vietnamese communists cooperative government led by Khmer Rouge defectors.
supported the insurgents, while the government came to After a decade of fighting between the cenrral government
be supported by the United States and South Vietnam. (and its Vietnamese backers) and the Khmer Rouge (and
The fighting was exacerbated by the expansion of the various non-communist Cambodian groups formerly
Vietnam War into eastern Cambodia, including a massive opposed to them), Vietnam withdrew its forces and peace
American bombing campaign against communist supply negotiations began. With the concurrence of all parties,
lines. Battlefield UXO was widely dispersed, while aerial- the U.N. Transitional Amhority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
delivered UXO was concentrated in the eastern and central was mandated to run Cambodia for I8 months (1992provinces (ref 1). According to the International 1993) in order to supervise demobilization and conduct
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ref 2), about IO elections. The Khmer Rouge chose to resume fighting, so
percent of the mines in Cambodia were laid during this demobilization failed, bur elections did rake place and the
period-most in the central and southern provinces.
central government gained greater international legitimacy.
The first civil war ended with the defeat of the central The war continued for the remainder of the 1990s, with
government in Apriii975. It was followed by 44 horrific the central government slowly gaining the upper hand and
months of Khmer Rouge rule, during which more than I internal and external support for the guerillas ebbed. Most
of the fighting took place in the northern and northwestern
provinces, bm there was also significant fighting in the
central and southern provinces. By the late 1990s, the
guerillas were a spent force and the last groups gave up in
1999.
The majority of the mines, 85 percent, were laid
during rhe second civil war. All combatants used mines
extensively, and, ironically, the highly mine-affected
Cambodian civilians began using them for their own
purposes-self-defense, protection of property, or brutally
direct dispute resolution. Few records were kept, bur in
1994 the United Nations estimated that there were as many
as I 0 million mines in Cambodia (ref2). In I997, this was
reduced to 4 million to 6 million (ref 2), an estimate
supported by the number of mines that were actually being

I
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A bridge along National Route 10, the main highway
connecting Cambodia's second-largest city, Battambang, to
Thailand. c/o Rohan Maxwell

located (ref 3). In 1999, the HALO
Trust rook this empirical approach one
step further, applying the known
clearance results to the amount ofland
thought to still be contaminated: this
estimate suggested that there had been
no more than 1 million mines to begin
with (ref2).
UNTAC identified more than
I ,900 potentially contaminated areas
(ref 3) totaling approximately 3,600
square kilometers (refs 2 and 3). By
1999, subsequen t survey efforts had
reduced this to 2,800 sq. km (ref 3) .
O f this total, 656 sq. km were known
to be contaminated (ref 4), leaving
2, 144 sq. km in doubt. Since on
average only 35 percent of suspected
terrain is actually mined (ref 2), it is
probable that a further 750 sq. km of
contaminated land will be identified,
for a total of approximately 1,400 sq.
km. This total will require a significant
amount of clearance, since on average
each square kilometer ofcontaminated
land contains more than 1,000 mines.
In 1993, the UNTAC force
commander estimated that it would
take 30 to 40 years to demine
Cambodia (ref 5). In fact, given the
current clearance rate ofapproximately
15 sq. km per year (ref 2), it would
take 93 years to clear I ,400 sq. km. If
only high priority land is consideredland needed for resettlement,
agriculture and critical developmentthe task becomes more manageable.
For example, the HALO Trust
estimates that all high-priority land in
Cambodia could be cleared in five to
10 years at the current rate of progress
(ref 2). This estimate depends on the
definition of high-priority land, but
the key point is that with continued
international assistance it should be
possible for most Cambodians to live
a mine-free existence within a
reasonable period of time. Once that
has been accomplished, a smallerscale, long-term effort can deal with
the remaining areas.

The Mines

Of all mines in Cambodia, 99
percent are AP: 68 percent blast, 26
percent fragmentation, and 5 percent
bounding fragmentation. The Russian
PMN-2, whose 115-gram charges
inflict great damage, accounts for
approximately 80 percent of the blast
mines. Smaller blast mines include the
Vietnamese MD 82B and MN 79, the
Russian PMD-6 and the very low
metal content Chinese Type 72A and
B (the B model incorporates an antidisturbance device). Most fragmentation mines are Russian POMZ-2 or
POMZ-2Ms, while the Chinese Type
69 is the bounding fragmentation
mine of choice. AT mines are almost
all Russian; many of them are buried
in stacks of two or three more than a
meter down with a bamboo pole to
conduct pressure from the surface to
an AP mine placed atop the first AT
mine (refS 3 and 4).

analysis-at present a majority of the
estimated 49,846 Cambodian
amputees (ref 1) are casualties of mines
and UXO. As amputations represent
27 to 40 percent of all injuries (refs 5
and 8), there could have been as many
as 124,615 ro 183,281 casualties.
Discrepancies on such a large scale are

Casualties

In 1994, Handicap International
determined from the number of minerelated amputations per month that
there were approximately 500
casualties per month from 1985-1994,
or a total of 60,000 casualties (ref 5).
In contrast, a 1998 estimate by the
U.S. government gives a smaller figure
of 37,428 casualties for the longer
period of 1979 - 1996, including
13,328 fatalities (ref 1). The most
comprehensive and recent information
is that gathered by the Cambodian
Mine Incident Database. This source
provides a figure of 48,842 mine and
UXO casualties from 1979 to the
present (ref 8). Adding 15 percent for
pre-1979 casualties (based on the
proportion of mines laid before 1979)
increases this to perhaps 56,168
casualties since the fighting began, as
many as 28 percent of which may have
been fatal (15,727 deaths-refs 1 and
8). This is by no means a worst-case
• 77.
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A mine detecting team

ready for the mine field.

c/o Rohan Maxwell

difficult to fathom until one recalls
that a much larger figure-the number
who died under the Khmer Rougehas not yet been narrowed down to
the nearest million.
The Mine Incident Database
provides excellent derail on the current
situation. At present, 91 percent of
casualties are civilians, 38 percent of
whom are injured in the course of
subsistence activities such as farming,
gathering wood, fishing, collecting
food, fetching water and herding
cattle. An additional 15 percent are
injured while travelling. Adult males

account for 63 percent of all victims,
bur 30 percent are children under the
age of 18. Tampering causes 42
percent of casualties, including onequarter of the men, three-quarters of
the children and one-quarter of the
women. Most of them fall victim to
mines, but UXO accounts for 41
percent of all casualties, including 69
percent of children . There are, on
average, 85 new victims each month ,
and 1 in 5 do not survive their injuries.
Demining Organizations

There are many humanitarian
organizations that have conducted,
supported or are pres en tly
contributing to demining operations
in Cambodia (e.g. Norwegian People's
Aid (N PA), Handicap International
(HI), World Vision, CARE) but this
article will discuss only those that are
c urrently conducting operations:
HALO Trust, Mines Advisory G roup
(MAG) and the Cambodian Mine
Action Center (CMAC). HALO Trust
has been working in the northwestern
provinces of Banteay Meanchey and
Siem Reap since O crober 1991. Tts
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500 Cambodian staff are organized
in to 16 clearance teams working
predominantly in th e immedi ate
vicinity of villages-houses, schools,
water supplies, health facilities and
paddy fields. HALO 's C ambodia
op erations are funded by the
governments of the United Kingdom,
the United States, Finland, Ireland and
Japan, as well as the United Nations,
the E uropea n Union (EU) and private
donors in England and Japan. MAG
Cambodia starred work in 1992. Its
min e action ream s are presenrly
co ncentrated in the northern and
northwestern provinces ofPreah Vihar
and Battambang. Like the HALO
teams, they normally work in
proximity to villages. The 389
Cam bodi an staff (including 48
amputees and 46 woman deminers)
and nine expatriates are supported by
donors including the governments of
t he United Kingdom, the United
States and Austria, as well as the
Lutheran World Service and Church
World Services.
CMAC evolved from th e
UNTAC Mine C learance Training
Unit in 1993. After initial funding

Billboard depicting a cooperative project of CARE, the World Food Programme and CMAC. C/o Rohan Maxwell
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difficulti es, it expanded ro a strength
of 2,800 Cambodian staff and 50
expatriates. C MAC is a Cambodian
agency, but it relies almost entirely on
international donations and it is
administered as a project of the U.N.
Development Programme. Its annual
budget has peaked at approximately
$12 million (U.S.), plus numerous
donation s in kind from donors
including Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Japan , the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the EU, the
United Kingdom and the United
States.
CMAC's approximate 60 demining platoons are organized and
d eployed in groups of four to six
plaroons plus supporting elements
(ambulance, radio, guards, etc.), with
three such groups making up a
D emining Unit (DU). This type of
organization m ea ns that CMAC
ca nnot deal readily with smaller tasks.
Some flexibility is provided by
community min e teams whose
mandate is to take on urgent tasks in
order to reduce casualties as quickly
as possible. Ideally, these teams clear
the most critical areas in a village and
mark the remaining mined areas un til
CMAC can mount a larger operation.
There is also a small development
demining unit that-has carried our a
number of high prio rity tasks with
funding directly from UNHCR.
CMAC also deploys EOD, mine
awareness and mine marking teams.
Froml993 to 2000, CMAC's
platoons cleared an average of 10 sq.
km per year. In mid-2000, three of the
four DUs were working in th e
no rthwe stern
provinces
of
Battambang and Banreay Meanchey
and the fourth was preparing to move
into northern Ca mbodi a. Unfo rtunately, CMAC had failed to
adequately address a multitude of
concerns about mismanagement and
corruption, despite increasing donor
press ure beginning in 1999. As a

result, funding became steadily scarcer
an d after sc raping by for several
months, CMAC ceased operations
and laid off the majority of its staff in
late 2000. This effectively removed
t hree- quart ers of the d em ining
resources in Cambodia. Currenrly, it
appears that CMAC will resume
o perations at some point in 2001 ,
once donor concerns have been fully
addressed and funding reinstated.
Mea nwhile, several co mmercial
demining companies are currently
seeking to benefit, in part, from
C MAC's failings and receive the
a uthority to begin demining
opera nons.
The Planning Process

In theory, d e mining efforts
should be preceded by a systematic
Level 1 Survey. Unfortunately, the
sec urity situation in Cambodia
precluded such a survey until the late
1990s, and as a result the mo st
comprehensive data was that collected
by UNTAC and refined by CMAC.
Planning was further complicated by
the fact that many of the most afflicted
areas were not accessible to demining
organizations for security reasons. This
meant that demining effo rts were
freq uently directed at areas that were
accessible, but nor necessarily high
priority. Now that security levels have
improved, the plann ing process is
slowly being refined. In concept, the
prov incial governments should se t
demining requirements and priorities.
W h ere appropriate, NGOs and
international organizations working in
the province must also be involved in
the planning process, as they normally
provide the resources needed to pur
the de mined land to best use. Demining agencies should provide technical
advice-what can be done, and when
it can be done-bur they should not
set priorities. This concept places
responsibility for land use where it
belongs. Cambodian political

st ru c ture at th e prov in c ial level
includes the provincial governor and
government, the subordinate district
chiefs, the commune chiefs of each
district and the village chiefs of each
commune. The Provincial Rural
Development com mittee reco m mending demining priorities to the
governor, bur the derailed work is
carried our by the Land Use Planning
Unit (LUPU). Each district has a
District Working Group (DWG )
which submits its demining requirements and priorities to the LUPU (and
then to the PRDC) based on input
from the commune chiefs (who have
in turn consulted their village chiefs).
The PRDC then coordinates with the
demining agencies ro match resources
to tasks, and the result should be a fully
coordinated demining and development plan.
This process is sti ll being
developed . The key is to ensure that
planners and staff at all levels develop
the re quired level of te chnical
expertise-for example, the use of
Geographical Information Systems
(GIS)-as well as m anageme n t,
organizational and planning skills. In
Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge
did its best to eliminate those who
possessed such skills, planning and
organizational stru ctures are being
rebuilt very nearly from scratch, and
it will be some time before the concept
outlined above can be completely
implemented. Land riding must also
become mo re reliable if de mined land
is to be pur to its intended use. Finally,
accurate survey data is still required,
and to thi s end a national Level 1
Survey has finally been in itiated, with
funding from the Canadian government.
National coordination between
the demining age n cies was until
recen tly a CMAC responsibility.
However, the agencies did nor
normally work in proximity to each
other, and CMAC and the demining
NGOs normally conce ntrated on
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different types of tasks. There was little
call for coordination in the field and,
fo r planning purposes, MAG and
HALO worked closely with selected
communities and agencies, while the
task of working with the provincial
governments fell largely to CMAC. In
2000, as part of the response to the
CMAC crisis, a national demining
authority was created. The
Cambodian Mine Action Authority is
d eveloping policies to regulate rhe
operation of commercial demining
companies and to conduct quality
assurance checks on all demining
agencies. Its secretary general envisions
the commercial companies underraking mine clearance tasks unsuitable
•

Acluster of three
PMN-2s,
Cambodia's most
ubiquitous mine.
c/o Rohan
Maxwell

for humanitarian organizations. It is
anticipated that t he first such
operation will be officially licensed in
March.
Demining Operations

Manual demining is the primary
method in use in Cambodia. The
eq uipment is typical for the job
(tripwire feelers, vegetation cutters,
mine d etecto rs, prodders and
excavating tools, varying suites of
protective equipment), as are th e
phys ically and mentally arduous
conditions deminers face daily. Rates
of pay are high by Cambodian
standards: $ 160 a month for a
b eginner CMAC deminer, in a
country where the per capita monthly
income is about $23. These wages and
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Mine field clearance
operation showing
typical vegetation
cover.
c/o Rohan Maxwell

the status associated with being a
deminer are more than sufficient to
overcome any concern about death or
injury, and there is no shortage of
volu nteers. There has been a steady
trickle of casual ties amon g the
demining and EOD teams, averaging
eight or nine a year since 1993, about
7 percent of which are fatal. The
variety of soil conditions across the
country- in particular, che large areas
in which the soil contains a high
natural metal content-presents a
significant challenge, which in
CMAC's case has been partially
addressed by deploying two different
mine detectors. Another challenge is
the high level of metal contamination
in many areas- not just o n old
battlefields, which can be expected to
contain a great many metal fragments,
but also on the sites of abandoned
villages chat are now being resettled.
Ten miniscule fragments per square
meter is nor uncommon, and even the
most experienced dem iner cannot
differentiate between the signal
produced by such a fragment and that
produced by a low me cal con tent
mme.
In addition to the manual
de miners, there are a number of
mechanical systems that are either in

service or under evaluation. These
systems fall into two categories: those
designed to accelerate the manual
demining process by removing
vegetation (and tripwires); and those
intended to demine on their own, with
the sup port of a small number of
manual deminers. Vegetation cutters
are well suited co the Cambodian
situation, where the removal of
vegetation and checking for tripwires
consumes up to 70 percent of the
deminers' time (ref 3). HALO Trust
has successfu lly deployed seven
tractor-mounted vegetation cutters in
support of its 16 clearance teams.
MAG is currently conducting trials on
the Pearson Tractor, a multi-functional
system that can be adapted to clear
vegetation, cut small trees, and
conduct area reduction and quality
assurance tasks. The Tempest is a
remote-controlled mini-flail, which is
also being eval uated by MAG for
vegetation clearance. This machine is
unusual in that it was built in
Cambodia by a British charity that
employs disabled Cambodians.
Finally, CMAC is testing Japanese
vegetation cutting systems that are
essentially tracked excavators with
brushcutters in place of the excavator
buckets.
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The mechanical vegetation cutters described above are either
operational or show promise; in
contrast, the two mechanical
demining systems that have been
evaluated (both by CMAC) have
enjoyed less success. The first is the
Sisu RA-140 flail, originally designed
to clear scatterable mines from hard
surfaces or standard mines from open
terrain. After extensive trials, it" has
been concluded that this system
cannot clear terrain to meet required
standards. Only about 80 percent of
the mines (at depths of 5 to 20 em)
are detonated or rendered inoperable,
and there is a significant risk that some
mines could be thrown our of the mine
field into previously safe areas. In
addition, the system lacks mobility.
The Finnish government, though,
remains willing to underwrite the costs
of d eploying and operating two
systems, so CMAC uses them as
vegetation cutters. They enjoy
reasonable success in this role ,
particularly against thick bamboo, but
they continue to encounter mobility
problems.
T he second system is RHINO, a
cracked vehicle equi pped with two
heavy counter-rotating drum s
mounted laterally, one above the other,
on the front of the chassis. This
adapted agricultural system is designed
to till the soil to a depth of 20 em,
crushing all mines and UXO between
the drums. At a weight of 48 tons
(without the 14 ton tiller unit
attached), it was very difficult to
deploy RHINO co task sites during
its trials. Cranes and flatbed trailers of
the required capacity are not easily
procured in rural Cambodia, and it
was sometimes necessary to make
roure improvements in order to move
the system. Once on site, the machine
worked reasonably well when
difficulties with depth maintenance
had been resolved. A small number of
manual deminers dealt with awkward

spo ts and provided a measure of
quality assurance.
After its initial evaluation,
RHINO did valuable work in support
of a multi-village rehabilitation project
under the aegis of CARE Cambodia.
The drums survived mine and UXO
deto nations, but on a number of
occasions AT mine detonations
rendered the system inoperable for
significant periods of time. Spare pans
were an ongoing concern, because
most of them had to be shipped from
Germany. Most critically, RHINO
was expensive co operate. This can be
more than made up by the savings in
manual demining costs, but only if the
system can be deployed in a series of
very large, open mine fields in close
proximity to each other. This was not
the case in Cambodia, and once the
fun ding provided by the German
government ran out, RHINO
returned co Germany.
Finally, CMAC is developing a
mine detecting dog (MDD) capability,
fu nded by the Swedish government.
The inrent is to use MDDs for area
reduction and possibly for quality
ass urance , but the training and
deployment process has been a lengthy
one. The project began in 1996, but
there was a significant initial setback
w h en Cambodian dogs taken to
Sweden for training proved unsuitable
for the task, necessitating a fresh start
using Swedish dogs trained in
Ca mbodia. These dogs and their
Cambodian handlers moved from
their training facility to Battambang
province in early 2000. The intent was
to familiarize the teams with the
terrain before starting area reduction
tasks in the spring of 2000, but this
took longer than anticipated and as of
mid-2000 there were no operational
teams.

Conclusion
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Munitions and Mines:
Peace Education for Laos
From the end of the Vietnam War to 1994, 10,000 Laotians fell casualty to the
millions of pieces of UXO within their borders. The author recounts the role of
Mennonite Central Commitee and other NGOs in reversing this situation.
By Titus Peachey, Mennonite Central Committee
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Phonsavanh, the
capital of Xieng
Khouang
province, is
situated on a high
rolling plateau.
c/oMCCU.S.

t was 8:00 one morning in March of 1998, when Phou
Vieng, a villager in the northern Lao province ofXieng
Khouang, was preparing his work for the day. Having
recently built a simple house for his family, his first task
for the morning was to dig several shallow holes in the
earthen floor to anchor his bed. After measuring and
marking the places where his bedposts would lodge, he
prepared his digging tool and squarred beside the first mark.
In one short stroke, his life was forever changed.
AJl Phou Vieng can remember is the sound of the explosion. Hundreds of shards of steel tore into his body
from a cluster bomb buried just beneath the soil. One of
the pieces of shrapnel punctured a nearby can of gasoline,
and it burst into flames. Fortunately, neighbors gathered
quickly and carried Phou Vieng to safety, but his house
and all the family's belongings were burned.
The bomblet in Phou Vieng's house was dropped as
part of a massive U.S. bombing campaign that flew more
than 580,000 missions over Laos between 1964 and 1973.
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This equals roughly one mission for every five inhabitants
of the country and an average of one bombing mission
every eight minutes around rhe clock during the entire
nine years. Researchers estimate that approximately 90
million submunitions were dropped during the bombing
campaign. With a dud rare of I 0-30 percent, well over 9
million pieces of UXO were left behind. This ordnance,
much of it cluster munitions, has now lain in the ground
for over 25 years and becomes less stable and more
dangerous with each passing year.
When the war ended, hundreds of thousands of Lao
villagers who had fled the bombing returned to their homes.
In most cases, everything had been destroyed. They had to
rebuild their homes, repair the paddy dikes in their rice
fields, and open up the soil with shovels and hoes. They
carried on this imensive work in the midst of a staggering
array of still-lethal UXO littering the soil. Unknown to
them, their villages and surrounding fields had become
one vast, unmarked mine field. With no one to help them,
these villagers were trapped. In 1994, I asked one villager
why he cominued to grow vegetables in a location with
bomblets, or "bombies" as they are often called. He
responded, "I can't move my garden. There wouldn't be
any point to it anyway. Ifi moved it ro a new location, I'd
just find more bombies there. So I might as well keep it
where it is."
Thongsavanh, a reacher in Xieng Khouang province
during the war years, remembers instructing his students
ro pick up the strange round pieces of ordnance that
appeared in the forests and hillsides near his school. "I didn't
know it was dangerous," he recalled. "I thought since the
bombies hadn't blown up on impact they weren't dangerous
anymore."
Typically, when villagers found ordnance in their fields
and gardens, they simply removed it with their bare hands.
They found within themselves a courage borne out of
necessity. Farming was their livelihood and the only land
available to them was filled with bombs. Indeed, with the
passage of time, villagers became almost casual in their
approach to the ever-present bomb lets. An encounter I had

with Thong Dee, who was plowing his
field in Lek Village, illustrates this
attitude. When I asked Thong if any
bomblets had been turned up during
the plowing thus far, he matter-offactly replied that over 20 had been
plowed up the previous day. He had
thrown or placed some of the bomblets
into a hole at the edge of the plowed
field. As I walked over to the hole and
peered over the edge, Thong hurriedly
pulled away the weeds and scrap metal
he had placed on top to reveal the four
or five bomblets underneath. Noticing
that I was about to take a picture, he
quickly moved each bomblet into
clearer view, handling them like they
were merely billiard balls.
Sadly, not everyone was as lucky
as Thong Dee. Between the end of the
war in 1975 and the beginning of
clearance operations in 1994, more
than l 0,000 Lao villagers suffered
injury or death from UXO. In many
ways, the stories are remarkably similar
to the stories of accidents from
landmines. People are injured or killed
during their everyday activities such
as collecting firewood, herding carrie
or hoeing in their fields and gardens.
Because of their curious shapes
and colors, and because many of them
can be found easily accessible on top
of the soil, cluster munitions are
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almost irresistible to children. In fact,
over 25 percent of UXO-related
casualties happen to children, none of
whom were born when the bombs fell.
On Nov. 22, 1993, four Tu Va Chao
children were walking along a street
on the edge of Phonsavanh, Xieng
Khouang province's capital. They were
raking rhe water buffalo to pasture
when Kou Ya, four, and Sia Ya, six,

noticed a round object in the ditch. It
looked like the ball boys and girls toss
to each other during Hmong New Year
festivities. It was actually a cluster
bomb. Sia Ya threw it to her brother.
He couldn't catch it and it landed
behind him, exploding and killing him
instantly. Sia Ya died after two
agonizing days and nights in the
provincial hospital.
The story of the Chao children
illustrates yet another tragic aspect of
cluster bomb explosions. Compared to
land mines, cluster bombs have higher
explosive power and deadly fragmentation effects. They are designed
to kill. In Laos, 52 percent of all UXO
accidents have resulted in death.
In the period immediately after
the war, the Soviet Union assisted with
the clearance of a large state farm in
Xieng Khouang province. Aside from
this effort, rhe only assistance came
from two North American NGOs: the

•
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Bomb craters in Xieng Khaouang
province. c/o MCC U.S.

Mrs. Chao and
surviving children.
c/oMCCU.S.

•

Mines Advisory
Group technician
searching for
UXO.

c/oMCCU.S.

Mennonite Central Committee
(MCC) and the American Friends
Service Committee. These groups
imported good-quality shovels for
agricultural use. Shovels were thought
to be somewhat safer to use than the
traditional Lao hoe, which was swung
from high over the head to turn the
soil. Shovels were gentler and perhaps
less likely to detonate a hidden
bombler. There were other experiments in these early years, such as an
MCC-supplied armored tractor with
a chain flail device on the front. These
experiments proved ineffective and
were eventually abandoned.
H owever, in 1994 the MCC, the
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and
the Lao government initiated a UXO
clearance project. The project quickly
drew the attention of U.N. agencies
and other governments. As funding

became available, the project grew.
From 1996-1998, over 122,000 pieces
of UXO were cleared; approximately
50-75 percent of UXO cleared were
cluster bombs. 1 By the year 2000,
eight international partners, in
cooperation with the Lao government
and local partners, were clearing UXO
in nine of the country's 18 provinces
and educating local people to the
dangers of UXO.
As MAG began working in Xieng
Khouang province, Laos, the newly
trained clearance teams encountered
a curious problem. Each morning,
when they arrived at the work site they
discovered, resting on top of the soil,
new cluster bombs that had not been
there the day before. The work site was
a large open area that was the future
site of a teacher's train ing college. A
conversation with the villagers across
the road from the worksite cleared up
the mystery.
It seems the villagers, who were
aware that cluster bombs were being
destroyed each day, decided to carry
cluster bombs from their village to the
clearance site each evening. In this way,
the bomblets from their village could
be destroyed, even though their village
had not been chosen for clearance.
This action by the villagers, while
extremely risky, also made a clear
statement about the presence ofUXO
in the vast affected areas of Laos. UXO
is everywhere, and clearance teams can

only begin to create tiny islands of
safety in a great sea of ordnance.
MAG and its counterpartS in the
Lao government responded quickly to
this action by the villagers. Rather than
putting all their resources into the subsurface clearance of a piece of land,
which would take months to clear,
they split the team in two. One team
remained to clear the site of the future
school, while the other team traveled
from village to village to destroy
bomblets on the surface posing an
immediate threat to life and safety.
Roving teams continue to destroy
bomblets on the surface but do not
make the ground safe for agricultural
use. The benefit of a roving team is
the immediate reduction in risk,
especially to children who are often
attracted to the toy-like appearance of
bomblets. Over a period of t ime,
however, the Lao rov ing teams
discovered that they could be called
back to the same area repeatedly.
Bomblets that bury themselves on
impact often work their way to the
surface as time passes. Through the
natural expansion and contraction of
the soil and erosion, new bomblets
appear where none could be seen
before.
In May 2000, I accompanied a
film crew to Laos to help produce a
documentary that will be shown on
public television. I watched as a bomb
clearance team prepared to blow up

nine bomblets that had been found on
a hillside used for grazing cattle. As
the team worked, my colleagues and I
spo tted four more bomblets on the
hillside. The metal shells of the
bomblets had just begun to appear
above the soil. This area had been
cleared before and will certainly have
to be cleared again.
April 2001 will mark the seventh
a nniversary of the beginning of
systematic UXO clearance in Laos.
Tremendous progress has been made
since the first team of 20 clearance
specialists was trained in 1994.
Hopefu lly, all the destroyed ordnance
has resulted in some reduced risk and
some tragedies have been avoided. It
is gratifYing to see these developments.
Despite all this work, there has
been linle reduction in the rates of
inj ury and death. Casualties still occur
at the rate of about one accident every
two days. As the Lao population grows
and the pressure on the land increases,
new areas will have to be opened up
for agricul t ura l production and
se ttlement. Much of this land will
present a serious UXO problem .
Ordnance clearance work will have to
continue in Laos for decades.
MCC's 25 years of history in Laos
an d ongoing struggle with the
problem of UXO has led it into the
arena of advocacy. As a people of faith
committed to peace and non-violence,
we could not visi t with families who

had experienced painful losses from
cluster munitions without asking the
larger questions about why and how
cluster munitions are used. As we
researched the continued production
and use of cluster munitions in
numerous conflicts around the globe,
we became convinced that serious
problems exist related to targeting, the
size of cluster bomb footprints and
dud rates.

MCC has joined other agencies
in issuing a Call for a Moratorium on
the production and use of cluster
munitions. As a result of our work in
Laos and our exposure to the UXO
problem on the civilian population in
post-war Iraq and Kosovo , MCC
believes it is time for the international
community to ban these weapons. •

•

Over the past 35 years, in places
like Viemam, Laos, Cambodia, Sudan,
Yugoslavia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kosovo ,
Chechnya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and
Afghanistan, cluster muni tions have
had a persistent and tragic record of
indisc riminate killing. During
Operation Desert Storm, at least 25
U.S. military personnel were killed by
U.S. submunitions, and other U.S.
personnel we re injured. Cl u ster
munitions are an increasingly
significant o b stacle in va rious
peacekeeping operations.

Contact Information
Titus Peachey
Director of Peace Education
Mennonite Central Committee
21 S. 12'h St., Box 500
Akron, PA 17501
Tel: (717) 859-3889
E-mail: tmp@mccus.org
Websi te: http:/ /www.mcc.org/
clusterbomb

WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A LANDMIN E AND A CLUSTER MUNITION?
Cl uste r mun i tion s are sma ll
bomblets or submunitions which are
delivered to their targets in large
containers o r shells. The container
opens in mid-airoverthe target area,
often dispersing the bomblets over
an area the size of several football
fields. A drop of several canni st ers

can easily create kill zones of a
square kilometer or greater in size.
The bomblets may be the size and
shape of a law n dart, or an elongated soda can, and are designed to
explode on or shortly after impact.
The AP bomblet s have fragmenta-
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tion features w hich ca n send hundreds of shards of steel at ballist ic
speeds over a w ide area. Anti-armor
bombs have shaped charges which
can penetrate heavy armor. The
cluster munitions are delivered in a
bomb by ai rcraft, or launched by
rocket or artillery projectile.

The primary di ffe rence between
cluster munitions and landmines is
in their design.
Cluster munitions are designed to
explode as a result of their impact,
so that their effect is felt with in a
short rime of th ei r delivery.

Landmines are designed to explode as
a result of contact with or proximiry
ro a person. By design, their effects
may be felt many months after their
p lacement, depending on when a
perso n in itiates contact w ith the
landmine.
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Cluste r m unitions which fa il to
explode on impact, however, are very
similar in effect to landmines.
Since dud rates for cluster munitions
are often in t h e 10 p ercen r-30
percent ra n ge, mo st cluste r
munition strikes create the actual
effect of a mine field .

U.S. bomb on
display in front
of a home in
Phonsavanh,
Xieng
Khouang.
c!oMCCU.S.
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Mine Detection Dogs At Work
The Journal profiles mine dog companies ranging from South
Africa's Mechem Engineering Services to the United State's
RONCO Consulting Corporation in Washington D.C.
By Stacy L. Smith, MAIC
History of War and Mine Detection
Dogs

T

hrough exte nsive training in
scouting, detection, and search and
rescue (SAR), military working
dogs have proven to be valuable assets to rhe
defense and safety of many countries.
Since World War II, the U.S. military
has deployed over 30,000 dogs in the aid of
soldiers. In 1943 , the Germans attempted
to deter Allied troops from North Africa by
placing nonmetallic mines in the ground.
The British quickly found a method for
counteracting the Germans' strategic move
with the help of"M-dogs" trained to detect
mines encased in plastic or wood. The
United Stares soon followed with the
implementation of a mine dog detection
program with over 100 dogs and 120
handlers assigned ro a mine detection unit
under the 228'" Engineer Mine Detection
Company at rhe Cat Island Dog Center
(Lemish) . Deployed in 1944, rhe dogs were
initially unsuccessful in locating mines in
Algeria and Italy. Key factors included a lack
of training to prepare the dogs for loud
•

Weitkamp and his German Shepard in front of
M-Detect's training facility in Ascheberg,
Germany. c/o Weitkamp

sounds such as artillery or small-arms fire.
"Like other crash programs instituted
during the war, the M-dog program was
ha sti ly conceived withour sufficient
background knowledge to implement the
program-finding bones is entirely different
from locating an explosive mine" (Lem ish).
U.S. efforts to maintain the mine dog
detection program did not resurface again
until the Vietnam War. After conducting a
feasibility study in 1967, the U.S. Army
Limited Warfare Laboratory (USALWL)
determined that improved training methods
and advanced techniques would resolve
problems occurring during min e detection
dog (MOD) deployment in World War II.
Instead of using fear motivation or food
rewards to promote successful detection, the
USALWL elected to use positive reinforcement. As a result, MODs performed at a
high success rate in Vietnam, locating mines,
trip wires and booby traps.
Mine Detection Dogs Today

Today, MODs are used worldwide in
mine-afflicted countries to locate and detect
UXO/landmines remaining from internal
and external conflicts. After intensive
training, MODs are able to assist in
demining and clearance efforts efficiently
and effectively with a proven success rate.
Following is a brief description of companies
and organizations specializing in MOD
training and deploymenr.
Mechem Engineering Services

In South Africa, Mechem, a local
company and division of Denel's Systems
Group, is clearing much of the country's
mine- infested areas. Mechem uses the latest
demining technology to remove mines
inexpensively and efficiently.
MODs a re used in the Mechem
Explosive and Drug Detection System
• 86.

(Medds). The system uses vapor concentrations and the nasal sensitivity of demining
dogs to uncover traces of chemicals from
explosives. This system can be used for
detecting both metallic and non-metallic
explosive devices.
In March 200 I, Mechem will begin
demining operations in Mozambique with a
crew of 16 men and eight MODs. The crew
will work towards locating and removing
approximately 2 million mines left over from
internal conflicts between the Frelimo
government and Renamo rebels. Operations
are ex peered to last until October 2001.
Contact Information
Kip Shultz, Senior MOD Advisor
Mechem Engineering Services
P.O. Box 912-454, Silverton 0127
Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27 12 826 506883
Fax: +27 12 808 3533
E-mail: mecdoc@mechem.denel.co.za
Swedish Armed Forces Dog
Instruction Center

The Swedish Armed Forces Dog
Instruction Center trains dogs specifically
for the situation in which they will perform.
For example, dogs ne eded to rescu e
personnel from mine field accidents in
Bosnia are trained for conditions and
situations they are likely to encounter in the
coumry.
MODs from the Swedish Armed Forces
Dog Instruction Center are currently
working in Cambodia, Kuwait, Lebanon,
and the Western Sahara. Operations are
often accomplished in collaboration with
local mine action organizations who provide
background information and region-specific
project derails. In cooperation with the
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC),
MODs have been very successful in
eliminating the dangers ofUXO/Iandmines
found in Cambodian mine fields .
Contact Information
Peter Soderberg, Director
Swedish Armed Forces Dog Instruction
Center
Box 100

Police Dog Institute for Consultancy
and Management

•

An MDD surveys the landscape. c/o Martin Weitkamp

146 22 Tullinge
Tel: +46 8 778 00 32
Fax: +46 8 607 35 14
E-mail: fhtc-international@postbox.mil.se
Website: h ttp://www.mil.se/ ovrigr/ fh tel
explosive. hem
Humanity Dog

Since the 1940s, Humanity Dog has
trained MODs in order to aid humanitarian
dem ining efforts. Each year approximately
100 dogs are trained and deployed to locate
and identifY landmines, mercury, PCB and
drugs. Demining dogs trained by Humanity
Dog can detect mines at depths of 50 em,
in paths 2-3 em wide and in low-level
concentrations.
MOOs undergo rigorous training in
sce nt analysis. Trained dogs can detect both
single substances and combinations of
substances used to create landmines.
Training is conducted fo r both dogs and
dog handlers through rhe Mine Detection
Dog Handler Training Programme. Dogs
and dog handlers are paired and taught
together to ensure a working relationship
between each team. MODs are required to
complete 15 months of basic training and
12 months of specialized training before
taking a comprehensive exam for fieldwork
eligibility. During special ized training,
MODs also complete three weeks of training
designed to acclimate MODs to their new
surroundings. Environmental training
allows dogs to adjust to the density and smell
of the soil. In addition, some dogs require
two days of ground adaptation training in
areas where the clearance soil fluctuates.

Contact Information
Anders Bruse, CEO
Humanity Dog
50
S-122 88 Enskede
Sweden
Tel: +46(0) 8-39 90 00
Fax: +46(0) 8-39 94 39
E-mail: anders. bruse@hundskolan.se
Website: http://www.humanitydog.se/
company.htm
RONCO Consulting Corporation

RONCO works under a U.S. Department of State Humanitarian Oemining Program Office contract. RONCO 's current
mine detection initiatives that utilized MODs
include participation in the Mozambique
Mine Detection Dog Program and the Thailand Mine Detecting Dog Center.
In addition, the RONCO Team assisted
in an international effort after Hurricane
Mitch wreaked havoc on Central America
in 1998. In Central America, 12 reams
comprised of six dogs and six dog handlers
demined bridge abutments and river
crossmgs.
Contact Information
Ronald Boyd, President
RONCO Consulting Corporation
2301 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel: (202) 785-2791
Fax: (202) 785-2078
E-mail: roncowash@aol.com
Website: http:/ /www.roncoconsulting. com

In 1995, the Police Dog Institute for
Consultancy
and
Management
(POLDICAM) began training dogs to
combat and detect crime. Using the latest
training techniques, POLDICAM trains
dogs for deployment in detecting explosives,
landm ines and narcotics . In addit ion ,
POLDICAM also trains dogs for personal
protection, patrol and apprehension, arson
detection, crime prevention, and SAR.
According to POLDICAM director
Stan Gillham, approximately 15 dogs are
trained each year for mine detecting
purposes. The dogs are carefully selected for
drive and scent abilities, and POLDICAM
uses imprinting to train MODs to recognize
scents specific to explosive devices or UXO.
Currently, POLDICAM has seven
operating MOD teams consisting of a
matched dog and handler. Most of these
teams a re working in Northern
Mozambique, clearing fields at a rate of
10,000 sq. m per day. Gillham explains that
mine detection teams like the ones trained
at POLDICAM are "able to expedite area
reduction for landmines" and work towards
the goal of using "properly trained dogs as
an important aid in policing."
Contact Information
Stan Gillham, Director
POLO I CAM
P.O. Box 73768
Lynwood Ridge 0040
Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27 12 6513888
Fax: +27 12 651 1555
E-mail: poldicam@yebo.co.za
Global Training Academy

The Global Training Academy was
founded in 1984 and specializes in training
dogs to detect narcotics and explosives as
well as assist in police patrol, tracking and
SAR procedures. G lobal Training Academy
director Dan Hayter said MODs are a
valuab le asset to mine detection and
removal. "The dogs' ability to cover a large
amount of ground in a short period of time
with great accuracy is a plus," he said, "[and)

continued on page 119
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Asia & the Pacific

Mine Detection Dogs At Work

Comparative densities of mines and UXO in clearance operations in the region:
Region

Square meters

Mines/UXO removed

Koch Mine Safe
NPA, Songo, Cabora Bassa
Mechem, Massingir
Mechem, Corrunana Dam
Mozambican average

3,809,281
738, 180
89,634
1,700,000

65,185
12,072
349
3,600

Square meters
per mine/UXO
58
61
467
472
1,500- 2,500

Source: Mechem, NPA Mozambique, Quarterly Report 4th Qtr, 1999, Koch-M ine Safe, IND, Maputo.

Working under extended hours,
the mechanical team was capable of
bringing the company up to between
6.5 ro 7 .5 million m 2 of land by
February 200 1. The Mine Collector
processes 20,000 m 2 of ground per
day, and the manual team covers
around 12,000 to 12,500 m 2 per day,
potentially destroying over 1,000
mines per day.
On ave rage (over both mine
fields), KMS's teams are lifting and
destroying one mine per 58 m 2 of

KMS cleared 421,000 m 2 . By mid-July
2000, the team had cleared a total of
3,809,28 1 m 2 of land and 65,185
mines- one mine per 58 m 2 . By any
standards, the current safety record of
KMS is exceptional considering the
conditions.

:ontact Information

Henry Thompson
RHS Associates Ltd.
33 Ludlow Way
Finchley London N20JZ
Tel: 44-208-444-3496
• No "missed mines" have been reported Fax: 44-208-883-2399
by BacTec, which assesses 10 percent of E-mail: henry@rhsassociates.co.uk
the land cleared. The level of quality
achieved under these conditions is very
high. •

'KMS was also strongly criticized for a high accident rate. From March to June 1999,
12 accidents occurred. Over half of the accidents were incurred during excavation. The
primary cause of one-third of these was attributed to management error, notably serious
injuries from handling mines. 5 "
4

ground. In the Cordon Saniwire mine
field, this broad average rises to one
mine per 20m2 . The mechanical team
working in the center of the Cordon
Sanitaire clears one mine per 12 m 2
on average-spot densities can be more
than double this figure.
Two things characte ri ze the
current clearance program:

• The high density ofmines and number
of mines being cleared. In June 2000,

{eferences
1

C hris Pearce, Director, Mine-Tech, Interview
in Johannesburg, June 6, 2000.
2 Alistair C raib, EU and Zimbabwe Ministry
of Defence Consultant, Interview Feb. 6, 2000.
3 Koch-Mine Safe was using Vallon detectors,
fine German detectors capab le of high
sensitivity- bur more complex ro use than
many comparable models. The QA team was
using British Guartcl MD8 detectors, a robust
and simple model.
4
Temba Kanganga, Mine Safe, Deputy Project
Manager. The Road Forward: HumanittJrian
Mine C!etJrtlnce in Southern AfrictJ. SA IIA
Johannesburg, August 6, 2000.
s Data from Andy Smith, DDIV database, April

continued from page 87
the [dogs'] ability to d etect plastic
mines when metal de tectors are
ineffective is even more important."
The Global Training Academy
has the capacity to train 30-36 dogs
per year in mine detection. In 2001,
18 dogs will be trained for deployment
in Lebanon, Oman and Thailand. In
addition, the Academy currently has
dog teams working in ten countries:
Mozambique, Rwanda, Bosnia, Costa
Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Croatia,
Namibia, Thailand and Afghanistan.
These dog teams often work with the
ho st country's military In mine
clearance operations.
Contact Information
Dan Hayter, Director
Global Training Academy
P.O. Box 445
Somerset, TX 78069
Tel: (2 1O) 622-9460
Fax: (830) 429-3122
E-mail: Graden@aol.com
M -Detect

M-Detect, a min e dog training
facility in Germany, specializes in
training MODs for mine detection
operations in mine-affected countries.
Each year, M-Detect trains and
deploys approx im ately eight dogs.
This year, MDDs are being trained for

deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and C roatia. Martin Weitkamp,
director ofM-Detect, said MDDs are
"an imporram part of the international
demining toolbox" if used as quality
assurance in unknown areas.
Weitkamp adds that dogs should not
be used in a known mine field in place
of deminers or demining machinery
but in unknown areas where sweeping
the fields with an MOD is faster and
more efficient.
Contact Information
Martin Weitkamp, Director
M-Detect
Munsrerstrasse 13
D-59387 Ascheberg
Germany
Tel: +49-2599-92-5207
Fax: +49-2599-92-5295
E-mail: wd-weitkamp@t-online.de
Website: http:/ /www.securarec.de
Conclusion

MDDs are an effective means for
mine clearance operations worldwide.
With proper training from mine dog
companies and organizations, MODs
employed in mine-infested countries
return successful results. Their driven
success continues co be an asset to
countries in times of need. •

6, 2000 .
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The training period ends with
MDD leading the trainer.
c/o Martin Weitkamp
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The Challenges of

Integrating Mine Dogs into Humanitarian Demining
From sentry duty for Napoleon to mine sniffing in Vietnam, dogs
have played key roles in war and peace for centuries. More accurate than human beings and many metal detectors, dogs are now
being used in more and more detection capadties.

capitalizing, utilizing and understanding a
dog's skills, are the key eleme nts of a
favorable canine operation. MODs and their
users have benefited from lessons learned by
the earlier use of dogs in the military. While
there may still be challenges to fully utilizing
a mine dog's paten rial , they have been
deployed by commercial co mpanies and
NGOs with varying degrees ofsuccess. Their
use will continue to be debated in the HD
community until better scienrific
understanding of thei r sce nt detection
ca pabilities is demonstrated and th e
relationship between the handler and canine
1m proves.
•

A well camouflaged marine and his dog, Soloman Islands, World War II. c/o AP

Origins of the War Dog

•

The relationsip between handler and canine is
a key component in the success of a working
dog. c/oAP

By Margaret Buse, Editor

T

he story of mine detection dogs
(MDD) is really the story of the
successes and failures of canine use
in the military. Dogs have been used since
antiquity by armies, both passively and

actively. In the 20th century, the Red Cross
and European military utilized dogs with a
high degree of success. The establishment
of organized training facilities, instilling the
proper training ofboth dog and handler and
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Dogs were first used as an offensive and
defensive weapon of war. Michael G.
Lemish, author of War Dogs, wrote ,
"Persians, Greeks, Assyrians and Babylonians
all recognized the tactical advantage of war
dogs and deployed them as forward
attacking elements." Even women led packs
of war dogs against the Romans at the battle
of Versella, which delayed the Roman's
victory. The Romans eventually adopted
dogs as a military tool of their own. The
Roman dogs, bred for fierceness , were
encased in body armor with razor sharp
spikes. Writers of the day reported that these
dogs would not retreat even against men
armed with swords. Later, Napoleon used
dogs for protection and sentry duty by
chaining them to the walls surrounding
Alexandria. Europe had a long history of
using dogs in various working roles. The
military simply capitalized on this use.
In America, the Native Americans used
dogs for sentry, pack duty and as draft
animals. Early colonists relied on dogs for
herding. It was Benjamin Franklin that first
proposed the use of dogs as military
weapons. He wrote: "Dogs should be used
against the Indians. They should be large,
strong and fierce." John Penn, founder of
Pennsylvania, said, "You will acquaint the
captains that every soldier be allowed three
shillings per month who brings with him a
strong dog for pursuing the savages, put this
idea into action. Each dog is to be kept tied
and led by his owner."

Dogs were not used by Americans to
the same extent as the Europeans and
therefore were not organized by our early
military into any type of working cani ne
units. This lack of central organization, in
parr, led to the lack of success ofU .S. canine
military units well into the 20th century.
Dogs were employed during World War
I by European armies for ambulatory
assistance, messenger service, sentry duty
and as scouts. The Red Cross dogs composed
the most organized and successful canine
units. The dogs carried medical supplies and
canteens to wounded soldiers. They were
trained to not recognize dead soldiers. lf a
soldier was found unconscious, the dogs
would return to their handlers and lead them
to the location of that soldier. The Red Cross
dogs often worked at night and relied on
their olfactory abilities to find soldiers.
Canines were also used as pack animals and
could carry up to 40 lb of supplies that
included water, grenades or ammunition.
The war dogs successes guaranteed their use
in World War II. For the Americans, the
bombing of Pearl Harbor was a catalyst to
the American military to investigate the
utilization of canines as a military tool.
At the time of the bombing of Pearl
Harbor, the U.S. Army library contained
only one book about dogs -a field manual
for canines in arctic regions. The bombing
of Pearl Harbor mobilized some American
civilians to contact the U.S. military. Dog
breeders, trainers and the director of the

American Kennel Club were well aware of
the use of canines by the Europeans. They
formed the Dogs for Defense (DFD) to band
together volunteer amateurs and professional
dog handlers and breeders. They assumed
the military would jump at their offers for
dogs as offensive military a ides, but the
military didn't. It was only with the help of
actress Helen Menken, coupled with the
increased U.S. activiry in the war effort, that
the army was prompted to take another look
at the DFD.
After a slow start, the U.S. secretary of
war ordered that the dogs be trained for

uti I ization. The Air Force studied the
practicality of using dogs in the temperate
climate of Southeast Asia, combining a
sentry/scout dog, finding the best breed to
use, and developing an in-country breeding
program. The initial problems were getting
the South Vietnamese handlers to accept
these working dogs. Because of a lack of
centralized structure, interminent use
among all the military branches, and a lack
of careful obedience and tactical training,
the successes were coupled with problems
and failures. Lemish attributes this to the
lack of a centralized program like the DFD
in World War II, the treatment of dogs by
the military as superfluous equipment, and
the inabiliry to demilitarize war dogs.
A common thread amo ng both
European and American forces was the
conce pt that a good dog handler can
capitalize on the assets a well-trained dog
can bring with it to a military endeavor. The
best dog handler was considered a soldier
that could scout and patrol on his own and
use a dog as an extension of his own talents.
The foundation philosophy is that canines
are one of numerous military tools and when
combined with other instruments, can get
the job done. These could be the very
philosophies the humanitarian demining
community may ne ed to adopt to
successfully integ rate MDDs into
operations.
As with other mine clearance
technologies, dogs are not a replacement for
deminers and metal detectors. Rather, they

"A mine dog Licensing test can be compared to a driver's
license test. Its purpose is to provide confidence in a
basic capability to detect mines and tripwires. I have
learned that testing and licensing has a positive side
effect since the overall quality of the work seems to
improve significantly." - Harvard Bach, GICHD
sentry dury, search and rescue, patrol, and
messenger service. With the DFD as the dog
recruitment agency, organized war dog
training centers were soon established. After
the war, the PFD was disbanded and the
dogs were retired to civilians.
Through trial and error the U.S. dog
operation had varying successes through the
1950s. It was during the Vietnam War that
canine use went to the next level of
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can be an additional mine clearing asset to a
demining program. Author Rae McGrath
writes in Landmines and Unexploded
Ordnance that MDDs are most effective in
well-defined clearance operations and that
they "can work more quickly than normal
clearance teams, such as road and track
sections containing widely spaced mines."
McGrath also notes that an MDD is a
valuable asset in battlefield areas with high

FEATURE
metal content. They can speed up the
detection process because they recognize
explosive scent, rather than metal.
In contrast, Harvard Bach, senior liason
officer of the Geneva International Center
for Humanitarian Demining(GICHD),
feels dogs should not be used to verify
individual mines, but to verify the
boundaries of a mine field. Eddie Banks,
director of BiH, supports this. He said: "A
dog is a location tool. If you already know
where the mines are, you do not need a dog."
There have been many challenges to
effectively integrating MDDs into
humanitarian mine clearance operations.
Coordination, timing, cost, availability and
mismanagement have all been ci ted as
reasons that dogs have not been effectively
integrated. Extensive training requirements
of dogs, handlers and demining
management is needed for a program to start
successfully.
Bach says that coordination, timing,
and determining the best deployment
scenario for dogs are also factors. Banks adds,
"There are two major problems: We cannot
prove how effective a dog is and many
managers, at all levels, do not understand
the advantages and limitations of dog
teams."
He feels a major deterrent to successful
deployment ofMDD's is that many experts
in this field have no rei evant, practical

FEATURE
a good hunting instinct. Whether dogs
should be bred, indigenous or trained has
been widely discussed. Benefits and
draw backs to all methods have been
identified and debated. With large-scale
organizations it could be advantageous to
breed dogs for mine detection. Smaller
organizations are better off purchasing
trained dogs or rraining indigenous dogs.
The GICHD is currently implementing a
study to see which dog breeds are most
su itable for mine detection. Most
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"I believe that MODs will become more credible and less costly in the future. The latter
- Bach
due to more experience/documentation and less training failures."
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Two Russian soldiers try to seperate their dogs. c/o AP

are based on sound management," he says.
"[They] employ appropriately qualified and
trained personnel with suitable personalities, and adopt an open minded, flexible
attitude that promotes effective clearance to
high standards of safery and quality."
Successful integration ofMDDs can be
achieved through an effective training,
purchasing and management program and
by identifying the dogs' strengths and

International have all used mine dogs. Many
commercial companies have proven to be
serious promoters of MDD endeavors. The
national dog program in Afghanistan has
been very successful with more than 130
dogs and handlers operating in the field.
Bach feels if the aim is to run a short-term
operation, expatriate specialists should be
brought in to the country. If the operation
is long-term, local handlers must be trained.

''If you are using a dog you are using it as a primary detector. Based on my experience,
[if] managed properly, a dog is a more effective than a human being and most metal
detectors in the detection role. However, dogs have Limitations, therefore the combination of deminers and dogs can be most effective. Even in the quality control role a dog
is being used to confirm that an area is clear." - Eddie Banks BiH
experience using dogs in a humanitarian
clearance role. "We need to train the
managers, both internationals and nationals,
in order that we can manage these and other
aspects professionally and effectively. The
challenge is to get all levels of management,
handlers, team leaders, monitors and
inspectors to understand how to effectively
use this tool."
Banks feels that what an organization
needs to be successful is the understanding
of the dog's capability and the understanding
ofhow to manage the dogs and the demining
operation effectively. "Good organizations

integrating a training and handler education
program. Once properly established, an
MDD program can be an effective tool in
the mine clearing toolbox. With limited
retraining, it is feasible that an MDD can
be utilized and beneficial in other scent
capacities like explosives, forensics, narcotics,
and search and rescue.
"I believe that MDDs will become more
credible and less costly in the future. The
larrer due to more experience/documemarion and less training failures. We will have

weaknesses and deploying them effectively.
Coupled with a humanitarian demining
management system that can integrate varied
assets effectively, this can result in effective
dog deployment in the mine field.
The MDD field has grown in step with
humanitarian demining. With all levels of
failure and success, the industry has seen a
jump in the last 10 years from a handful of
MDD organizations to over 25
organizations utilizing mine dogs. Very few
NGOs are currently involved in MDD
operations though HALO, Norwegian
People's Aid (NPA) and Handicap
• 90.

o rganizations assess individual dogs'
capabilities and proceed from there. It can
be considered a given that choosing suitable
dogs and handlers that meet training and
operational needs is essential. "Thereafter,
it is all about initial selection, professional
tra ining, selection and training of good
hand lers, a good bonding process and
ensuring continuation of training," Banks
states.
All would agree that MDD programs
have expensive startup costs and that it is
vital for donors to understand this critical
facto r. Also critical for donor support is the
ability tO understand that it tal<es time ro
establish an MDD capacity, whether you are
facilitating breeding, buying dogs, or

a better understanding of the potential for
and the limitations to mine dog detection.
We will also be able to integrate mine dogs
into a combined demining approach in a
better way then we currently do," Bach says.
Banks agrees with these sentiments. "If
we can improve management of demining,
including rhe husbandry and operational
capabilities of MDDs, then I feel we could
change current procedures in order that dogs
could be used even more effectively and
productively," he explains.
The keys to success with these war dogs
or humanitarian dogs do not lie so much
with the individual dog or species in general,
but with the handling by mankind. •

In general, dogs are more effective in
environmemal conditions that include a
degree of soil moisture, which increases the
transportation of scents from the ground to
air. Dogs usually work berrer in the morning
when there is still dew on the ground. As
the air hears up, the hot air rises along with
the target seem, making it more difficult to
detect. It stands to reason that dogs are less
effective in extreme weather conditionsbe it snow, heavy rains or high winds. These
conditions all displace scent.
While a dog wirh good scenting
capabilities is needed, dogs must also possess

Contact Information

Harvard Bach
Senior Liason Officer to U.N Mine Action
Team
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Fax: +41-22-906-1690
Eddie Banks
Mine Action Advisor
BiH Commission for Demining
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E-mail: vebanks@paleol.net
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A dog and his handler on patrol in the South
Vietnamese jungle. c/o AP
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K9 Demining Corp to Aid Clearance Efforts in Lebanon
The Marshall Legacy Institute, with major contributions from
the Humpty Dumpty Institute, is contributing six mine detection dogs to the Lebanese Army's mine clearance team.
by Elizabeth A. Cramer, MAIC
am of six mine deteC£ion dogs
MODs), known as the K9 Deining Corp, has been sent ro aid
mine clearance efforts in Lebanon. The dogs
will be a parr of the Lebanese Army's
extensive mine clearance throughout the
country. According ro the Landrnine Monitor
Report 2000, the U.S. Department of State
has estimated that there are 35,000 mines
in Lebanon, nor including the previously
Israeli-occupied area of South Lebanon,
where rhe U.N. estimates rhere are another
130,000 mines causing immediate risk of
landmine casualiries.
The United States has already
contributed $2.3 million ro humanitarian
demining programs in Lebanon since 1998.
In an effort to ensure rhe successful
integra tion of th e mine dog reams to
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humanitarian demining, rhe U.S. Office of
Humanitarian Demining Programs (HOP)
has created a partnership with rwo NGOs
ro fund and deploy the K9 Demining Corp,
and has provided funds for rhe training of
Lebanese handlers and for infrastructure
support. The HOP contracted RONCO
Consulting Corporation to provide rhe
MODs, associated training and equiprmenr
for the Lebanese dog handlers.
The K9 Demining Corp was created
with funding contributions ro the Marshall
Legacy Institute (MLI), a non-profit
international humanitarian organization.
MLI is leading a national campaign ro
increase rhe number of MODs worldwide.
By combining pri va t e tax-deductible
contributions with U.S. government
funding, MLI is able to help build
humanitarian programs in mine-affected
countries.

Lebanese soldiers
stand in a safe lane
during a clearance
operation.
Operations like the
one shown will
soon be enhanced
by the presence of
mine detection
dogs.
c/oAP
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A major contributor ro MLI is rhe
Humpty Dumpty Institute (HOI), a nonprofit NGO formed in 1998 by American
business leaders ro promote private-public
partnerships ro confront global problems.
HDI focuses on programs ro strengthen U.S.
and U.N. relations and on the global
clearance of landmines. William Rouhana,
co-chairman of HDI, believes rhat dogs are
among rhe most effective tools in mine
clearance. Rouhana, also chairman of
Winsrar Communications, and his wife Amy
Newmark are among rhe major contributors
for the Lebanon project. Rouhana and
Newmark requested that guests at their
recent wedding contribute money ro the
HOT to aid in the training of mine detecting
dogs, instead of giving traditional wedding
gifts. HOI funding to MLI has provided for
the purchase, training, certification, and
transport of six dogs, each costing $16,000.
Ar rhe time of rhe donation, ir was
planned to send a corp of dogs ro Eritrea for
humanitarian demining. Because of internal
conflict in the country, the circumstances
were later considered unfit to send the dogs,
and a replacement country was needed. In
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June 2000, Perry Baltimore, president and
executive direcror of MLI, conducted a
feasibility study on rhe use of mine dogs in
Lebanon. The study resulted in a request
fro m Gen. George Sawaya, president of the
National Demining Office in Lebanon.
Sawaya asked that MODs be integrated into
the Lebanese mine clearance program ro
accelerate the pace of demining operations.
T he Lebanese Army is responsible for all
current demining efforts and reports that in
areas of difficult terrain, mechanical mine
clearance methods are nor viable but could
be replaced by MODs. At the time there
were no MMDs in rhe country, and it was
co nsidered an exciting option for mine
clearance efforts. Lebanon was choosen for
the K9 Corp and rhe dogs were prepared.
The MMDs were first trained in Europe
in obedience and socialization. They were
then sent ro rhe Global Training Academy
(GTA) in Texas and there underwent 12
more weeks of training in explosive scent
detection, odor, response, positioning and
search patterns, under the direction of
trainer Paul Brown. While in Texas the dogs
became acclimated to the living and working
environment, including the temperature,
odors, soil and kennels. At GTA dogs are
assigned a temporary trainer who rakes them
through scent training. The biggest challenge
for the trainer is learning what motivates
each dog and applying the motivating factor
in the training. The trainer must teach the
dog ro associate a reward with a target scent.
Baltimore believes that the training was
successful, "The dogs have learned and
responded well."

Dan Hayter with Peggy, Baltimore, and
the National Demining Office's Maj.
Mohammed Jamal El Kaakour, Lt. Col.
Takieddine El Tannir and Gen. George
Sawaya with Taz at the Global Training
Academy, Texas. c/o MLI

On Nov. 28, 2000 Queen Noor of
Jordan, an MLI board member, announced
the K9 Demining Corp program at the U.S.
Mission ro the United Nations during a
deployment ceremony for the dog ream. The
ceremony was attended by officials from
HOI, MLI, and the State Department.
During the deployment ceremony Sally, a
rwo-yea r old Dutch shepherd, was given the
chance to display detection skills. Sally was
ab le ro detect an inactive APL that was
buried among many large planters in the
conference room. At the ceremony, HOP
Director Pat Parierno stated that he is
confident that the combination of trained
dogs and local handlers can create what is
possibly the mo st optimal d e mining
technology for Lebano n. He explained that
no one method is the answe r to min e
clea ran ce difficulties, howe ver, th e
challengin g terrain limits the use of
machinery, making dogs the most possible
sol ution.
The dogs were prepared to depart with
a series of vaccinations and were deployed
to Lebanon on Feb. 12, 2000. Reliable air
carriers delivered rhe dogs in good condition.
Upon arrival in Beirut the dogs were happy
ro receive food, praise and play from a
familiar face, trainer Paul Brown. The dogs
then began a period of acclimatization,
becoming accustomed to the new environment. During this period th e dogs are
rematched with local Lebanese handlers. To
make the best matches of handler and dog
several factors a re considered about the
handler, including their skill level, balance
and coordination, hand gestures, adaptation
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ability, use of commands, personality and
temperament. The rematch rakes so me
adjustment for the dog, but as the handlers
care for, train with and nurture their dog
they develop a strong bond.
Now in rhe mountains no rtheast of
Beruit, the dogs will undergo three more
months of training. T he training is important for rhe dogs and their new handlers so
they can learn to work as a team. During
the training the dogs wi ll learn to identify
the rypes of mines that are co mmon to the
area, and the smells that are associated with
rhe explosives of the mines. The dogs will
eventually become exposed to actual mines.
In April 2001, the K9 Corp will be
deployed fo r their first clearance mission.
Baltimore and Brown believe that favo rable
environmental co ndi t ions, recept ive
leadership and a positive military worki ng
dog experience all support the indigenous
MOD program. There is only one major
co ncern, some sharp prickl y bushes in
Lebanese fields, which may make it difficult
to keep the dogs' noses to the ground, and
to the task at hand-making way for a safer
Lebanon.
Contact Information
Perry Baltimore
President and Executive Director
Marshall Legacy Institute
1000 North Payne St. Suire 200
Alexandria, VA 22314
Tel: (703) 836-4747

Fax: (703) 836-4677
E-mail: pbaltimore@marshall-legacy.org
Website: http://marshall-legacy.org
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K-9 Dog Academy Takes its Training to the Mine Field
The Journal senior editor Margaret Buse sits down with dog
trainer Malinda Julien to discuss the K-9 Dog Academy and
the future-and present-of mine detecting dogs.
So, we decided to dedicate a lot of our
program ro mine detecting dogs (MODs).
MB: What is the basic training needed by
all working dogs before they can be deployed
into a specific situation?

By Margaret S. Buse, Editor
Margaret Buse (MB): Can you tell me the
history ofThunderstorm Canine and the K9
Academy?
Malinda Julien (MJ): The academy is
actually a small part of what we do.
Thunderstorm Canine is undergoing a
change. The kennels were originally designed
to work search and rescue. In our search and
rescue work we came across the law
enforcement folks who kept telling me that
they could really use some good canine units.
We decided to go into explosives, cadavers,

MJ: In our view it starts even before the dog
is born- the genetics. For example, the litter
we dropped in January is specifically targeted
for explosives and MODs. They will be seem
imprinted. This is something that I do with
all of my litters. Some of the old-timers think
it doesn't work, but we are convinced that it
does work. The pups themselves are actually
reared with certain scents that they will have
to find later. What we are trying to do is cut
down on handler error. The handler is our
number one problem. When pups are scent
imprinted they will seek rather than be
taught this scent. MODs will be trained
using a specific scent like TNT, or other
types of materials that will be found in
mines. After that they go through an
extensive off lead program where they are
heavily conditioned to do as they are told.
People refer to that as obedience. We refer
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understand what it is that they think. This
is why many scenr programs fail because the
handler is teaching them to find the wrong
thing. They may be thinking that they are
teaching them to find the desired scent, but
they are teaching them to find something
that they tap on or that is in a particular
container. What we have done is based on
studies that came out of the 1960s on the
training and socialization of dogs. It was
established in the scientific community that
you could imprint anything onto an animal
while it is being raised. We are teaching a
dog to want to find a particular smell. The
smell is incorporated into everything that is
good-food, warmth, affection all the things
that the mother supplies. It's like when we
have had a grandfather who chewed
peppermints-everytime we smell that we
think of him. Dogs in turn seek that smell
which they associate with what is good. We
have taken out about six months of the
conventional training program in which we

is one year old, he has gone through all of
his training. He has spent six months with a
handler and is ready to go out in the field. If
we set up a program, unless he finds 10
mines in three different areas I 0 times each
under all terrain and different weather
conditions reliably, the dog would be put
back into the program. Many of the current
programs out there allow for 70 percent
accuracy. That is not good enough. In our
academy only the professionals work with
the dogs through the entire training process.
The dogs are not handed down to assistants.
We may not produce a lot, but the quality
and assuredness of that dog is much higher
than the dog that is mass-produced.
MB: I know you work predominantly with
purebreds, but as the conference revealed,
some organizations do not have that luxury.
They are working with stray or abandoned
dogs.
MJ: We work with pure breeds for a number

many that can. Purebred dogs usually have
more genetic problems than mixed breeds.
So I don't have anything against these and
would use dogs that are already in place in
an area and breed on characteristics that
would be desirable.
MB: What advice cou ld you give to
organizations rhat are working with
indigenous dogs so that they don't have a
high washout rare?
MJ: The biggest probl e m in using
indigenous dogs is we are raking a dog that
has no socialization skills with humans.
Unless we can breed them from the
indigenous dogs that exist we are going to
be missing the mark. Strays have very little
positive socialization with humans. We need
dogs that look at us as providers. Most strays
have been providing for themselves for some
rime. Also , some dogs may have too srrong
a herding instinct and we need a hunter

Malinda Julien and her canine team member.
c/o Malinda Julien

By the time a dog is four to five months old
they are ready to be introduced to a handler
and a leash. Our programs have been very
successful. We have dogs certified and on
the street before most people begin training.
Our approach extends the working life of
the dog, cuts down on handler error, and
makes a more successful team for handler
and dog. They work more productively all
at less cost.

Most dogs we train never see a leash for the first five to six months of their lives
because stupidity goes down the leash and it goes right into the dog. The dogs do not
know what you want, the dog does not understand. The dog understands one thing:
survival. If being a part of the pack means food, warmth, security and survival, the
dog will do anything that is necessary for it." - Malinda Julien
II

narcotics, evidence search, along with search
and rescue. Now we are planning to go into
mine dogs. Living here in the United States
and not traveling abroad very much it never
really dawned on me on how severe the
problem really is. When I went to the
conference [Mine Detecting Dog
Conference, San Antonio, Texas] and got to
meet the people involved and found out
more about that situation, J realized that
there are not enough sufficient dog suppliers.

to it as tactical obedience. These dogs must
be able to stop on a dime. They must have
the ability to do anything we ask them to
do without being forced by lead or choke.
Therefore, the dog is compliant. At that
point the dog is 12 weeks old and the
training starts immediately. We put them
with more experienced dogs, dogs that are
already detection dogs, usually their parent.
The dogs work with their mom and do what
their mom says. It gives us a more stable dog.
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MB: You mentioned that they seek scent
rather than being taught the scent. What
does that mean?
MJ: The training world has not budged
much from 1950. Most of the people who
are in this field are using the methods from
[the 1950s]. We are looking at it from a fresh
perspective. We want the dog not to have to
be taught by humans. First, we don't speak
their language. Second, we can't possibly

•

Disaster training
schooi.Julien
sits on top of the
truck.
c/o Malinda
Julien

could possibly not do as well as nature could
itself. So, we imprint the dog with a
particular seem so the dogs seek the seem
rather than be taught to find it.
MB: When a dog has gone through your
training program how do you measure and
determine irs competency?
MJ: I am pretty tough on the dogs that go
out. I want 100 percent accuracy rate. If a
MOD was to go out of my academy and he

of reasons. In the United States, we are a
very visual society and people expect to see
the German Shepherds in police work.
However, we have a program that works with
re-homed dogs, dogs that may be srrays,
abandoned, nor wanted for whatever reason.
In rhe MOD field, I feel it may work better
if we used indigenous dogs. Dogs that are
already there are climarized and they can
have their talents capitalized. There may be
some that wouldn't work bur there will be
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instinct more than anything else. In setting
up programs, one of the things I intend to
do is reach evaluators what they really need
to look for in a dog. They need to get one
very young or find good parent dogs and
breed from them.
MB: What qualities would you look for in a
good MOD?
MJ: Stability, nerves of steel. A dog that can
handle a great deal of stress without loosing
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control, running or fighting. I have seen this
happen many times. Dogs may be able to
perform the duty in a test environment but
when they get out in the field their nerves
fail. That is our number one evaluation tool.
What can this dog handle? What is his stress
level? If he has a good stress threshold and a
good drive to hunt or prey drive then he is a
likely candidate as an MOD. Size will also
be important. Small feet, smaller size, easier
to transport and less dog trotting around a
mine field. These are the qualities I would
establish in setting up a program.
MB: What else in the current canine training
process would you do differently?
MJ: Without being involved with specific
training programs, I can say assuredly there

MJ: The biggest problem that we have with
handlers is that we don't speak the same
language. We see things from a human point
of view and dogs see things from a dog's
point of view. As long as the human reads
the dog through human interpretation, they
are always going to be wrong. A handler
must know something about canine or social
animal behavior. Most dogs have been
taught correction or praise or a combination
of both, and usually it is incorrect. It sets
the dogs up to fail. It is the number one
problem of all canine handlers. However, if
we give handlers some education, we set the
dog up to win by having a handler that is
better equipped and we set the handler up
for more successes. 1 often hear I can't get
the dog to work. The problem is they don't
understand how to make them work. We
sometimes expect the handler to do too
much in a short amount of time. The
handlers need to be our number one priority
and they must know how to read the dog.
MB: What are the three basic foundation

11

time that a dog from another source is
already mature. That dog may posses
everything it needs and we can proceed from
there. It really depends on your situation.
How fast is this dog needed? What do we
have available? Some times your kennel is
fu ll and other times you have to depend on
o utside sources. That is why we plan to
dedicate this upcoming litter to MODs.
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Malinda Julien on a drug search.
c/o Malinda Julien

MJ: That really does present a problem. I
have traveled in that part of the world and I
am aware of the stigma that is attached to a
vermin animal like a canine. I realize the
psychological ramifications for them must
be tremendous. 1 don't think there is a clearcut answer. If the MOD program is
successful and the dogs are successful and
well mannered it will help in the dogs being

We work within the parameters of the behavior and social

structure of the animals. When we stop throwing on big,
nasty chains, choking them to death and ... heavy punishments out of our own frustrations, then the dog will work
better for us." - Malinda Julien
•

Quat, a stray that became a star working dog.
c/o Malinda Julien

qualities that are needed in a good dog
handler?

are things I would probably change because
my guess is that they are training an old style
of training. We need to approach the
training from a psychological perspective
and from the dog's and handler's point of
view. Educate the handler as to what the dog
is doing and predispose the dog ro find it,
then we would have a much higher success
rate than what we have now. I recognize in
some countries this may be a challenge.
Basically, we want a program more educated
on the handler side and less work on the
canine side.

MJ: They need to be patient. No egos
running around out there. They must have
a true desire to work with the animal. It is
probably not one of the most respected
things to say that you work with an animal
all day so they must have strength from
within. They must enjoy what they do and
be good at it. You must have confidence in
your animal. If the dog says it's there you
have got to believe the dog. These are
qualities that can not be taught, they must
be present within the handl er. Slow and
steady as she goes, that's the handler that we
want.

MB: You have mentioned about the handler
playing such a crucial role. Can you tell me
more about the crucial role the handler plays
with the dogs?

MB: A problem for many organizations
integrating MD Ds overseas is the cui rural biases
of the indigenous populations that must be
trained to be effective dog handlers.
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received well by the population-at least so
that they don't disdain them. Evenrually, we
can overcome the biases-to a point. Trying
to recruit these individuals will take a lot of
work. The institution must take pride in
what they do. Perhaps not seeing the "dog"
in the situation, but the clearance of fields
as the mission would help increase the pride
of working with dogs.

MB: Your academy is very integrated. You
do a lot of different aspects of canine training
from search and rescue to narcotics. Do you
thi nk dog training academ ies should be
multi-faceted or single use facilities?
MJ: We really only do one thing. We use
dogs as a scent detection tool. Whether we
are looking for explosives, mines, narcotics,
forensics or live people is really not the issue.
It is the fact that a dog is being used as a
detection item. These are the things we have
specialized in: the ability to utilize the dog
to find a certain seen t.
MB: MOD is a small, but strong field. Do
you think canine academies may begin filling
the niche for MODs?
MJ: I don't think so. It is a real hard sell
publicly. Here in the United States people
will think that you are sending dogs to be
killed. I don't think that the average working
dog training facility will be able to train to
the parameters that are ne eded for a
successful mine dog. This is not like finding
narcotics or a piece of evidence. This is very
serious and lives are involved. I think it is

probably cheaper for them to turn out
overpriced police dogs.

your training methods are different from this
"old-style 1950s training"?

MB: You mentioned briefly about public
outrage. Have you had problems with
an imal rights groups?

MJ: Our training methods are very different
because they are based on an entirely
different view. The old phrase used to be, " l
am the master of my dog," and that's
typically how it was looked at. It was never
looked at as a partner, as an entity unto itself.
The dog was something that we told what

MJ: Yes, because they are misinformed and
they think we are using the dog without any
regard to well being. I do nor mess with
them. I just ask them to leave my facility. I
have run into a lot of people who have gotten
their hackles up when MOD's are
mentioned because they think we are going
to send Fifi into the mine field to get blown
up.
MB: You have often mentioned how little
the training methods have changed since the
1950s. Why is that so?
MJ: Just because they have been doing it
for 20 years doesn't make it right. There is
always evolution, there is always somethi ng
new, but the people in this industry really
are ve ry adversarial. They see and view
everyone as heavy competition. None of
these changes will take place immediately, I
guarantee you, but we are willing to take
the slings and arrows in order to go out and
attempt to do this. One of the goals in
formulating our academy is to allow the
newer people that are coming into the
industry to have a broader view. The
oldrimers have been doing it a long rime,
but it has stalemated and they just continue
to do what they think works.
MB: Can you give me a specific as to how

MB: You and your organization have both
bred dogs and received dogs from other
sources. What are the benefits and
drawbacks to both approaches?
MJ: When we breed the dogs we know what
we are going to get, within certain
parameters. We can scent imprint and do
everything from a social aspect. The dogs
are ready to go much faster. The biggest
problem is that it takes time to raise a dog.
In the year that it takes to begin working is
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Malinda Julien in boat with Gypsy. Cadaver search during floods in Texas. c/o Malinda Julien
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Malinda Julien rappelling with Quat.
c/o Malinda Julien

to do and if it doesn't do it I will make it do
it. As we have become more involved and
more educated we have definitely found out
that your grandmother was right, you can
catch a lor more flies with honey than you
can with vinegar. We work within the
parameters of the behavioral and social
structure of the animals. Most dogs that we
train never see a leash for the first five to six
months of their lives because stupid goes
down the leash and it goes right into the
dog. The dogs do not know what you want,
j t does not understand. The dog understands
one thing: survival. If being a part of our
pack means food, warmth, security and
survival, the dog will do anything that is
necessary for it to do. So, we look at it from
an almost completely 100 degree difference
from the rest of the world. There are a lot of
t echnological advancements such as
electronic collars that make us more precise.
There are a lor of things we can do rather
than tie the dog to us and choke the ai r our
of it every time it doesn't do what we want.
All that does is break rhe bond between the
handler and the animal and makes the
animal more reluctant to work for the

FEATURE

FEATURE

handler. The handler becomes frustrated, rhe
handler says rhe dog is stupid, the dogs say
I'm scared of you, and there we have 1950s
dog training. That's why most people all rhe
way from pets to law enforcement fail in
their K9 programs. So, we don't approach it

dog. I think rhis is a whole new field that
really no one is looking at and it starts with
working that trainer and getting those dogs
where they need ro be, nor necessarily
together and not necessarily ar the same
time. Unless we teach these people how to

uThey still want to do what we call 'Billy Bob' training
and it does not work. It will work for a little while or it
will work 60 to 70 percent, but it doesn't give us the
amount of efficiency and accuracy that we would require
in a mine detection dog." -Julien
from that perspective. We approach it from
a scientific point of view. If we want to get
the dog ro work for us, we must understand
the dog and his behavior and his language.
That's what we reach.

be more educated handlers and show them
how much they do need to know about
themselves, about situations, about rhe
animals, they are not going to be more
successful.

MB: That rype of change actually occurred
in the horse industry with rhe horse
whispering training that has received media
attention. Ir really revolutionized the
training methods that had been in place
since rhe cavalry days.

MB: I'm sure in all the years that you've been
training and breeding, a lot of dogs have
passed through your academy. Do you have
any unique or favorite success story from
working with one specific dog?

MJ: I have a dog and she is still with us. She
MJ: Yes, it has, and it took just a couple of
people to be visual enough to get the public
behind them. The United Stares, in its quest
to have K9 units are still in the John Wayne
phase of it all. They still want to do what we
call Billy Bob training and it does not work.
It will work for a little while or it will work
60 to 70 percent of the time bur it doesn't
give us the amount of efficiency and accuracy
that we would require in a mine detection

is old and aged at this point. She was nothing
but backyard garbage, terrible, disgusting,
everything confirmationaly wrong with this
dog. I do nor know to this day why, I decided
to risk life and limb to handle this dog. We
pumped tons of money into her and made
her well. I worked with her and to this very
day she is responsible for finding many folks
who would be dead without her. She works
narcotics for me in the school systems, she
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runs securiry for our properry, and she is
probably going to retire in the next year or
rwo . She is probably one of rhe most
heartfelt, soulful animals char I've run across
in all of my years. Somewhere in those eyes
was simply somebody who said, "ff you save
my life, I promise you, I'll make it worth
it." And she has. She's very much a part of
our company. She is very much a part of
everywhere we go. This dog is usually always
present and people all over the world actually
know this dog by name. Her name is Quat.
MB: With working with a lor of different
animals, you can have good relationships

with a lor of animals, bur there comes that
special one that you just have this unique
bond with. Nor only do you have a unique
bond, but they go rhe extra mile for you.
MJ: It is absolutely incredible and once you
have that, it opens the way to have others. I
had a Doberman that was with me in the
Oklahoma disaster and he has since gone
on to be in the Pet Hall of Fame. He is now
retired and lives with a friend of mine in
Colorado; however, this dog again was a
stray, a nothing. He was a beautiful
Doberman, bur he was extremely mean and
had been abused. I rook the dog for God
knows what reason and I trained this dog
and it would do anything I asked it to do. I
asked this dog to jump our of the back of a
fire truck while we were in Oklal1oma. I said,
"I need you right now!" You know how big
a firetruck is? The dog jumps right our, it
pops his jaw on the concrete, gets up, shakes
his head and keeps right on coming. H e
wasn't an absolutely extraordinary dog and
he met his fate not in the disaster areas of
Oklahoma, bur with a rattlesnake and
became severely impaired mentally from roo
many bites to the head and thus was retired.
If we can ever put dogs like that into the
hands of these handlers, dog that are special.
They are there; rhey do exist.
Handlers that can recognize those
qualities do exist. It is our job to find them.
It is our job to seek them our and to show
them the gift that they have, as handlers,
and to find the gifted dogs that are out there.
You can walk through any shelter and one
dog in that shelter will look at you with eyes
that say "Take me out of here. I promise I'm
good, I know I can do this, if you just tell
me what it is." We've had many of those
dogs. Many of these dogs are very successful
in our police program. We have put rhem
out with units that could not afford the overinflated $10,000 (U.S.) fee. These dogs are
doing marvelous, and they came from
nowhere, bur it was rhe right dog and it was
the right handler. I firmly believe that those
dogs know you saved their lives.Their bond
with you is much stronger than that with
the dog that simply came along and had it
all made. rf you can get those dogs, they will
work and work and work until they drop.
That's what we're looking for. That's what
we want. That loyalry, that bond between
animal and human, that is only in certain
people and only in certain dogs and can only
be done if a person is there to help facilitate

•

Cobra takes a break from training to play with Julien.
do Malinda Julien

the process. That's what we want to
accomplish.
MB: What IS In store for you for the
upcoming year?
MJ: Hopefully, I will finish all of these shots
and various pills I'm raking to go over to
Croatia and Mozambique. I need to go over
and see what's going on and find out who is
looking for better ways to use dogs, what
companies are willing to look at a more
educated way of dealing with a very difficult
and timely problem. I'm looking at spending
a lor of rime overseas. I'm looking at getting
this program up and running, and seeing
what we can do.
I think that 2001 will probably be one
of our most exciting and rewarding years and
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I think we can definitely make a change and
a mark in this industry that will enable us
to clear those fields, which is our goal. If we
can do that, I will certainly consider 200 I a
tremendous year, char's for sure. •
Contact Information

U.S Tactical K9 Academy
Malinda Julien
7383 East Lake Road
Abilene, Texas. 79601
Tel:(915) 672-4840
Fax; (915) 672-5327
Cell: (915) 668-0193
Email:k9sar@rhunderstormcanine.com
Web:www. rh undersrormk9 .com

NOTES FROM UNITED NATIONS

NOTES FROM GENEVA INTERNATIONAL

MINE ACTION SERVICE

CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

The United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) serves as the focal point
for all U.N. mine-related activities carried
out by II departments and agepcies within
the organization. This coordinated and
proactive approach minimizes the potential
for duplication of effort, and ensures clear
delineation of responsibility and integration
of work by all involved. To fully address the
needs and objectives of U.N. mine action,
UN MAS is responsible for the coordination
of:
• Mine action policy development and
coordination;
• Assessment and monitoring of the
globallandmine threat;
• Mine action program initiation and
support;
• Information management;
• Quality management and technology
ISSUes;

• Advocacy and consciousness-raising;
and
• Resource mobilization.
Policy Development and Coordination
As focal point, UNMAS develops
policy to guide the cooperative efforts of all
those involved in U .N. mine action in
support of humanitarian and peacekeeping
operations. Mine Action and Effective
Coordination: The United Nations Policy was
developed in close consultation with other
partners in 1998 ro clarify the key principles
on which mine action is based, and to
identify roles and responsibilities within the
United Nations for all mine action activities.
UNMAS has continued to develop
further guidelines to augment this policy,
including a 1999 paper on cooperation with
indigenous militaries, which establishes the
range of assistance ro military involvement
in mine action, and emphasizes the key
principles of neutrality, impartiality and
humanity. Other guidelines are also under
development in close cooperation with
U.N. agencies and departments and other
key entities.
UNMAS also chairs an inter-agency
consultative and priority-setting mechanism
within the United Nations, and an
additional forum involving key NGO and
international organizations.
landmine Threat Assessment and
Monitoring
UNMAS assesses and monitors the
globallandmine threat in order to identifY
needs and develop appropriate responses.
Inter-agency and multi-sectoral assessment

missions are deployed to affected regions to
define the scope and nature of the landmine/
UXO problem, identify constraints and
opportunities affecting the mine action
response, and formulate recommendations
for mine action activities. Thus far, 15 such
missions have deployed. Depending on the
situation, Level 1 Impact Surveys are often
developed as a follow-up to such assessment
missions, with the information gathered
being used to determine priorities and
identifY areas with the greatest needs. Impact
Surveys identify the general location of
known and suspected mined areas, and focus
on the evaluation of the humanitarian and
socioeconomic impact of landmine
contamination.
Program lnttiation and Support
In keeping with the U.N. mine action
policy, responsibility for supporting longterm integrated mine-action programs rests
with the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), where UNMAS
remains involved in an advisory and
monitoring capacity. In the context of
humanita rian emergencies and peacekeeping operations, the involvement of
UNMAS is more critical and direct. It is
responsible for the planning, establishment
and coordination of deploying mine action
operations, as well as their support. The
most significant ongoing programs
implemented under UNMAS auspices
include Kosovo (FRY), southern Lebanon,
and the program in the Temporary Security
Zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
UN MAS is also responsible for supporting
the effective integration of mine awareness
and victim assistance activities with other
mine-related activities.
Information Management
Given the scope of the landmine
problem, the wide spectrum of factors to
take into consideration and the number of
actors involved, the development of an
appropriate information management
system has been idenrified as a priority to
support proper monitoring, planning and
program implementation. As a result,
UNMAS has asked the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to develop the
Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA). Thus far a "field module"
has been developed and has been deployed
in a growing number of counrries, while the
second phase-developing a "g lob al
module," as well as improving the existing
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By Robert Diethelm, Support Director
GICHD

version of the field module-continues.
Additional initiatives are also being
continued with regard to information
management issues, including development
of improved electronic mediums for dealing
with issues as diverse as donor funding and
stockpile destruction, as well as cooperation
with other initiatives in areas such as
conformi ty of mine action information
databases.
Quality Management and Technology
UN MAS is responsible for the
development, maintenance and promotion
of technical and safety standards for mine
action. As a part of this role, with the
support of the GICHD, the International
Standards for Mine Clearance Operations
have been revised, updated and expanded
to become the International Mine Action
Standards. Guidelines for mine awareness
education have also been formulated by
UNICEF, while the public health aspect of
victim assistance sees the World Health
Organisation (WHO) in the lead within the
U.N. system to discuss requirements for
additional standards with other actors such
as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). With regard to technology,
UNMAS has been called upon to take a role
through the collection and dissemination
of appropriate information, and the
development of standards where required
and practical.
Advocacy and Consciousness-raising
Advocacy, public information and
consciousness-raising activities are integral
pans of the international effort to rid the
world of landmines, and UNMAS is
involved in stigmatising the use of mines
and supporting a global ban on thes e
weapons. With over 100 States Parties to
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treacy, the
emphasis is also shifting from advocacy ro
supporting treaty implementation, as more
countries face the need ro implement the
obligations of ratification. UNMAS also
cooperates with other organizations

The Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was
established in 1998 to support the mine
action efforts of the international community, in general, and those of the United
Nations, in particular. The Centre aims to
promote cooperation in the field of mine
action in three main areas: research work;
operational assistance; and support for the
Mine Ban Treaty.
The GICHD contributes to the formulation and development of improved
procedures, practices and technologies in mine action.
The studies elaborated by the Centre
address actual problems brought up by
practitioners in the field or by donors. With
its research, the Centre aims co increase the
safety of demining and the cost-effectiveness
of mine action programs in the field.
Examples of the Centre's current studies are:
• The Revision of International Standards Project provides practitioners and
donors with an updated and revised
framework of technical and procedural
prescriptions for safe and effective mine
action.
• The Mine Detection Dog Study
analyses existing problems related with
mine detection dogs (MODs) (e.g.
training and evaluation) to allow safe
and efficient usage of the very
promising potential of these animals.
• The Socioeconomic Study provides a
framework for measuring
socioeconomic impact and value, to
help program managers to set priorities
and to allocate resources most
efficiently.
• The Donor Guidelines Study aims to
assist donors in ensuring value for
money and quality mine action from
funded programs.
• The Training Needs Analysis Study
analyses pre-deployment training needs
of international experts filling the posts
of program managers, technical advisers
or similar key positions in field
programs.
• The Use of Military Organizations in
Humanitarian Mine Action Project
aims to examine the practicability of
using military organizations, both
international and local, for all forms of

humanitarian mine action. An
appropriate integration of this potential
could considerably increase the available
work force for mine action.
• The Project on the destruction of PFM1 mines shall establish how best to
destroy stockpiles of such mines, since
their liquid explosive filling is both roxie
and corrosive.

relevant Standing Committees bring
together representatives of States Parties,
non-States Parties, of international organisations, of NGOs and other experts in order to ensure effective implementation and
to report co the States Parties. The Centre
also provides technical input to theses activities in the area of mine clearance, victims
assistance, stockpile destruction and
technology.

The GICHD provides specific operational support and assistance for ongoing
mine action activities in the field. The Centre develops and disseminates the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) in cooperation with the U.N.
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and other
users. One of the key problems in mine
action is information (e.g. location of mined
areas, types of mines used, lo cation of
incidents). The Centre-in close cooperation with UN MAS, and supported by
ETHZ Zurich-develops and disseminates
IMSMA. IMSMA consists of:

The Centre is an independent and
impartial specialist organisation.
It is supported by 17 governments, and
the Republic and Canton of Geneva. The
Centre's budget foresees expenditures of
some 7.5 million CHF (about U.S.$4.6
million) for 2001, covered by major
contributions from Switzerland and the
United Kingdom, as well as by project
o riented funding provided by Germany,
Norway, Sweden, the United States, UNDP
and the UNTF.

• The "Field Module," which provides a
ready-ro-use cool for mine action centers
at the national and regional level, to
cover their data collection and
information management needs, and
• The "Global Module," which refines
and collates data from the field and
provides the United Nations with
improved capabilities for decisionmaking related to mine action.
To date, IMSMA is being used in
Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Chad, Estonia,
Somaliland, Southern Lebanon, Eritrea,
Nicaragua, Thailand and, on the regional
level, in Cambodia.
The Centre provides ope ration al
support by providing shore-term operational
and technical assistance for newly established U.N. mine action programs by
deploying members of its staff. In addition,
the Centre carries out evaluation missions
and provides the framework for the annual
UNMAS Geneva Conference, which assembles mine action practitioners in the
field, as well as at Headquarters level and
provide for a comprehensive exchange of
information and experience.
The GICHD supports the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
The Centre also hosts meetings within
the intersessional work to implement the
Mine Ban Treaty. These meetings of the

continued on page 107
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The Centre Staff
The Centre has 20 permanent staff
members, including five seconded staff
members sent by the Governments of
France, Germany, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Additional experts work for the
Centre on a case-by-case basis. •
Contact Information
Robert Diethelm, Support Director
GICHD.
Phone+ 41-22-906-1689
Fax+ 41-22-906-1690
Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining
7 bis, avenue de Ia Paix
P.O. Box 1300
CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland
Phone: +41 22 906 16 60
Fax: +41 22 906 16 90
Website: www.gichd.ch

CTSC & HDTC

Asia & the Pacific

The U.S. Army's Countermine Training Support
Center and Humanitarian Demining Training Center
In response to former President Clinton's Landmine policy directives, the U.S. Army
Engineeri ng School formed the Countermine Training Support Center and the
Humanitarian Demining Training Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.
By Joseph M. Donahue, Survey
Action Center, VVAF
Background

T

he U.S. D e pa r tm ent of
Defense (DoD) possesses a
mine action resou rce whose
existence is nor widely known in the
humanitarian demining com mu nity.
In May 1996, the U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES) at Fort Leonard
Wood, Mo., established the Countermin e Training S u pport Center
(CTSC). In September of that year,
rhe Office of th e Assistant Secretary
of Defense fo r Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (SOIL! C) established the Humanitarian Demining Training Center (HDTC) at Fort
Leonard Wood, Mo. Both were created in direct response to the Presidential Land mine Policy Directive of May
1996. This document d irects "lrhe]
Department of Defense to ... significa ntly expand its hum an itarian
demining program to train a nd assist
o ther countries in developing effective

dem ining programs." It further explains that the "government program
is to tra in the trainers, includ ing
eq uipping rhe host natio ns to sustain
their own demining programs. The
U.S. Department of Stare [DoS] and
the Defense Department coordi nate
rhe funding and priorities to meet the
demin ing needs of each individual
nation."
CTSC is a countermine training
and information center, and although
d iscussed in rh is article, ir is not the
focus. The p rimary subject of th is
p iece is HDTC, the U.S. military's

primary center fo r humanitarian mine
action knowledge and skills. The rwo
cente rs share fac ili ties and a joint
mi ssion s tatem en t and provide
s uppo r t to U.S. gove rnm en tal
agencies, international organizations,
a nd other institutions involved in
counrermine operations and h umanitarian demining. Recently, H DTC
hosted the author as rhe first member
of an NGO to attend training there.
I came to attend HDTC because
of continuing efforrs by members of
th e NGO and U.S. m ilita ry communities aimed at creati ng more
opportunities for positive interaction
and mutual support. The HDTC basic
dem ining course is tailored for each
mil itary ream attending the course to
e ns u re that the team has th e
knowledge it needs to conduct a
successful "train-the-trainer" program
in the host country that includes
knowledge of the NGOs working in
that country. Richard Kidd, program
manager for SAC, said, "By initiating
co llaborative efforts in the classroom,
members of various sectors in the mine

CTSC/HDTC Mission Statement
"The mission of CTSC/HDTC is to serve as training and informat ion centers concern ing
countermine and demining operations, demolitions, UXO and mine awareness, and
booby traps. The centers research the latest lessons learned, t actics, t echniques and
procedures, and the use of mines by the Unit ed States and foreign countries. The
centers incorporate acquired information into current lessons and provide innovat ive
and realistic mine training tailored t o a unit's needs. The centers also develop training
and training aids in support of countermine and demining operations/ training."
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action community will be much better
equipped to interact and cooperate in
the field. " Collaboration between
military and NGO mine action
organizations is essential to resolving
rhe global landmine contamination
problem with greater efficiency and
speed. This collaboration should begin
at rhe training institutions within these
co mmunities.

Staffing
CTSC/ HDTC has an expenenced and diverse staff consisting of
eight civilian (including rwo RONCO
contractors) and three foreign military
personnel. Two periodically seconded
by USAES to support CTSC, while
SO/LIC funds the HDTC school and
personnel. HDTC sraff is drawn from
the special operations, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), combat engineering and commercial communities.
The three foreign military exchange
personnel, Maj. Griffin and Warrant
Officers Esrall and Clegg, are from rhe
United Kingdom, New Zealand and
Australia, respectively. These instructors have extensive experience conducting humanitarian demining and
related operations in countries that
include Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Esto nia, Kosovo, Mozambique,
Swaziland and the Solomon Islands.
RONCO

RONCO Consulting Corporation is an internatio nal services
firm that provides advisory, train ing,
implementation and man agement
assis tance to private and public sector
cl ients. RONCO is th e only U.S. firm
rhar has developed and uses "free
runn ing" explosive detecting dogs
(EDD). In August 1999, RONCO
was awarded a humanitarian demining
co ntract by rhe DoS. DoS's Office of
Humanitarian Demining Programs
(Bureau of Political-Military Affairs)
d irects RONCO through task orders

for specific mine act ion se rvices.
RON CO was tasked by DoS to
provide HDTC with rwo experienced
mine action technicians ro serve as
in structors. During the aut hor's
attendance at HDTC, a large portion
of th e technical instruc tion was
provided by these RO NCO
instructors: "Bart" Bartholomew, a
former Special Forces sold ier, and
Clarke George, a former Navy EOD
technician. They have co ndu cted
humanitarian demining operations in
Bosnia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kuwait and
Nicaragua. Participation in the
HDTC program is an important parr
of the larger RONCO contribution to
the broad range of U.S. government
mine action actiVIties.

rraining
CTSC/H DTC provides several
different mine action courses. T hese
co urses a re targeted ar different
audiences, and may be taught either
at Fort Leonard Wood or by Mobile
Training Team (MTT).

ountermine Course
CTSC conduc ts a two-day
co un term ine s ustain ment-trammg
course for U.S. military engineer units
preparing ro d eploy overseas. T his
trainin g may be provided at Fort
Leonard Wood or through an MTT
ar the unit point of origin. CTSC
maintains up-to-dare info rmat ion
regard in g co unre rmine training,
doctrine and mine awareness. This
course focuses o n mil itary units and
personnel.

vtme Awareness Training
Mine awa re n ess trai nin g is
integrated into both rhe CTSC and
HDTC programs of ins truc tion.
However, chis training may also be
provided as a stand-alone course and
is available to all U.S. military and
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government perso nnel deploying to
mine affected countries. The training
may be received either at Fort Leonard
Wood or through an MTT.

)emining
The Humanita rian Demining
O perations O rientation Course is a
tw o-week program of instruction
aimed at preparing U .S. Army Special
Ope rations Forces (SOF) to train
foreign military and go vernment
civilia n personnel ro implem ent
national mine action programs. These
SOF perso nnel travel to numerous
countries to train their hosts how to
set up a nd co ndu ct demining
ope ration s. The humanitarian
demining training team consists of
several SOF elements: Special Forces
personn el co ndu ct the train-thetrainer portion for host nation demin e rs, Civi l Affairs personnel
conduct mine action center training
and Psychological Operations
personnel conduct mine awareness
training. EOD personnel from all U.S.
military services are also included if
rhe mission requires their participation. HDTC conducts an average of
two courses each month and has
trained more than 850 student trainers
since inception. Countries that have
benefited from rhe program include
Armen ia and Azerbaijan (Beecroft
Initiati ve-see page 113), Bosnia,
Cambodia, Chad, Djibomi, Ecuador,
Estonia, Egypt, Geo rg ia, Jo rdan ,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Oman, Peru, Thailand, Yemen and
Z imbabwe.

..

Asia & the Pacific
Practical Exercises

Several practical exercises (PE) are
conducted during the course , and
students are tested daily by written
examination and/or evaluated PE.
These exercises follow a simi lar
progression to char of real world mine
action operations. The students are
ta sked to work thro u gh a mine
contamination problem from initial
survey through co mpletion, with
everything from mine field accidents
to media visits in between. The mine
action PE focuses on a specific mined
area in the notional country of "Fort
Leonard Wood" following a protracted
insurgency and is woven into the
curriculum thro ughout the course.
According to Col. Barry Shapiro, chief
of Joint U. S. Military Advisory
Group-Thailand (JUSMAG-THAI),
"The Humanitarian Demining
Operations Orientation Course has
been a key element in the United
State's efforts in development of the
T hai Mine Action Center [TMAC].
T he course has ensured that the U.S.
Special Forces instructors and advisors
are providing the approp riate
knowledge and expertise ro the Thai
program. Huma nitarian demi ning
assistance is an important part of our
engagement program with Thailand,
and t he course has provided a valuable

Special operator
working in a training
lane during a
Practical Exercise at
HDTC.

CTSC & HDTC

means of maintaining quality control
over o ur efforts."

The Beecroft Initiative

rraining Products

CTSC/HDTC is recogn ized for
production of hig h quality mine
act ion training aids. The centers
develop training products to support
mine awareness, counre rm ine and
demining activities. Among these
training a ids are se ts of mine
information cards for Bosn ia, Korea,
Rwand a, Mozambique, Er it rea,
Ethiopia, Angola, an d Central and
South America. Each card has a picture
of a landmine on one side and
ap p licable techni cal data o n t he
reverse. CTSC/HDTC has also
developed three-dim ens ional mine
boards. Each set of boards is a country,
with individual boards showing several
landm ines found there. In addition,
CTSC/ HDTC staff assembles demining toolboxes that include dem ining
han d-rools, inert landmines and mine
boards. T hese toolboxes are provided
to Special Forces teams deploying to
conduct train-the- trainer missions.
Finally, CT SC/HDTC produces inert
training mines for recognition and
famil iarization training.
he lmplementers

I attended the HDT C cou rse
with an Operational D etachm ent
Alpha (ODA or "A-Team") from 2"d
Battalion , I" Special Forces Group
(Airborne), as well as Navy EOD technicians. Based at Fort Lewis, Wash.,
1" Group's area of operation is Asia
and the Pacific Rim . The members of
this "A-Team" have international
experience in countries that include
Thailand, Korea and Madagascar. The
ream worked with TMAC for nearly
th ree months from O ctober th rough
D ecember 2000.
Tra ini ng provided to T MAC
included primary first aid for all
pe rsonnel and ad van ced m e di ca
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Joe Donahue using a Guartel MD-8
mine detector in the Fort Leonard
Wood training lanes. C/o Joe Donahue

(para med ic) skills for TMAC medics.
General, technical and clearance
survey operations were also taught, as
were UXO identification and
demolition.
The two Navy personne l
attend ing the course were preparing
fo r a dep loy me nt to Yem en. Their
commanding officer said, "U.S. Navy
EOD te chnicians s upp ort U.S.
Humanitarian Demini ng Operations
(HDO) worldwide. Following HDTC
training, these technicians are normally assigned as team members of larger
SOF contingents sent ro conduct
HDO in su ch places as Ye me n,
Thailand , Vietnam and Bosnia. Navy
EOD technicians focus upon trainingt he- trainer, and work with other
military forces and NGOs to meet the
demining needs of a given country.
The experience ofHDTC has significantly increased the sensitivity of U.S.
Navy EOD operators to rhe unique
needs of humanitarian operations, and
specifically, the teamwork requi red
among host nation, foreign mil itary
andNGOs to train and educate local
forces to create a safe environment."
Numerous SOF personnel have
conducted humanitarian mine action
rotations sin ce the program began
more rhan four years ago . These
deployments ryp ically last for three
months and are part of a "building
block" approach to mine ac tion
training and capac ity bui ldin g. In
other words, a deploying ream will
bu ild irs program of instruction upon

To speed the pace of reducing the
landm in e t h reat that endange rs
popu lations in Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia, and to strengthen
confidence and security in the southern
Caucasus, the DoS implemented the
"Beecroft Initiative," an innovative
mu lt ilateral program. Under th is
initiative, U.S. military personnel
conducted sim ultaneous humanitarian
demining uaining of select groups of
Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani
soldiers and civilians at a military base
in Georgia. They caught their fellow
so ld iers up-to-date humanitarian
demining skills, allowing those trained
to ser ve as force multipl iers by
returning home to train others. Robert
M. Beecroft devised this initiative while
he served as Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary in the Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs at the DoS, proponent
of th e Office of Humanitarian
D emining Programs.
The DoD O ffice of the Assistant
Sec retary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
(SOLIC - Peacekeeping and Humanita r ian Affairs) is charged with
overseeing the U.S . military's "traint he -trainer" program. Under this
program, Special Forces personnel train
foreign deminers at overseas sires in
mod ern hum anitarian demining

that o f a preceding rea m , where
app licab le . One of 1" Gro up's
detachments recently began another
deployment with TMAC.
ederal Agencies

HDTC courses are open to nor
only military servicemen and women,
bur to members offederal agencies and
other organizations. Federal Bureau of
I nvest igat ion (FB I) Special Age nt

techniques. To dare, approximately one
quarter of the world's humanitarian
deminers have been trained under this
program o r ar rhe U.S. Army's
Humanitarian Demining Training
Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.
The Government of Georgia
hosted this innovative training
program at the Gori military base near
Tbilisi, Georgia. Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan each contributed 20 sold iers
and civilians (for a total of 60 students)
to be educated regarding modern
humanitarian demining techniques by
70 U.S. Army demining experts. The
70 U.S. soldiers were primarily Special
Forces operators ("Green Berets") from
the I Orh Special Forces Gro up. T he
U.S. contingent also t aught the
conduct of informacion campaigns for
supporr of mine awareness education.
The HDTC program is logicall y
structured to cover all mine action
subject areas, from "digging in the
weeds" to national policy. HDTC
standard practice is to teach methods
and techniques in accordance with the
U.N.-administered International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). Blocks of
instruction are rotated among faculty
members based upon areas of expertise
and experience. Students are
en cou raged to provide input and
comment. Because the primary target

D avid D. Baker was recently the first
F BI empl oyee to atte nd the
Humanitarian Demining Operatio ns
Orientation Course. Asked why the
FBI perceives a need to send agents to
HD T C , h e said, " Internat io nal
o pera t ional co mm i tm en ts ro
invest igate and coll ect evidence o n
terro r ism-re la te d attacks agai n s t
Americans have significantly increased
in areas of the wo rld chat have mine
problems. The FBI saw a need for a

• 105 •

audience of special operators may not
have previous mine action experience,
HDT C facu lty provide broad
background regarding pol ic ies,
standards, area of operat ion and the
secto ra l distinctions between the
humanitarian, military and commercial mine action communities.
Among the blocks of instruction taught
are:
• Global Landmine Situation
• U.S. Demining Policy
• International Demining
Organizations (Military, United
Nations and NGOs)
• International Mine Action
Standards (Under development by
the United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS)
• National Mine Action Org.
• Survey, Levels 1-3
• Manual Demining Equipment and
Clearance Techniques (Equipment,
planning and execution, and
demolitions (including live-fire)
• Program Management
• Explosive Detecting Dogs
• Mine Awareness
• Mechanical Clearance
• Accident Investigation
• Country-specific Brief
• Public Affairs

more fo rmal safety training program
for irs personnel."
SA Baker said th at although the
FBI does n ot co nd uct demi ni ng
operat ions, the HDTC course "was
very beneficial, as it p rovided the FBI
w ith trai n ing on the threat of
landmines, m ine field recogn ition and
emergency actio n drills if a mine field
is accidentally entered. " N ow the FBI
will be better able to coordinate with
military, internatio nal and N GOs in
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The Mineseeker Airship:
~supporting the U.N:
The Lightship Group and the Defense Research and Evaluation Agency team up to
help survey mine fields from above. Airship completed its flagship mission in 2000.
by Elizahl>th A l"rarru•r

MLH(

F

rom October to November
2000, people in Kosovo may
have looked skyward and seen
the large wh i te airship titled
"Mineseeker.com, Supporting t he
UN ." For nearly two months the
Mineseeker Airship flew over regions
of Kosovo collecting information
about the mine fields below. The
airship was completing its debut
assignment as the first in aerial mine
field survey tech nology. Over the
course of six weeks the Mineseeker
team collected over 60 hours of
videotape and 500 digital images of
mine sites, completing the airship's
first mission- an aerial optical survey
collection of30 mine fields in Kosovo.
Background

The idea of aerial mme field
survey grew from rh e continual
advancement in demining technology.

(1-r) John Flanagan,
MACC program
manager; Mark
Finney, pilot; Sir
Richard Branson;
Chris Clark,
operations
manager; Steve
Saunders, Mine
Action Coordination Center; and Dr
Paul Bishop,DERA.
c/o The Mineseeker
Foundation

development. The radar is designed to
penetrate foliage and ground to create
a high-resolution image of metal and
plastic mines. T he radar was developed
to find smaller targets, maki ng it
suitable for survey of mines and cluster
bomb units (CBUs) . The UWB SAR
is currently the world's highest
resolution radar of irs kind.
The Mineseeker Project

Currently, the most reliable method
for clearing a mine field involves
manually probing the ground. By this
method, a man with a probing device
can clear 20-25 m per day. This
method is both costly and timely.
Ex p erts in demining have been
looking for a more time and costeffective method of clearing the U .N.
estimate of800,000 square kilometers
of land that is unusable due to the
suspected presence of mines. The
United Nations estimates that over 80
percent of th e land worldwide
currently restricted as mined is actually
mine-free. In order to release restricted
land for agricultural and residential
development, it must first be surveyed.
The original objective for an aerial
survey was to complete a fast and
accurate Level Two survey of the land.
The goal of The Lightship Group
(TLG) and the Defense Research and
Evaluation Agency (DERA) using the

Mineseeker Airship
in flight.
c/o The Mineseeker
Foundation

Mineseeker is to reduce the land to be
mined by 20 percent.
he Lightship Group

TLG was formed in 1995 as a
partnership between Lightship
America, the operating division of
American Blimp, and Virgin
Lightships, part of Sir Richard
Branson's Virgin Atlantic Group of
Compa nies in Telford, UK. TLG
currently operates 17 of23 worldwide
airships, making it the largest
operating airship company. The
Lightship Airship was created in
response to the need for low-cost, high
performance airships for both
advertising and aerial survey. The
group is known for its robust, costeffective airships. The Lightship crew
has combined for over 100,000 hours
of flying experience. The Mineseeker
Airship is an A60+ lightship th at
measures 150 feet long and 55 feet tall.
With a gondola 14 by 5 feet long, it
can hold up to five people.

DERA

II

• 108.

The ground breaking new
technology that makes aerial radar
survey possible is called the Ultra Wide
Ban Synthetic Aperture Radar (UWB
SAR). The UWB SAR was first
developed by the U.K. Ministry of
Defense for use in finding AT mines;
it was originally intended to find large
objects. In the last fi ve years the
Defense Evaluation and Research
Agency (DERA) has taken over serious

In response to the need for more
advanced demining technology, TLG
and DERA joined together to study
the use of airships in humanitarian
demining. T hey began to study the
feasibility of joining two technologies,
TLG's A60+ airship, and DERA's
UWB SAR, to create a mine-seeking
airship. Both organizations believe
that the airship is the most practical
a ircraft for aeri al survey primarily
because an airship is stable, vibrationfree and nonmetallic.
An a irship has the following
features that make it an ideal aerial
platform for the use of a sensitive radar
system: 1
•a mobile, stable platform;
•long endurance;
•low noise and vibration;
•no rotor downwash;
•relatively large payload capability; and
•a good operator environment.
Airships also have a low rate of
critical failure. Even when shot at the
airship can withstand several buller
holes before it sinks to rhe ground,
never crashing. The payload of the
aircraft is also important because the
electric equipment can be both heavy
and sensitive.
The Lightship Gro up's A60
airship has a half-ton payload, making
it ideal for the sensor equipment like
the UWB SAR. Using a helicopter
instead of an airship was considered
for the aerial survey, but was decided
against fo r several reasons. When
working in military zones, helicopters
can be perceived as a threat, whereas

airships are "friendly" to the public
eye. Although helicopters have the
ability to hover like airships, they also
have rotor downwash, which causes
strong downward
air pressure that
could cause mine
detonation.
In January
2000, TLG and
DERA officially
rook steps in their
partnership
to
create and develop
the Mineseeker
Airship. DERA was
already developing
a prototype UWB
SAR. The development continued
until January 2000,
when the prototype
system was fitted in
the Mineseeker airship, a Lightship
A60+, recently
diverted from a n
advertising assignment in Germany.
The most se rious
concern that engineers faced was to
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make sure the radar energy did not
interfere with the electrical power of
the airship, causing possible airship
failure.

•

Wescam sensor fit.
c/o The Mineseeker
Foundation

The Mineseeker Airship
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Testing

In January 2000 the first erial run
of the Mineseeker was held at a DERA
sire in Worcestershire, UK. The trials
proved promising for the technology,

deminers, discuss the requirements for
Level One and Level Two surveys and
to gain understanding of specific
te rrain iss ues invo lved in mine
clearance in order to give the ream a
more rounded view of the mine

The Mineseeker
crew.
do The Mineseeker
Foundation

MINESEEKER.COM

as the radar was able to detect surface
metal and plastic mines wirh at lease
the accuracy of ground level surveying.
With aerial survey, the ream detects
and maps mines and UXO, including
plastic mines as small as I 0 em. The
Mineseeker was found to be able to
sca n an estimated I 00 sq. m per
second, a dramatic increase from the
amount of land char can be covered
per second during t ypical ground
survey. By using aerial survey, large
areas can be mapped in a short time
and mine-free land can chen be
released for use, eliminating the need
for an actual physical search.
Deployment in Kosovo

In order ro d evelop a bette r
overall understanding of the mine
probl e m , the Min esee ke r t eam
planned a rrip to visit several mineaffected countries, including Thailand,
Cambodia and Ko sovo . The crip
objectives were ro meet experienced

problem and demining techniques.
In August 2000, rhe ream visited
Kosovo , wh ere it met with John
Flanagan , program manager of the
U.N. Mine Action Coordination
Centre (MACC) in Kosovo, to discuss
current mine clearance. T here are two
types of ammunition chat need to be
cleared from the land in Kosovo. One
type is landm ines laid by Serb armies.
During an ini tial Level One survey,
maps with mine field locators were
collected from the Serb Army and
delivered co MACC. However, the
maps do nor always make the mine
clearance work easier; the information
is often incomplete and vague. Mine
fields are not GPS referenced and the
field locarors are physical points such
as scone piles, cement walls, or sticks.
Using these maps ground dem iners
may have to prod through large areas
of brush o r forest to find the locators
before they could begi n clea ring,
wasting valuable rime.
T he ocher type of ammunitio n
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left in Kosovo is the NATO-dropped
CBU, a more d iffi cul t to d etect
munition. After some struggle to gee
clear, often classified informacion,
N ATO shared some coordinate maps
with MACC. However, the coord inates were often unclear. For example,
on some maps are a series of crosses,
bur there is no speci fic key to tell what
the crosses indicate. A cross could
stand for a known mine field o r a
reponed mine field. Without more
detailed information, deminers spend
valuable t ime searching in areas chat
may not co ntain mines, instead of
spending time in areas certain co be
mine- infested.
During the Mineseeker tea m's
visit to Kosovo it became eviden t chat
the re was a n immediate n eed in
Kosovo for an aeria l ob servati o n
platform char could be used co
pinpoint both landmines and CBU
strikes a nd their UXO. Upon
Flanagan's reques t the Min eseeker
team began to prepare for immediate
d eployment of the Minesee ker to
complete an extensive optical survey
of the land. T he MACC's statement
of requirements for Mineseeker were: 2
• Locate an d ident ify existence of
recorded mine fields an d identify
reference poi ms;
•Confi rm exten t of mine fields;
•Strategic planning regard ing rhe use
of assets (dogs, machinery and access);
•Confirm cha r fences and mine markers are still intact;
•Confirm land use and prioritization
of casks;
• Identify C BU s trikes with k nown
coordinates, and search for identifying
strike areas no t related ro k nown
coordinates;
• Produce derai led records, define
bound aries and e nabl e st rategic
planning for clearance; and
• E nsure all d ata collected, where
appropriate, is entered into MACC's
Information M anagement System for
Mine Action (IMSMA).

Aerial Optical Survey

There were two phases of the
Mi neseeker work in Kosovo. The first
phase of work was an aerial optical
survey, begun Sept. 13, 2000. The
airship flew over known mine fields
and cluster bomb sites using Wescam
camera equipment to cake derailed
photographs of che fields below. For
six weeks rhe Mineseeker flew over 30
mine fields us ing maps and old
sketches co find and zoom in o n fields
below. Steve Saunders, MACC threat
assessment officer, flew with the ream
during the optical survey. Using
previously collected information about
mine field indicators, Saunders and
p il ots Mark Fin ney and Andy
McDonald were able to zero- in on
ta rgets co cake pictu res and make
reco rds. By viewing the mine fields
from an overhead view, the crew was
able co spot mine locators more easily
than ground deminers. The locators
were chen refe ren ced for us e by
dem in ing reams. From an overhead
view, areas of cluster bomb strikes were
also more easily spotted and recorded.
One of the g reatest challenges in
completing the aerial survey was flying
the a irship so low to rhe ground.
Saunders and the pilot had to navigate
hazards such as electricity pylons and
moumains char usually were far below
the airsh ip. Another concern was rhac
in case of an emergency the airship
might have to land near o r in a mine
field. About chis, David Partridge,
project direcror, gives assurance: "In
the event of a major system failure or
hostile action, airsh ips are remarkably
robust and would float to (relative}
safety. T his aspect has been well
researched and formed parr of the risk
register for our deployment. "
adarTesting

T h e second phase of the survey
was a testing period for the prototype

Post conflict battle
damage can be
assessed for UXO
risk, and associated
mined areas
pinpointed using
aerial images and
provided military
records.
do The Mineseeker
Foundation

ground-penetrati ng UWB SAR. The
radar was reseed over a former mine
dog rest sire-its first erial in an actual
mined area. The area was on a hillside
in a former war zone, and contained
boxes buried with several types of
mines and UXO. The resr site gave the
Mineseeker team a chance to analyze
the accuracy and system limitations of
th e radar. The radar had already
proved co be able co penetrate foliage
during rhe resting in United Kingdom.
The team wamed to learn more about
rhe highest level of performance of the
radar. From resting ir was confirmed
that the radar can detect plastic and
metal mines up to I 0 em below rhe
ground-a reassuring fact for borh
DERA and TLG.
The results of chis
prototype resting will
be used to develop
the radar and design
tests for fu t ure
prototypes.
PubliC Awareness
in Kosovo

The Mineseeker
team also attempted
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to promote public awareness of rhe
M ineseeker in Kosovo through a threepart campaign. The team used a threeparr m ethod to promote public
awareness. The first parr was getting
local television and rad io coverage in
the areas of surveying. The med ia
explained that the Mineseeker was
there for mine survey and not any type
of military action. The second part
consisted ofsending a mine awareness
ream to speak with local people ro
reinforce the positive nature of rhe
project. The third part involved
conversing with village elders and
inviting them to look at the airship
and equipment on the ground at its
base. T his gave the people a chance to
The canister from a
cluster bomb
strike identified
from 1,000 feet.
c/ o Wescam

The Mineseeker Airship
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see the equipm ent up cl ose an d ,
acco rding to Partr idge, pro b abl y
contributed to the fact that none of
t h e eq uipm ent was in t ention a ll y
damaged while at its base in Kosovo.
Dr. Paul Bishop , DERA proj ec t
director, said that overall m edi a
coverage was very pos iti ve a nd
extensive and public reaction to the
project was supportive.

successful part of the mission. "All the
compan ies we provided with information said it was very useful; so yes,
it_was a success," Saunders stated.
T he results are currently being
integrated into the MACC's IM SMA.
At the time of the delivery of the COs,
lo cal mining had stop ped for the
winter, so there was no immediate use
for the information in the IMSMA.

Kosovo Results

Benefits of Mineseeker

After completing irs 103.2 hours
of aerial s urvey t he tea m put irs
exte nsive collection of informatio n
onto C Os, which were delivered to

Besides completi ng aerial survey,
there are other great benefits to the
Mineseeker Airshi p projectincreased global awareness of the mine

(1-r) Mike Kendrick,
CEO Lightship
Group, Col. Alastair
McAslan, Geneva
International
Centre for
Humanitarian
Demining; and
David Partridge,
Minesee ker
project director.
c/o The Mineseeker

commercial funding ro support the
project, believing that it is important
to keep mine action in the public eye.
T he commercial support bri ngs new
h ope that more humanitar ian
dem ining support will co me from
sponsors other than the government
and U.N. programs. Mine awareness
and suppo rt will continue to be raised
in both rhe public and commercial
sectors.
This does not discoun r the
benefit of redirecting fo rmer military
resources and techno logy towards
human itarian dem ining. The UWB
SAR is the product of many years of
development under the M inistry of
Defense. "The most significant thing
achieved by the Mineseeker is that it
is providing media glare, and that we
now have the license to use technology
that was re leased from inherent
mi litary demin ing fo r h umanitarian
demining," Partridge explained.
Future Plans

Foundation

MACC in November 2000. The C Os
contain video footage and still pictures
of specific areas of mine restrictio n.
The photographs taken by the airsh ip
make visible previous ly un known
tracks and paths running through the
mine field areas of interest-where the
tripwires are most likely fo und. T he
C O s are avai lab le for NGOs for
assistance in their min e clearance.
Providing NGOs with aerial photos of
the land they are d emining is
considered by Saunders to be the most

problem, a move towards commercial
sponso rship for humanitarian demin ing and rhe positive contribution
of mil itary demining resources to
human itarian dem ining. The Mineseeker h as bee n fu lly funded by
sponsors Virgi n Atlantic Ai rlines, The
North Face, Wescam and Linde Gas.
T hrough these s ponsorships, the
commercial world has been introduced ro the mine problem and taken
p art to h elp. The Mineseeker
Foundation will continue to look for
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The Mineseeker Foundation was
lau nched on Jan. 27, 200 1, as a joint
partnership of DERA and TLG and
includes patro ns Nelson Mandela, his
wife Graca Machel Mandela, Si r Richard Branson and Noor-al-Hussein,
Queen ofJordan. The fo undation will
continue to seek commercial support
fo r rhe M i:1eseeker project for rhe next
two years of development and fo r future airshi ps. Under the direction of
Chairman Mike Kendrick, rhe foundation hopes ro raise approximately
$ 14 m illion (£10 million) for the
cause. Bishop says, "The Mineseeker
Foundation is committed to looking
ar new technology nor just in mine
clearance bur in mine action, to using
rhe airship fo r mine awareness." He
poincs our rhar the M ineseeker can be
used for tasks such as road surveys,
mon itori ng the movement of refuges,
a nd even dropp ing li ght parcels,
should the need arise .

The immediate task ar hand is to
assess preexisting technology and the
potential developmenc of demining
technology. The Mineseeker Foundation strives to determine precisely
what mine action requires now and
what it will require in rime. Partridge
says that TLG's goal is to make the
Mineseeker a cost-effective aid ro rhe
global mine action community.
Future plans for rhe Mineseeker
include a two -year development
program. The first 18 months will
include development to increase the
performance of the radar. DERA is
c urren tl y wo rking on a new
techno logy rhar would enable the
radar to scan the ground surface in
layers. With this capability, the team
can take a set of pictures of the surface,
then take another set at 2-5 em below
the su rface, and another set at I 0 em
below.
DERA and TLG are also looking
into the development of a more
complex, automated system to manage
rhe collected data from surveys.
Cu rrently, rhe information is difficult
to analyze and can rake a long rime to
be organized. The information is
stored by individual mine. However,
the ideal management system would
provide on the spot, organized output
of specific mined areas, in rhe fash ion
of an advanced Level Two survey.
After the advanced development
stage will come a six-month period of
intensive testing. The resting will rake
place in the U .K. and various other

active mine testing sires throughout
the world, possibly including Croatia.
The Mineseeker ream aims to meet the
standards of the International Testing
Evaluation Program (ITEP) for aerial
mine survey. The tests will be done on
various types of soil, water content,
mines, and detection characteristics.
DERA recognizes the importance of
resting in actual mined areas in order
to prove rhe capabilities of rhe radar
before i r can be deemed accurate
enough for extensive use . The
Mineseeker team wants ro provide at
least the same accuracy of current
Level Two ground surveys.
After the Mineseeker meers the
prescribed accuracy standards, T LG
will develop the Mineseeker II. The
goal of the M ineseeker Foundation is
to eventually deploy flve airships, one
or two per year. TLG will provide and
operate the technology at the request
of NGOs, nor as a replacement ro all
current clearance methods, but in
hopes of radically improving mine
clearance. As Partridge explains about
the project, "New technology is
important in terms of speeding up
demining. But the most important
thing is that we are nor standing on a
soapbox saying 'We've got the answer';
it's not a silver buller. We've just got a
program enhancement system that can
be improved and used." With this in
mind, the Mineseeker Foundation and
its s p onsors join the efforts of
humanitarian demining with a whole
new approach- from rhe sky. •
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Mineseeker Project Director
The Mineseeker Foundation
Room C501
St Andrews Road
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WR I 4 3PS
Tel : 0 1684 897306
Fax: 01684 896137
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'Christoforaro, Bishop & Thornhill.

DERA. The ftasib;!ity ofoperating an Ultra
w;deband Synther;c Aperture Radar (UWB
SAR) from an airship for the detection of
mh1ed areas ;n a humanitarian role. h ttp:/
/www.mineseeker.com/press-info/docs/
dera/dcra.html. July 3, 2000.
1

First Mineseeker Airship Deployment
Declared a Success in Kosovo. http ://
www.mineseeker.com/pr-archive/kosovodcployment-success.html. Nov. I 0, 2000.
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Koch Mine Safe and the Cordon
Sanitaire Clearance Program
Through the work of Koch GmbH and Mine-Tech, the 359 km-long Cordon Sanitaire
in Zimbabwe is being demined in one of the first humanitarian demining efforts of
its kind.
By HenryThompson,RHS

Associates
Background

n 1993, the European Union
(EU) funded a survey of the
Cordon Sanitaire in Zimbabwe,
a series of six border mine
fields covering 766 km. The
contract for the survey was
won by the mine clearance
NGO Mine-Tech, who had
three months to perform the
survey in late 1994. 1 MineTech did not survey all of the
mine fields because the fields
and a major portion of the
adjacent service road had not
seen maintenance for two
decades. However, maps were
available at the Zimbabwean
Army Engineer's Headquarters at Pomona Barracks,
and Mine-Tech completed
the survey and handed over
the final report. The report
included maps, diagrams and
a broad assessment of the problems
and difficulties in clearance. While the
report also contained some significant
inaccuracies, it did present a broad
overview of the mine fields.
Of all mine fields, the top priority
was a 359 km-long one in the
northeastern corner of Zimbabwe. To
advise on the tendering process for a
clearance contract, the EU hired
consultant Patrick Blagden. The
European Development Fund
provided funding for the project, while

I

the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence
handled financial contro l and
contractual issues. The invitation to
tender was issued in late 1997, and was
co mprised of two co ntracts: main
works (clearance) and quality
assurance (QA).
This was one of the humanitarian

demining industry's first major
contracts offered to international
competition for a project of this scale.
The issues of assuming risk and the
disclosure of information were not
fully explored. The Zimbabwe
Ministry of Defence, as the client,
provided the bidding companies with
very limited information, while the
tender documents defined the scope
of work as the clearance of 10,000,000
m 2 of mine-infested land in 18
months. It also required the bidding
• 114.

companies to bid with a fixed price.
Six companies expressed interest
in performing the clearance. MineTech was one of the companies
allowed to bid-an unusual action for
a company that performed the initial
survey. The bidding companies were
allowed to visit the mine field at the

Mukumbura end for two days under
the supervision of the Ministry of
Defence, but high vegetation hid
much of the visible detail within the
mine field. Four companies (MineTech, Koch GmbH, Royal Ordnance
and Mineclear) then presented
technical accreditation and bids that
were judged by a technical threshold
and by price. 2 Koch made its bid in
partnership with Mine Safe, a
Zimbabwean company owned by
retired Zimbabwean army officers.

After passing the technical prequalification, Koch Mine Safe (KMS)
won the contract with the lowest bid.
And while Koch couldn't provide a
performance guarantee, it was
successful in finding backing for
deployment from a major Dutch
salvage and dredging company, Royal
Boskalis Westminster NY, a group that
owned the German subsidiary
company Heinrich Hirdes GmbH, an
EOD company. The QA contract was
issued to BacTec.

Schematic Diagram of Mine Fields MOZAMBIQUE
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Cordon Sanitaire

Game fence

The Cordon Sanitaire

The Cordon Sanitaire mine field
consisted of a 25 m-wide strip of
ground laid with three rows of blast
AP mines at a density around 5,500
mines per kilometer. The mine field
was fenced on both sides by a game
fence of three strands of steel wire
supported on thin steel posts set in
concrete and was cleared ofvegetation.
The bottom strand held a thin wire
mesh game fence. Also attached to the
fence was an intruder alarm system
linked to control points rhat fed
information to patrol teams. By 1997,
virtually all the fencing had been
removed by local p eop le or had
disintegrated. Three lanes of mines
were laid using knotted ropes. Within
the three rows, patterns were only
discernable over short distances. The
majority of mines in rhe Cordon
Saniraire were the South African
R2M2 and the Portuguese M969. The
Italian VS50 was also laid. Due to
breaches of the mine field and animal
incursions, there was a good level of
in-filling with more random patterns
and different landmines.
The Cordon Sanitaire was backed
for most of irs length by a second
"ploughshare" mine field containing
three rows of large fragm entation
mines mounted on pickets one meter
above rhe ground. The fragmentation
mines were laid with 30 m tripwires
and three additional blast mines

Service track

ZIMBABWE

c/o Henry Thompson

protected each mine. T he mine density
in this field was around 100
fragmentation mines and 300 buried
blast mines per kilometer. The rows
were unevenly spaced and the
vegetation was not cleared, so the mine
field contained substantial trees and
dense thorn bush. The field was
subject to a great deal of in-filling and
randomly spaced APLs, and had a
service track running behind and
parallel to it to allow patrolling and
maintenance. Amazingly, the Cordon
Sanitaire was even found to run up to
8 km into neighboring Mozambique
-indicating the hasty nature of its
deployment.
Under its contract, KMS was
restri cted to three working teams,
though mechanical methods were
allowed only if the land was manually
checked. The contractor had to ensure
that environmental damage was
minimal.

he Clearance Operation

KMS planned to deploy its
clearance operation in October 1998,
but it actually deployed six months late
at Mukumbura in March 1999. The
mine clearance outfit experienced
problems assembling manual teams
because the available pool of
experienced deminers in Zimbabwe
was minimal, meaning KMS had to
do more training than anticipated. As
a result, there is now a small outflow
of KMS-trained deminers joining
other companies. Also, in March,
Alistair Craib gained control of the
demining operation from Patrick
Blagden and made his first visit to the
project.
After an initial halt to reassess
procedures following some early
accidents, work recommenced in April
1999, and clearance efforts moved
slowly for four months. Metal
contamination forced clearance rates

Koch Mine Safe and the Cordon Sanitaire
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Minebuster takes to a mine field. do Andy Smith
2

to be about 30 m per two-man lane
pe r day. By the end of May, eight
months into the contract, 0.25 percent
of the 10,000,000 m 1 ofland had been
cleared. Efforts we re th e n furt her
slowed by h eavy rainfalls, whi ch led
to o utb reaks of cho lera a n d the
suspension of work by local health
authorities. Due to the force majeure,
KMS was granted a two - month
extension to irs 18-month contract.
Meanwhile, BacTec had deployed on
sched ule in October 1998, bur was
in trouble because irs contract had
been negotiated o n the basis of
payment per unit of land verified.
More flaws in KMS's bid and
the terms of the contract arose
early in the p rocess. The dem iners
were spending the bulk of their rime
locat ing false signa ls fro m p ieces of
scrap m etal in the mi ne field. 3 T h is
scrap metal came from the remains of
fencing and rubbish fo u nd in the mine
field. T he demin ing company had
originally estimated the le vel of
contamination at one false alarm per
20 m 2 and had worked this estimation
into its bid. In reality, though, it was
find ing up to 30 signals per sq uare
meter in close proxim ity co fence
li nes. 4
T he contract does nor specify
clearance of all metal bur requires
clearance to U.N. standards of 99.6
percem of mines rem oved down ro a
depth of 2 0 em . In p ractice, KMS

Mine buster griddle-rack from the rear. do Andy Smith

cl ea red all metal from th e ce nter
mined lanes and was encouraged by
the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence
and BacTec ro clear all metal, which
makes area verification a much simpler
task. However, the dem iners had
u n deres t i m a t ed
th e log ist ical
difficulties of the operation. The so il
in winter is very hard, so by July 1999,
the manual teams required 7,500 liters
ofwater per day tO water the mine field

before prodding or excavating. KMS
a lso had to build access roads to rhe
mine field. T he M ine-Tech survey
document (and subsequently the
Ministry of Defence c ontra c t)
spec ified that there was a service track
runn ing about 50 m behind the m ine
field. In reality, rhe track was between
300m and 1.7 km from the m ine field
and no longer existed in certain areas.

iafety
KMS was also strongly criticized
for a high accident rate. From March
w June 1999, 12 accidents occu rred.
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Over half of the accidenrs were
in cu rred dur in g excava t ion. The
primary cause ofone-th ird of these was
attributed to m an agemen t e rror,
notably serious inju ries from handling
mines. 5 A total of 20 people were
injured in 18 accidents from February
1999 to Jul y 2000. Two of t h e
se riously injured subsequently died in
the hospital-one from pneumonia
contracted in recuperation. Only one
accident occurred as a resu lt of
stepping on a deep-buried mine on
land nor yet offered for QA.
The accidents show a number of
clear features:
• Only one d eminer was seriously
injure d while clearing m ines and
adhering to all Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP);
• Nine out of 14 (64 percent) of those
injured were back at work with in 10
days of rhe incident;
• The two fatalities bot h occurred offsire and under medical care; and
• N o one was killed or injured by a
ploughshare fragmentation mine (no
ploughsha re mines were found intact
with d etonatOrs).
Two of the se r ious h andling
incidents were partly the result of m ine
n eutralization (taking the deconaror
out of t he mi ne casing), a p rocedu re
that was specified as a SOP under t he
init ial contract. More than 4,000
mines were d isarmed in ch is way, bur

fo llow ing a rev iew of SOPs, the
p ractice was abandoned and, henceforth, all m ines were destroyed intact.
One way of assessing accidents in
mine clearance is to look at the density
of mines and UXO (based on the fact
that no mines and n o UXO equals no
a ccide nts) . KMS 's teams were
hand ling very large quantities of
minimum-metal APLs under a broad
ran ge of conditions, including
excavating them from down to 35
em-well beyond the depth required
by U.N. srandards.6
In May 1999 , Craib recommended a change in management. As
a result, Herman van der Vorm was
appointed to replace the previous prog ram d i rector. Th e appointment
proved an immediate success as critical management decisions were implemented and efficiency improved rapidly. By August 1999, the project was
operating productively a nd safely. In
September 1999, KMS a lso introduced alcohol (Breathalyzer) and d rug
resting and a pay increase.

Mechanical Clearance
Soon after deployment in March
1999, KMS explored the potential for
mechan ical
clearan ce
and
co mmissioned an environmental
impact assessme nt of m echanical
cl earance of t he Co rd on Sanitaire
mine field. T he study concluded that
approximately o ne-third of the mine

field was suitable for mechanically
assisted clearance, one- third was
suitable for clearance with following
remediation to reduce erosion and
one-th i rd was not suitable for
mechanical clearance.
KMS subsequently purchased a
Vei lhaben Minebuster. The 56 ton
machine arrived in Zimbabwe in July,
at w hi ch point it was renamed the
"Mine Collector" and was rested and
evaluated to develop working
parameters SOPs. These procedures
were put inro operation in October
1999. Two of the dem ining teams
remained as manual teams working on
the ploughshare mine field, and the
third ream followed the Mine
Collector.
The Mine Collector is like a heavy
potatO harvester built around a crawler
tractor with a heavy mi ll added before
the lifting and sifti ng apparatus. This
machine can process a 3m-wide swath
down to a depth of 50 em. Soil is
m ixed up by a carbide-toothed grinder
and deposited onto a set of three large
nylon-finger rollers char break up clods
of earth and separate our solids from
loose soil that escapes through the
rollers. Any sol id items such as stones,
roots and mines are deposited on a
slatted co nveyor that deposits them
back on the surface some 7 m behind
the fron t mill. Mines and UXO are
left on the surface, ready for the
manual teams. It was found that roots
of some trees would be picked up and
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bound in the nylon rollers, so working
depth (and forward speed) is parrially
varied according to vegetation . In
practice, the Mine Collector works
beh i nd two orher machines: a
bu ll dozer that removes t rees and
shrubs and a heavy mine-protected
tractor with steel wheels and a ripper
chat loosens soil and breaks up roots.
When running efficiently, the
machine processed 12,000 to 15,000
m 2 of land per day. When following
the machine, individual deminers
could process 400 to 500 m 2 per dayabout 10 times the normal manual rate
per person. The Mine Collector ran
successfu lly for a few weeks until the
hea vy rains retu rned . The M i ne
Collector broke down on a number of
occasions and several frustrating weeks
were spent awaiting spare parts from
Germany. From March to May 2000,
t he productivity declined significa ntly
due co downtime.

roductivity
In February 2000, 17 months
into the 18 month contract, the KMS
management team looked at its
prospects. The reams had cleared less
than one-third of the contract area (2.6
million m 2 ou r of a total of I 0 million
m 2 ). The need for a contract extension
became obvious. Luckily, the EU and
the Zimbabwe M inistry of Defence
agreed to exte nd the company's
conrracr to February 200 l.

Grinding teeth
and nylon finger
rollers of the
Minebuster.
c/ o Andy Smith
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Mine Detection Dogs At Work

Comparative densities of mines and UXO in clearance operations in the region:
Region

Square meters

Mines/UXO removed

Koch Mine Safe
NPA, Songo, Cabora Bassa
Mechem, Massingir
Mechem, Corrunana Dam
Mozambican average

3,809,281
738,180
89,634
1,700,000

65,185
12,072
349
3,600

Square meters
per mine/UXO
58
61
467
472
1,500 - 2,500

Source: Mechem, NPA Mozambique, Quarterly Report 4th Qtr, 1999, Koch-Mine Safe, IND, Maputo.

Working under extended hours,
the mechanical team was capable of
bringing the company up to between
6.5 to 7.5 million m 2 of land by
February 2001. The Mine Collector
processes 20,000 m 2 of gro und per
day, and the manual team cove rs
around 12,000 to 12,500 m 2 per day,
potentially destroying over 1,000
mines per day.
On average (over both mine
fields), KMS's teams are lifting and
destroying one mine per 58 m 2 of

KMS cleared 421,000 m 2 • By mid-July
2000, the team had cleared a total of
3,809,281 m 2 of land and 65 , 185
mines- one mine per 58 m 2• By any
standards, the current safety record of
KMS is exceptional considering the
conditions.
• No "missed mines" have been reported
by Bac Tee, which assesses 10 percent of
the land cleared. The level of quality
achieved under these conditions is very
high . •

:ontact Information
Henry Thompson
RHS Associates Ltd.
33 Ludlow Way
Finchley Londo n N20JZ
Tel: 44-208-444-3496
Fax: 44-208-883-2399
E-mail: henry@rhsassociates.co. uk

"KMS was also strongly criticized for a high accident rate. From March to June 1999,
12 accidents occurred. Over half of the accidents were incurred during excavation. The
primary cause of one-third of these was attributed to management error, notably serious
injuries from handling mines. 5 "
ground. In the Cordon Sanitaire mine
field, this broad average rises to one
mine per 20m2• The mechanical team
working in the center of the Cordon
Sanitaire clears one mine per 12 m 2
on average-spot densities can be more
than double this figure.
Two things cha racterize the
current clearance program:
• The high density ofmines and number
of mines being cleared. In June 2000,

eferences
1

Chris Pearce, Director, Mine-Tech, Interview
in Johannesburg, June 6, 2000.
2 Alistair Craib, EU and Zimbabwe Ministry
of Defence Consultant, Interview Feb. 6, 2000.
3 Koch-Mine Safe was using Vallon detectors,
fin e German detectors capable of h igh
sensitivity- but more complex to use than
many comparable models. The QA tearn was
using British Guartel MD8 detectors, a robust
and simple model.
4
Temba Kanganga, Mine Safe, Depury Project
Manager. The Road Forward: Humanitariart
Mine Cleamnce in Southern Africa. SAIIA
Johannesburg, August 6, 2000.
5 Data from Andy Smith, DD!V database, April

continued from page 87

the [dogs') ability to detect plastic
mines when metal detectors are
ineffective is even more important."
The Global Training Academy
has the capacity to train 30-36 dogs
per year in mine detection. In 200 I,
18 dogs will be trained for deployment
in Lebanon, Oman and Thailand . In
addition, the Academy currently has
dog teams working in ten countries:
Mozambique, Rwanda, Bosnia, Costa
Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Croatia,
Namibia, Thailand and Afghanistan.
T hese dog teams often work with the
host count ry's military 1n m1ne
clearance operations.
Contact Information
Dan Hayrer, Director
Global Training Academy
P.O. Box 445
So merset, TX 78069
Tel: (21 0) 622-9460
Fax: (830) 429-3122
E-mail: Gtaden@aol.com
M-Detect
M-Detect, a mine dog training
facility in Ge rmany, specializes in
training MODs for mine detection
operations in mine-affected countries.
Eac h year, M-Derect trains and
deploys approximately eighr dogs.
This year, MODs are being trained for

deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia. Marrin Weitkamp,
direcror ofM-Detect, said MODs are
"an important parr of the international
demining roolbox" if used as quality
assurance in unknown areas.
Weitkamp adds that dogs should not
be used in a known mine field in place
of deminers or demining mach inery
bur in unknown areas where sweeping
the fields with an MOD is faster and
more efficient.
Contact Information
Martin Weitkamp, Director
M-Detect
Munsrersrrasse 13
D-59387 Ascheberg
Germany
Tel: +49-2599-92-5207
Fax: +49-2599-92-5295
E-mail: wd-weitkamp@r-online.de
Website: http://www.securatec.de
Conclusion
MODs are an effective means for
mine clearance operations worldwide.
With proper training from mine dog
companies and organizations, MODs
employed in mine-infested countries
return successful results. Their driven
success continues ro be an asset to
countries in rimes of need. •

6, 2000.
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The t raining period ends with
MDD leading the trainer.
c/o Martin Weitkamp
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The Direct Approach from Kosovo:
Mine Awareness Education
HMO Response's Philip Dive sees the inherent value in the direct approach in mine
awareness training and urges the mine action community in Kosovo not to look past
this approach.

Purpose
HMO Response MAEP exists to
help the people ofOpoja and Gora to
avo id becoming casualties of mines
and UXO throu gh education,
awareness and other relevant
informacion.

ollectively, the managers of
mine aware ness edu cati on
programs (MAEP) have
helped rhe people ofKosovo focus o n
rhe mine threat through a compl ex
web of approaches. These approaches
include child-to-child , so ld ier-tochild , moth er- to - child , puppet
theaters, road shows and summer days.
Other MAEP ini tiatives utilize soccer
p layers a nd mosque !ma ns as the
messengers of mine awareness. Still
another program educates reac hers
about m ines in p reparatio n for the
arrival of mine awareness in school
curriculums. All of rhe above programs
have been accredited by the U.N .
M ine Action Coo rdination Centre
(UNMACC), and rogerher fo rm one
of the most comprehensive mine
awareness packages in the world.
Among a ll t hi s c reat ive,
progressive and radical thinki ng, there
may be the danger rhar rhe so-called
"direct" app roach h as been made
redundant in the r u sh for an
" i nt e ract ive" MAEP. Th e direc t
approach si mply explains rhe situation
co ncerning nearby mine fields and
offers advice on safe behavior to the
adults of a community in the hope rhar
they and their families can avoid these
areas until demining agencies are able
to clear them .
Wh ile the initial estimates fo r
landmine clearance in Kosovo
predicted that UNMACC wou ld be
busy fo r m any years, more rece nt

C

studies lean toward a less pessimistic
ou tl oo k , perhap s requirin g only
another year to clear the vast majority
of mine fields. After January 200 I , ir
is ca lcu la t ed that o n ly about 20
percent of the known mine-affected
areas wi ll remain. All of these locations
are in rhe mountainous border areas.
In Ko sovo, the hi ghest- risk groups
tend to b e m e n-usual ly you n g
agricultural workers-who live nontechnical, rural lives. For this group

fa il if poorly imp lemented. As for
via bl e a lte rn at ives, I k n ow of no
cu rrent p rogram, direct or community-based , rhar actually o ffers the
people ofKosovo a sustainable second
option that allows fo r a real change ro
their dai ly mine-affected routine.
T he MAEP presented by H MO
Response in this art icle views the
simplicity of the d irect approach to be
o f lasting importance because m ine
aware n ess docs not need to be
co mplicated. T h e direct approach can
de m o nstra te a very hig h level of
awareness of local conditions and can
be sw i ft to im pleme n t. W ith
co mpete nt management, the direct
approac h ca n also be easy to
adm inister, control and evaluate.
THE DIRECT APPJDACH-A
MAEP OUTLINE

AWARENESS TEAM
the direct app roac h is th e on ly
guaranteed way to exchange minerelated informat ion and therefore
should form the foundation for a
national strategy.
T his article acknowledges ch at
during the evolution of a MAEP the
direct approach often lacked sensitivity
ro local concerns, tended ro be "ad
hoc" and offered no alternatives to
help change people's risky behavio r.
These concerns focus on the lack of
man age men t during the ea rl y
progra m s, ra ther rhan th e innate
potential of the direct approach itself.
To be fair, though, any approach will
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Program location
HMO Res pon se's MA E P is
located in the MunicipalityofDragash
in the south of Kosovo. Dragash is
linguistically, politically and culturally
divided into two pa ns. Irs' 34,000
residents are divided into the Alban ian
s peaki ng m ajo rity residin g in 19
villages ro the north (an area called
Opoja) a nd t he n o n-Alban ian
speaking minority (the Goranis) who
live in 19 villages to the south. Within
the mo u ntai ns that surround D ragash,
many of which reach altitudes of up
ro 2,500 meters, these 3 8 v illages
coex ist with few points of co ntact
ocher than their faith in the Koran.

Information Exchange:
Help both the demining organization
and the public with the exchange of
mine related information.

UNMACC:
Structure

By Philip Dive. Senior Mine
Awareness Educator

Liaison:
Visit demining operations.

The program consists of four elements:
1. Informacion Center
2. Village Mine Education Tearns
3. C learance Information Liaison
4. Mine Awareness Truck
Activities

Static Display:
Prov ide a static UXO and mine
display for the public to visit at any
rime.

!MSMAMaps:
Inform the public of known UXO
and mine locations.

Com pletion of UNMACC forms
clarifying public awareness of
clearance operations close to their
homes.

Maintain Public Interest:
Use a 4-ton truck as a large mobile
platform from which mine related
information is offered to the public.
T he truck is parked at sports events,
market places and busy road junctions.
Curnculum
Through the four program elements
the public should be able to do the
following as a result of the HMO
Respomse MAEP:

after real izing that you are in a mine
fi eld.
Understand safe behavior:
• Understand that the best solution is
to stay our of mined areas.
• Understand that safe paths must be
used at all times.
• Understand chat mines and UXO
must nor be touched.
• Be able to recognize above ground
and below ground mines.
• Be able to recognize cluster bombs
and grenades.
• Be able to recognize ammunition,
fuses and rockets.
Know the local m ine field situation:
• Know the agencies that are demining
Dragash.
• Know rhe locations of mine fields in
Opoja and Gora.
• Know that mine warning signs must
be left in place.
• Know chat clearance is a slow and
dangerous activity.
Management

Dangerous Area Reports:
Process UXO and mine information
provided by members of the public.

MateriaLs:
Design, test and produce additional
and appropriate UXO and mine
awareness m aterials.

Respond to the mine/UXO threat:
• Be able to recognize dangerous areas
through warning clues.
• Be able ro recognize mine fields
through the presence of warning
stgns.
• Be able to take appropriate action

Establish dialogue:
Talk with president and/or religious
leader.

Data Gathering:
Compile a questionnaire to find our
the local level of mine awareness.

The above results are implemented via
three sequential objectives:
tl

I. Organize, equip and train a specific
team for a public information program
in the Dragash Municipality.
2. Implement a public information
program that is focused on MAE to the
many communities within Dragash.
3. To depart from Dragash in an
organized and planned mann e r
ensuring char, where possible, nontechnical tangible assets are disposed
of in the best possible way.

Group Presentation:
A 25-minute forma l presentation.

Mingle:
A three-ho u r village visit stopping
people in the street /co ffee bars to
discuss the mine si tuation.

From 38 villages, 600 mine awareness
quesionnaires were collected for
program evaluation purposes. This w ill
be repeated in May 200 1 as an
indicator of the program's impact .
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Each objective ha s associated
performance indicators chat are tested
by the director of HMO Response
during his three planned visits to the
program. T hese verification visits are
copied to our donor.
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The Direct Approach from Kosovo

Team Size

from the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
prior to the selection and training of
local staff. The OSCE field office was
asked to help us recru it sui cable people
from both the Albanian and Gorani
communities. Also, ocher agencies
were given the opportunity to make
recommendations, such as the Red
Cross, HANDIKOS and the Balkan
Peace Team. Through these liaisons,
HMO Response was able to obtain the
support of organizations chat were
already respected by both communines.

The program employs the following:

Position
Kosovo Programme
Manager
MAEP Coordinator
Opoja Team Leader
Gora Team Leader
Opoja Team:
MAE Teacher
MAE Teacher
MAE Teacher

Nationality
English
English
Albanian
Bosnian

Albanian
Albanian
Albanian
/Turkish

Gora Team:
MAE Teacher
MAE Teacher
MAE Teacher

Go rani
Go rani
Go rani

Artist
Cemer cleaner

Go rani
Gorani

Guard
Guard

Albanian
Albanian

T he two MAE teams deploy under the
supervision of their ream leaders. From
Dragash the teams go to their areas to
undertake the sequential tasks shown
below. Each village has irs own file and
as the tasks are completed within each
location, the rel evant boxes are
checked off. A task can be repeated
several times if deemed necessary by
the team leader. The MAEP
coordina tor monitors the teams
through unannounced visits throughout the week.
\ illage N.une
l.Visit president
2.Data collection
3. Leaflets
4.Informal mingle
5.Formal presentation
6. Truck visit
? .Clearance briefing

• Location of the program office.
HMD Response mine awareness coordinator formal

presentation. HMD Response teachers
demonstrate parts of packing boxes in a village from the Opaja area.

In addition to this simple program
structure, four more complex issues are
now addressed: political awareness,
local capacity building, clearance
integration and program evaluation.
These have been chosen because they
are areas of weakness often associated
with MAEPs, irrespective of the
chosen approach.
~olitical

Awareness

Since the conflict touched
Dragash there has been a steady
outflow of Goranis. This is due to
security concerns follow in g their
suspected compliance with the Kosovo
Serbs, and for economic reasons as
they are becoming increasingly
isolated and economically limited.
T he Albanian border to the west
also adds to security concerns as crossborder smuggling of guns, drugs and
girls has become a viable source of
income to many entrepreneurial
villagers who have a love- hate
relationship with the new U.N.financed administration.
UNMACC was concerned that
many NGOs working in the south were
recrui ting mine awareness trainers that
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were excl usively Albanian. Not surprisingly, irs delivery of MAE in whatever
form was biased towards the Albanian
majority. This situation had become
unacceptable within a U.N. administration that promotes equal access to
information and human rights to all the
citizens ofKosovo. HMD Response was
tasked with remedying this imbalance
within the Oragash Municipality. One
option was to recruit Goranis and target only the Gorani villages. However,
this would have been a mistake as we
considered a neutral position to be borh
politically correct and physically safer.
A bener solution was to run two teams
alongside each other- a team of Albanians and a team ofGoranis. Although
two teams ensured our neutrality and
guaranteed access to all the co mmunities across Dragash, ir did raise the potential for internal conflicts within our
own organization. In part because of
the following actions that we rook at
the very start of our program, we experienced few conflicts:

• Integration with other neutral
agencies.
Advice was requested and noted

After long negotiations with the
Oragash U.N. Administered Council,
HMO Response was allocated office
space within the municipal
administrative building of the
education department. Located in the
same corrido r as the director for
education, we can be clearly observed
working alongside the existin g civil
structu res of the municipality. The
town of Oragash is also the political
and economic focus for both
Albanians and Goranis, so any other
location, be it to the north or south of
Oragash, would have been totally
unacceptable.

produced within Kosovo are written
only in Albanian. For rhe Gora team
it was necessary to translate existing
posters into local languages.

• Mobile displays.
When using our 4-ton truck as a
mobile platform for mine awareness
education in the multi-ethnic town of
Dragash, it is necessary to deploy
representatives from both reams at the
same time. This is important to ensure
that both communities feel they have
equal access to m ine-relared information. It is encouraging to observe
our teachers openly working alongside
each other, mixing and reaching across
ethnic groups. The local representatives ofOSCE and the U.N. admin istration have praised their example.

• Avoidance ofpolitical rallies.
We plan our visits schedule
several weeks in advance and try hard
to stick to our program. Often,
however, political gatherings somerimes clash with our visits. When a
clash occurs, the teams are under strict
instructions to leave the village and
return to the office. This avo ids any

unintentional association with a
political party.
The two teams have learned tO
work together and provide a good
example to those who continue to
express pessimism about the future of
a culturally divided Kosovo. Within
their own communities they are
communicating effectively and
ensur ing that mine aware n ess
education can take place without any
unn ecessary political/ ethnic distrac tions. This has been achieved
because we approached th e two
communities in a manner appropriate
co their situations and retained our
sense of balance.
While other direct approach
MAEPs may have lost their sense of
balance, HMO Response has been
very careful not tO do so. This suggests
that failure to be politically sensitive
is a fault of program managers, rather
than an inherent flaw in the direct
approach itself.
ocal Capacity Building

As a part of the former Yugoslavia,
Kosovo's education, training and
management style was summed up by
the Soviet doctrine "order is preferable

A 4-ton truck is
used as a mine
awareness
platform and focal
point in town
centers, at busy
crossroads and
during sports
events.

• English as a core office language.
All the teachers passed an English
test before being recruited, allowing
our office to be an English only area.
T his ens ures that everyone
understands all the discussions and
that no single linguistic gro up can
dominate the proceedings. This also
eliminates the need to use interpreters
in the office, helping the international
staff assess developments quickly.

• Mine awareness materials.
In keeping with earlier observations, th e vast majority of posters
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to change because change infers a
risk." Many agencies in Kosovo, both
large and small, usher in well meaning
albeit fundamentally new ways of
working immediately upon arrival in
Kosovo. To ensure "appropriateness"
and to aid local capacity building, local
staff are quickJy hired, trained and
returned to rheir local communities
with progressive methodologies that
may or may not be fully undersrood
either by the staff or the recipient
communities. The lack of employment opportunities and the cultural
acceptance of the all-knowing "boss"
will ensure that teaching takes place
even if learning does not result.
To its credit, the direct approach
is immediately transparent to suspicious people who are in a state of total
upheaval, where change is frightening
and Western organizations are slow to
reveal their funding and possibly their
hidden agendas. All too often, those
who criticize the direct approach's lack
of sensitivity miss a far deeper concept-gaining the trust and respect of
the local population by giving them
the information they want in a manner that they recognize as agenda-free.
For HMD Response, the direct
approach has enabled strong-minded
international members of staff to
quickly establish an ordered
program that is objective-led,
tightly focused and immediately understood by the local
members of staff. From this
starting point local members
of staff feel confident ro take
some responsibility within a
highly structured program
that they are able to culturally
endorse. The positions of
team leaders and that of office

The Direct Approach from Kosovo
managers were not advertised, but
rather internally appointed from the
initial mine awareness education
teachers within our own pool. The
professional growth of the team leaders
and the office manger in the second
half of our program is a mutually
beneficial, realistic "capacity building"
goal. These three individuals will very
soon be running the program for short
periods in the absence of the two
international managers who will be
needed to assess other proposals for
MAEPs.
Concepts like authority, autonomy and trust are all inexplicably
contained within the concept of
capacity building and they are
achieved slowly with very small steps.
Random MAEPs, typically with only
12 months of funding, cannot expect
to have the impact of long term
developmental agencies such as
Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) or
the Peace Corps, who hope to observe
local human resource advances over a
period of two or three decades. If any
capacity building can occur within
short, isolated MAEPs, it would
probably be an improvement of
existing methods, rather than newly
developed teaching methods.

The technical supervisor for
the charity HELP briefs the
awareness teams from HMD
Response on the location
and types of mine fields
along the Albanian border.
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Integration

Mine clearance and mtne
awareness must be integrated.
Agencies that work in the same
geographic areas on these activities
need to talk to each other, exchange
information and follow agreed upon
procedures to ensure that the local
people are given every opportunity to
stay safe. HMD Response has been
able ro establish a good relationship
with the clearance companies working
in the south of Kosovo for the
following reasons:
• HMD Response prioritizes work that
relates to assisting clearance
operations. UNMACC procedures
insist that clearance operations require
mine awareness be undertaken in
nearby villages before, during and after
the demining has taken place. For
HMD Response, these villages
immediately become the main focus
of our activities and due to the
simplistic nature of our approach, we
can react within hours of being
informed of a new clearance operation.
Also, the rapid checking and
processing of "Dangerous Area
Reports" that are received from the
villagers are given rop priority. In both

interviewee if necessary. The
:onclusion
interviewer checks the appropriate
responses as the discussion takes place.
All MAEP approaches have a
At the end of the discussion, the place within the mine action toolkit,
• HMD Response invited demining
agencies to help in our training course interviewer shows the completed and no single approach can offer all
for local staff. Deminers and medical questionnaire sheet ro the interviewee the answers to every situation.
teams from demining companies and checks that the answers are a fair However, if managed well, the direct
within our area taught our awareness reflection of the interviewee's approach can make an important
teams about the technical aspects of responses. If the interviewee has made contribution.
their work, which was followed up by mistakes, then those questions are
In Kosovo, the direct approach
several educational visits to clearance discussed again and, where necessary, can be used even when the normal
operations. When information HMD Response staff will explain the routines of children and adults are
disrupted. It also has the potential to
concerning a clearance operation is reasons for the corrected answers.
gathered for a village briefing, we
Prior ro going inro the villages, reach high-risk groups, in this case
encourage our teams to talk directly HMD Response staff practiced their young men and adult agricultural
with the deminers in order to prevent interviews with OSCE staff members workers, who do not typically interact
any misunderstanding. The cross at its NGO Resource Centre in in conventional social structures.
checking of IMSMA maps is now a Prizren. These practice sessions served
The direct approach should not
standard procedure. This physically to check and modify the draft be disregarded because it appears to
puts our staff alongside the deminers questionnaire; ensure that HMD be roo easy, too cheap and too
and alongside the mine fields. Without Response staff understood the need to simplistic. If a good Needs Assessment
such visits, our credibility with the explain any corrections to the exercise leads to the outcome that a
demining companies and the local interviewees after the interview; and direct approach will be the most
people would be lost.
to adjust rhe approaches and styles of effective and efficient solution for a
all the interviewers so that they particular landmine problem, then a
In short, HMD Response is presented the questions in a similar direct approach should be utilized and
implementing a program that manner.
respected as a reliable commonsense
clearance agencies can relate ro very
The final questionnaire was approach.
This article has been written to
easily. Deminers rend to view the carefully prepared in English,
direct approach as a clear and simple Albanian and Gorani. See AnnexA for give the direct approach renewed
way to deal with a clear and simple the English version.
credibility at a rime when many
problem- a view that HMD
Every village in the Dragash MAEP managers may be opting for
Response in Kosovo accepts.
Municipality has now been visited and unnecessary, albeit innovative,
600 interviews have been recorded. complexity in mine action. •
Evaluation
The results have been analyzed and are
:ontact Information
displayed in our information center in
In each village about 20 adult Dragash.
In May 200 I, HMD Response Philip Dive
interviews are carried our before any
MAE teaching occurs to better staff will return to these villages and Senior Mines Awareness Educator,
understand the aptitudes and previous undenake the same number of HMD Response
knowledge of locals. The interview interviews
using
the
same E-mail: hmdresponse@hotmail.com
subjects are always asked if they wish questionnaire in order to make a
to be interviewed and no attempt is before and after comparison. The Philp Garvin
made to challenge those who decline. outcome of this comparison will form Chief Executive, HMD Response
A trained member ofHMD Response the basis of a report rhat will evaluate 23 Pembridge Square
staff is present throughout the entire rhe effectiveness of our MAE teaching. London W2 4DR
interview. The questionnaire forms the
To organize 600 interviews in 38 Tel: +20 7229 7447
basis of the discussion, and the different villages requires good Fax: +20 7229 3434
questions are read out slowly and management and far-sighted vision,
clearly and repeated as often as the something that UNICEF and the All photos courtesy ofthe author.
subject requests. The interviewer is Landmine Monitor have both recently
allowed to explain the questions to the recommended for all MAEPs.
cases, we try to emphasize a service
philosophy.
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Annex A:
H\1D Rec;ponse MAEP QLES I IONNAIRE

a) once
b) twtce
c) three rimes
d) four times
e) five times
f) more
g) never

1. Age
a) 16-24

b) 25- 34
c) 35 - 44

d) 45- 54
e) 55 - 64
f) 65 plus

the locations of the mine fields in the Dragash
Municipality?
Yes
No

3. Sex: Male I Female
8. If you have unfortunately walked into a mine field
please select that best action to take. (interviewer ticks
as appropriate)

4. Please describe the signs that are put on either
wires or on poles to warn people of an area that
contains landmines. (interviewer ticks as
appropriate)

a) Slowly and carefully re-trace your steps.
b) Stay still, warn others and call for help.
c) Find a long stick to check the ground and slowly
find a safe route out.
d) Run very fast back the way you came into the
minefield.

No Idea
Red Triangle
Skull and crossed bones
VJ sign with "Mine" painted on wood.
White, yellow, red rape
More than one sign described
There are no mine signs

9. If you find an item that you do not recognize but
guess that it is maybe something that was left by a
person within the military, probably during the
conflict, what is the best action to take? (interviewer
checks as appropriate)

5. Please list the possible clues I items that may
help you to realize that you have ventured into a
dangerous mined area. (interviewer checks as
appropriate)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Since 1994, the United States has committed approximately $400 million to worldwide
humanitarian demining efforts. With its sights set on 2010, the U.S. Office of Global
Humanitarian Demining is working to establish partnerships in the private sector.

7. Have you observed I studied a map that shows you

2. Home village: _ _ __ __

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

U.S. Office of Global Humanitarian Demining
Works Toward Demining 2010 Goals

a) Remember irs location and tell UNMIK police
or KFOR.
b) Pick ir up and take it to UNMIK police or
KFOR.
c) Just leave it and forget about ir.
d) Pick it up and show your friends who served in
the military and rry to find out what it is.

Exposed mine
Trip wire
Fuses
Safety pins
Mounds and hollows
Bullet casings
Dead animals
Packing boxes
Military cloth ing

10. In this area the problem of landmines is which of
the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)

6. How many times have you been educated
about the threat of mines by professional mines
awareness teachers in the last twelve months?
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A big problem
A problem
A small problem
No problem

By Elizabeth Cramer, MAIC

T

he United States has long been committed to
the universally shared vision to rid the earth
of the threat oflandmines. On Nov. 28,
2000, U.S. Special Representative of rhe
President and Secretary of State for Global
Humanitarian Demining Donald K.
Steinberg addressed the U.N. General
Assembly, outlining U.S. Global
Humanitarian Demining (G HD) plans for
2001. The plans include nearly $I 00 million
(U.S.) in funding for rhe upcoming year, and
continued work with over 36 nations toward the
goal of making the world "mine safe" for civilians
by rhe end of this decade. The address was a
contin uation of the U.S. "D emining 20 I 0 Initiative," first
announced in 1997.

Demining 2010 Initiative
On O cr. 31, 1997, former Secretary of Stare Madeline
Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen
jointly announced President Clinton's "Demining 2010
Initiative," with the goal of creating a mine safe world by
the year 2010. The initiative was created in respo nse to
the severe threat to civilians posed by landmines. In 1997,
it was estimated that I 00 million landmines in over 64
countries cause about 26,000 casualties per year. The goal
of the 2010 Initiative is to accelerate demining efforts,
increase international coordination, and increase public and
private resources dedicated to demining.
The initiative included several elements. The first
element of the initiative was rhe appointment of a Special
Representative of the President and Secretary of State for
GHD and the creation of the Office of the Special
Representative to oversee the 2010 Initiative. One element
was a conference held in Washington D.C. in May 1998,
ro develop specific goals and strategies for achieving the
initiative. The most obvious element was rhe continuation

of U.S. funding, with the United States commirting $80
million for 1998, a two-fold increase from its $40 million
in contributions in 199 7. The final element was to
encourage and support public-private partnerships to
augment government and international organization
activity.
Creation of GHD
The Office of the Special Representative for GHD
and the new position of special representative of th e
president and secretary of stare for GHD were established
in October 1997, with the announcement of the Demining
2010 Initiative. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian
Affairs Karl F. lnderfurth was assigned as the first special
representative.
T he position of special representative was designed to
provide the international demining community with a
coordinator to bring together donors, deminers, landmine
accident survivors and mine victims with governments,
international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector

• 127 •

U.S. Office of GHD

Asia & the Pacific

a) once
b) twice
c) three times
d) four times
e) five times
f) more
g) never

Annex A:

HMO

Re~ponse

MAEP QUESIIONNAIRF

1. Age
a) 16- 24

b) 25- 34
c) 35-44

Since 1994, the United States has committed approximately $400 million to worldwide
humanitarian demining efforts. With its sights set on 2010, the U.S. Office of Global
Humanitarian Demining is working to establish partnerships in the private sector.

7. Have you observed I studied a map that shows you

d) 45- 54
e) 55 - 64
f) 65 plus

the locations of the mine fields in the Dragash
Municipality?

2. Home village: _ _ _ _ __

Yes
No

3. Sex: Male I Female
8 . If you have unfortunately walked into a mine field
please select that best action to take. (interviewer ticks
as appropriate)

4. Please describe the signs that are put on either
wires or on poles to warn people of an area that
contains landmines. (interviewer ticks as
appropriate)

a) Slowly and carefully re-trace your steps.
b) Stay still, warn others and call for help.
c) Find a long stick to check the ground and slowly
find a safe route out.
d) Run very fast back the way you came into the
minefield.

No Idea
Red Triangle
Skull and crossed bones
VJ sign with "Mine" painted on wood.
White, yellow, red tape
More than one sign described
g) There are no mine signs

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

9. If you fmd an item that you do not recognize but
guess that it is maybe something that was left by a
person within the military, probably during the
conflict, what is the best action to take? (interviewer
checks as appropriate)

5. Please list the possible clues I items that may
help you to realize that you have ventured into a
dangerous mined area. (interviewer checks as
appropriate)
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
G.
7.
8.
9.

U.S. Office of Global Humanitarian Demining
Works Toward Demining 2010 Goals

a) Remember irs location and tell UNMIK police
or KFOR.
b) Pick it up and rake it to UNM IK police or
KFOR.
c) Just leave it and forget about it.
d) Pick it up and show your friends who served in
the military and try to find out what it is.

Exposed mine
Trip wire
Fuses
Safety pins
Mounds and hollows
Bullet casings
Dead animals
Packing boxes
Military clothing

10. In this area the problem of landmines is which of
the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)

G. How many times have you been educated
about the threat of mines by professional mines
awareness teachers in the last twelve months?
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A big problem
A problem
A small problem
No problem

By Elizabeth Cramer, MAJC

T

he United States has long been committed to
the universally shared vision to rid the earth
of the threat oflandmines. On Nov. 28,
2000, U.S. Special Representative of the
President and Secretary of State for Global
Human itarian D emi ning Donald K.
Steinberg addressed the U.N. General
Assem bly, outlining U .S. Global
Humanitarian Demining (GHD) plans for
200 1. The plans include nearly $100 million
(U.S.) in funding for the upcoming year, and
continued work with over 3G nations toward the
goal of making the world "mine safe" for civilians
by the end of this decade. The address was a
continuation of the U.S. "Demining 2010 Initiative," first
announced in 1997.

Demining 2010 Initiative
On Oct. 31, 1997, former Secretary of State Madeline
Albright and former Secretary of D efense William Cohen
jointly announced President Clinton's "Demining 2010
Initiative," with the goal of creating a mine safe world by
the year 2010. The initiative was created in response to
the severe threat to civilians posed by landmines. In 1997,
it was estimated that 100 million landmines in over G4
countries cause about 2G,OOO casualties per year. The goal
of the 2010 Initiative is to accelerate demining efforts,
increase international coordination, and increase public and
private resources dedicated to demining.
The initiative included several elements. The first
element of the initiative was the appointment of a Special
Representative of the President and Secretary of State for
G HD and the creation of the Office of the Special
Representative to oversee the 2010 Initiative. One element
was a conference held in Washington D .C. in May 1998,
to develop specific goals and strategies for achieving the
initiative. The most obvious element was the continuation

of U.S . funding, with the United States committing $80
million for 1998, a two-fold increase from its $40 million
in contributions in 1997. The final element was to
encourage and support public-private partnerships to
augment government and international organization
activity.

:reation of GHD
The Office of the Special Representative for GHD
and the new position of special representative of th e
president and secretary of state for GHD were established
in October 1997, wirh the announcement of the Demining
2010 Initiative. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian
Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth was assigned as the first special
representative.
The position of special representative was designed to
provide the international demining community with a
coordinator to bring together donors, deminers, landmine
accident survivors and mine victims with governments,
international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector
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to improve the effecriveness of the global humanitarian
demining effort.
The Special Representative's primary responsibility is
to coordinate and lead the 20 l 0 Initiative. This is achieved
by working with other nations and organizations to
coordinate and accelerate international demining efforts.
The Special Representative also works to increase the
public and private resources dedicated to identifying and
clearing mines, promote public awareness about mines, and
improve the means of detecting and removing mines.

:iHD Objectives

The objectives of GHD are achi eved through the
combined efforts of U.S. government agencies, foreign
governments, nongovernmental agencies, private corporations,
international agencies and the United Nations. The ultimate
goals are to empower mine-affected countries to assume their
own leadership over mine action programs and to speed the
pace of demining.
The goals ofG HD depend upon partnerships with the
private sector and the availability of adequate resources from
appropriated U.S. funds. While, contriburions have already
been made to mine action by corporations, NGOs,
philanthropic foundations, civic foundations, educational
institutions and other private groups, public-private
partnerships are needed both presently and for the future to
speed the demining efforts.
Ambassador Steinberg's Recent Address

The current
special representative, Ambassador Steinberg.

GHD Mission Statement

The Office of the Special Representative for G HD
seeks to create conditions that will eliminate the threat of
landmines to civilians around the world by the year 2010.
The office supports efforts in the U.S. and abroad to
accelerate landmine detection and clearance programs,
promote landmine awareness in affected nations, assist
survivors of landmine accidents, enhance research and
development of new demining technologies, and develop
public-private partnerships to support these programs
(From the Office of the Special Representative of the President and Secretary of Scare for Global Humanitarian
Demining).
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On Nov. 28, 2000, rhe current special represen tative,
Ambassador Steinberg, addressed the U .N. General Assembly with an update on the progress in the fight against
landmines. Ambassador Steinberg reassured the audience
that the United Scares is pleased to support the effort to
reduce the danger of over 70,000 land mines that threaten
individuals and the peace, democracy, and national reconciliation of one-third of the world's nations. H e outlined
G HD 's progress since 1997 . Since then, the United Scares
has destroyed 3.3 million landmincs. In 1997, rhe country unilaterally banned the export and transfer of APLs,
and by 2003 it will end the use of all APLs outside Korea.
Ambassador Steinberg also stated that the U nited States is
seeking alternatives to landmines. The United States has
committed to joining the Ottawa Treaty by 2006 if effective alternatives can be found and deployed by char time.
H e stated that the U nited Scares is currently working
with more chan 36 nations in mine clearance, mine
awareness education and mine clearance training. Although
the programs cake place worldwide, the largest programs
are in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Central
America, Laos, Mozambique, and Rwanda. The United
States is using the best scientific talent available to identify
new demining and clearance techniques. GHD continues
to advise and support mine action centers such as the
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining
(GIC HD) and James Madison University's Mine Action
Information Center.
In his speech, Ambassador Steinberg also outlined
some of the exciting efforts of GHD to help establish
public-private partnerships to support the Demining 20 l 0
Initiative. The United Nations Association of the USA's

(UNA-USA) Adopt-A-Minefield program generates private
contriburions to de mine the 100 worst mine fields in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia and Mozambique,
in coordination with Ted Turner's U.N. Foundation. The
U.N. Foundation is also supporting the Survey Action
Center to produce mine surveys of a dozen countries. DC
Comics created more than 1 million mine awareness comic
books for children in Bosnia, Central America and Kosovo.
An especially exciting operation is the joint effort of the
Marshall Legacy Institute and the Humpty Dumpty
Institute to purchase, train, and deploy mine detecting dogs
worldwide, including a dog team recently sent to Lebanon.
Wheelchairs fo r the World is helping disabled people regain
mobility throughout the world.

ambassador shared his experiences in Angola and Kosovo ,
where he saw firsthand the effects oflandmines on civilians.
Two Texas chapters of the UNA- USA also launched drives
to clear select mine fields in Bosnia and Herzegovina as
part ofUNA-USA's Adopt-A-Minefield program. On Sept.
21, 2000, Ambassador Steinberg was a keynote speaker at
the GHD conference held by the Austin Chapter of UNAUSA to promote public awareness for humanitarian
demining, particularly to "adopt" a mine field in the village
of Praca, Bosnia and Herzegovina. T he Ambassador then
proceeded ro help the Houston Chapter launch its AdoptA-Minefield drive to clear another mined area in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. He also spoke at four schools while in
Texas. The ambassador and GHD cominue to plan evems
to promote public awareness of the landmine problem.

GHD Efforts m 2000
GHD Plans for 2001

Besides spearheading efforts to promote private-public
partnersh ips, Ambassador Steinberg worked to raise
domestic awareness of the landmine issue. In December
2000, he addressed over 600 high school students from 27
schools at the 17th Prince William Model United Nations
Conference ar C.D. Hylton Senior High Schoolin
Woodbridge, Va. In his speech tided " Humanitarian
Demining: To Walk th e Earth in Safety," Steinberg
described U .S. and U.N. mine clearance efforts. The
conference was designed for students to model actual
foreign delegations to the United Nations in attempt to
address world issues through diplomacy, debate, negotiation
and parliamentary procedure.
An ongoing partnership arranged by the special
representative between the U .S. Department of State and
Roots of Peace, a California-based NGO, has evolved into
a new mine awareness campaign. Passengers of public
transportation in the San Francisco Bay Area are now seeing
bright orange advertisements with the message "What if
landmines were in t he USA?" The signs are designed co
provoke commuters to imagine the effects of landmines
and provide information about how they can participate
in making the Balkans mine-safe through Roots of Peace
and the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining
and Mi ne Victim Assistance.
The District of Columbia Students Against Landm ines
(DC SALaaM) Project was created in January 2000 as part
ofTed Turner's U.N. Foundation outreach program to the
District. This project incorporates the UNA-USA AdoptA-Minefield Program. On Nov. 16, 2000, Ambassador
Steinberg was the keynote speaker at Bell Multicultural
High School to helplaunch DC SALaaM's campaign to
raise funds to clear a mine field in Mozambique. The

Since former President C limon's 1994 call to the
United Nations to eliminate the threat of landmines, the
U.S government has donated about $400 million to
humanitarian mine action efforts worldwide. In his address
to the U.N. General Assembly, Steinberg announced that
the United Stares is committed ro conrinue support through
the provision of approximately $100 million in 2001.
As 200 1 gets underway, GHD is working with Warner
Brothers on a pilot project for public service announcements using animated Looney Tunes characters combined
with real footage from mine affected countries. The purpose
is to foster greater mine awareness among threatened
populations, particularly children, and to demonstrate that
mine victims continue to be valued citizens.
Following up on Ambassador Steinberg's public
outreach in Texas last summer, G HD is now working with
a consortium of leading citizens from Austin to galvan ize
that city's practical support for mine action overseas.
Through these and other efforts the GHD strives to build
public-private partnerships to support the Demining 2010
Initiative and to create a mine-safe world for all. •
~ontact

Information

John Stevens
Office of the Special Representative for Global
Humanitarian Demining
Tel: (202) 647-0676
Fax: (202) 647-2465
E-mail: stevensje@r.state.gov
Website: www.state.gov/www/global/arms/pm/hdp
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Mine Action-

A Model for Other Global Challenges?
by Dennis
Barlow, Director,
Mine Action
Information
Center

A FEW SHORT YEARS AGO the humanitarian
demining task seemed insurmountable. Not only was
the prospect of eliminating landmines as a global
threat deemed unachievable, but the political and organizational landscape was new, diverse and uncharted.

ABrave New, and Complicated, World
Humanitarian demining, if not a new phenomena, was new ro a global community which had only
just shed its Cold War cloak and was trying to cope
with emerging regional threats to stability, independence movements, c ivil warfare, refugee surges, factional antagonis ms and border challenges. The organizations involved in demining were as varied as the
kinds oflandmines and UXO, which dotted the landscapes of so me 60 threatened co untries. Newly
for med , bm highly motivated and effective NGOs
such as Halo Trust, Norwegian People's Aid, and the
Mines Actions Group (MAG) were soon joined by
other NGOs, for-profit corporatio ns, international
organizations, mil itary task forces, donor nations and
concerned individuals.
The problem was that such diverse organizations,
performing a plethora of what we now call mine action functions, were engaged all over the wo rld in an
uncoordinated and sometimes dysfunctional process.
Everybody wanted to do well, bur there was no coordinating mechanism to maximize, integrate, record,
implement and evaluate overall p lans and operations.
Even worse, the modus operand i of these various organizations rarely brought them into contact wi th
congruent organizations. Whatever cooperative global, regional, o r co ncerted efforcs were devised had
to be engineered with little precedent and even less
authority.
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The Success of the Humanitarian Demining
Model
What has happened in the past five years has
been just short of a political miracle. Out of the chaos
of many individual organizations just trying to "do
good" has emerged a community of humanitaria n
mine action activists and operators which has collectively, professionally, and quietly created what may
be a model for other international efforrs.
The newly assigned D irector of th e U.N. Mine
Action Service (UNMAS), Martin Barber, observed
this new state of affairs in his address to the Fourrh
International Meeting of M ine Action Directors in
Geneva on Feb. 5, 200 I. Having the perspective of
one "return ing to the vineyard," he remarked upon
the extraordinary cooperation of many groups and the
seamless nature of operations as a matter of cou rse
in mine action today.
I must admit to some shock at hearing that observat ion, and yet it rook me only a few moments'
reflection to real ize that he was absolutely correct.
Having been involved in th is issue from 1994, ! like many others immersed in the challenges and everyday stickiness of demining issues- had failed to
appreciate the great organizational, operational, management, and informational strides which have characterized this great cause in the recent past. It is worth
the time to catalog some of the great, but perhaps
unnoticed trends, which have emerged and become
part of this process.

10 Innovative Approaches to Mine Action
Conftrences and Workshops. T he acceptance of a
new challenge dictated that a series of conferences,
seminars, and workshops, needed to be held to both
frame the challenges of demining and to get to know
the players. As a result of an aggressive schedule of
such meetings, many partnerships, all iances, d ialogs,
concerns and plans for action have resulted. These

gatheri ngs have targeted various dem ining groups,
fu nctions and issues, and have become "real-time"
clearinghouses for ideas and "next steps" and have
often framed such hot dem ining topics as the use of
mine detecting dogs, geographical systems requirements, donor concerns, standards, management
questions, etc. It is this kind offorum, which has fostered the trust and camaraderie, that has become a
hallmark of the mine action community.
UN. Leadership. Several U.N. agencies, such as
UNDP, UNOPS, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDPKO
and WHO, have an abiding interest in mine action.
Over the past several years these organizations, working with the U.N. agency specifically charged with
the comprehensive oversight of mine actionUNMAS-have coordinated their efforcs and facil itated a structured and organized U.N. approach to
meeting the entire scope of landmine-relared challenges.
Advocacy Groups. While the "anti-personnel
landmine ban" organizations are often recognized for
their devotion to advocacy, they have also been very
active in supporting humanitarian demining, mine
awareness and victim assistance projects. Besides performing ground breaking survey and database work,
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines,
through the publication of its monumental Landmine
Monitor Report, has produced an invaluable resource
relied upon by the entire mine action community.
R&D. One of the most frustrating aspects of
mine clearance is the lack of what has been called the
"silver buller" solution to the problem. Perhaps a
greater challenge is that the market and procurement
path for tech nologies designed for humanitarian app lications are murky. Despite the difficulties, however, many donor nations have developed creative
approaches to the problem. As a result, new demining
technologies are continually being developed. Of special note is the effort to unify much of the work be-

ing done around the world under the rubric of the
International Test and Evaluation Program (ITEP).
The ITEP approach promises to be an effective way
to avoid R&D duplication and point the way to an
impartial and effective evaluation process.
Coordination and Information Services. The new
millennium is already characterized by a realization
of the importance in the processing and management
of rel iable information. Whether geo-spatial, narrative, or quantitative, the identification and use of
information is one of the keys to carrying out effective mine action programs. The creation of the
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) was Switzerland's contribution
to this critical outreach effort. The GICHD has become a chief clearinghouse for studies, committee
meetings, and developing methods for implementing
U.N.-directed standards and electronic information
processes. James Madison University was asked by the
U.S. Department of Defense to supplement the
GICHD outreach w ith conference, web page and
journal activities. Perhaps the most effective real-time
and informal communications network has been the
always interesting and relevant chat room managed
by Menschen Gegen Minen (MgM), an NGO.
Civil-Military Cooperation. The role of militaries in supporting mine action has for some time been
controversial. Nevertheless, many nations-both
those providing assistance and those afflicted with
landmines- have re-configured and tra ined various
elements within their militaries co accept this mission.
A recent conference of militaries providing these services has revealed improved coordination efforts with
NGOs, host-nations, recipients and other organizations. Military humanitarian assistance roles are not
essentially in the mine clearing areas, but in providing technical advice and training, mine awareness support, victim assistance, research and development venues, and the procurement of equipment and supplies.
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UK firm begins demining in Taiwan

Surveys. In determining the kinds of mine action
required, as well as to arrive at a meaningful prioritization and development plan, it is critical that an
appropriate survey be conducted. However, there are
many surveys and methodologies to measure. The
humanitarian demining community has developed a
number of excellent instruments to measure various
relevant data on suspected landmine-contaminared
areas and the resulting socioeconomic impact. These
surveys have yielded invaluable data, which can suggest the proper scope of a campaign and greatly increase the efficiency of an operation. The impact surveys now being conducted by the Survey Action Center (under the control and guidance of the Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation and UNMAS, respectively) are producing just such data.
Public-Private Partnerships. A novel concept for
maximizing public participation and support of humanitarian dem ining activities has been the identification of private or educational organizations to participate actively in the process. This approach has the
benefit of allowing private donors to get more directly
involved. It increases the number of people who gain
a realistic and "up-close" perspective into the nature
of the effort, while, at the same time, raising muchneeded funds and increasing the range of activities
countenanced with in mine action . Both the AdoptA-Minefield project and the Superman and Superwoman comic books are examples of U.S. efforts to
invigorate the demining process through the active
participation and support of private organizations.
National Input. The demining issue confronts
many nations in many ways. Some nations are donor countries; within this group donations can consist of funds, human resources, training, equipment,
or logistical support. Afflicted nations have varying
needs: money, training, organizational and management skills, ere. The mix and match of requirements
and resources and the interplay of the application of
those resources is a very tricky game. Many of the
nations involved use some of the processes noted
above as ways to get involved. However, there are
other mechanisms. Twenty-three donor countries
have formed a sounding-board group called the Mine
Action Support Group (MASG), which frequently
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reviews the state of play in the mine action arena and
recommends policy guidance. Signatories to the O ttawa Treaty meet semi-annually under the auspices of
UNMAS and the GICHD in Geneva to stay abreast
of current trends and suggest various plans of action.
The bottom line is that virtually no nation goes without the opportunity to gain access or inpuc into the
various groups within the demining community.
Academia. At an important demining conference
held in Helsingor, Denmark, in 1996, it was noted
that universities bad much to contribute, but were
silent in their application to the landmine issue. Today, many universities are key players in the mine
action community: Cranfield University in England
is conducting a highly successful mine action
manager's course; JMU acts as a major mine landmine
information hub; and the University ofWesrern Australia has become a leader in rbe development oflowrech, but highly effective protective gear for deminers.
A whole host of schools are now involved in clearance
R&D, while others are offering courses directly related to landmine challenges.
It is inreresting to note that these approaches to
meeting the unique challenges posed by the landmine
threat have been accomplished in a very quiet and
unobtrusive way. Very little in the foregoing list
smacks of authority or command. Instead, they point
to a voluntary and flexible way of organizing various
capabili ties into a plan that uses each application for
the good of the whole. In many instances, roles have
been defined by trial and error, or by default. There
is no claim here that each of these efforts is proceeding without friction or even efficiently.
Still, it is amazing that such a wonderful quilt
could have been made our of so many different fabrics, with so many designs. One cannot help but wonder if the same kind of coordinating mechanisms are
possible (desirable?) in other international endeavors.

•

[Note: The Director does not claim that the above processes comprise a complete list. He invites readers to add
to this list ofmine action processes to make a more comprehensive reporting ofthis "model" sometime in the near
foture.}

Bactec International L&D began demining work March 6,
2001 on the Republic of China's frontline island ofKinmen. The
demining work on what is to be a new merchant port is expected
to be completed in 200 days. The 8,400 sq. meters coastal region
was heavily mined in the 1950s.

U.N. mine action program to receive $2.5 million in
additional funds

Mozambique to receive $1 million in aid from United
Methodists
The United Methodists Board of Global Ministries announced in October 2000 it has committed $1 million to mine
clearance efforts in Mozambique. T he clearance project will focus
on returning agricultural land, transportation routes and social
institutions to working capacity. Through its own company, the
United Methodists will use state-of-the-art equipment and hire
experts to train locals in removal techniques and protocol.

The U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA)
recently received $2.5 million in new funding from Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the Adopt-a-Minefield program. The additional funds are expected to make up for a budget
deficit that had caused mine clearance operations to be suspended,
leaving only 64 percent of clearance and 68 percent of mine awareness objectives met.

According to the U.N. Office for Project Services, mine removal efforts in northern Iraq have slowed due to equipment difficulties and the mountainous nature of the mine fields. At the
current rate of demining, it is estimated that the clearance efforts
could continue for decades.

Landmine explosion in Sri Lanka kills 11 soldiers

Elephant maimed by landmine faces death threats

At least 11 soldiers were killed when a landmine exploded in
Sri Lanka's northern J affna peninsula on Jan. 23, 200 1. T he soldiers were on a clearing operation when the blast occurred.

The Thai elephant maimed by a landmine in August 1999 is
now facing human threats on her life. Motola, who was forced into
early retirement while working in a heavily mined camp on the
Thai-Myanmar border, is reportedly the target of threats from jealous animal welfare organizations and elephant traders, according
to trainer Soraida Salwala. Soraida told the Associated Press she
received telephone calls from people saying they want Motola dead.

Three U.S. soldiers injured in Bosnia explosion
Three members of the NATO peacekeeping force in northern Bosnia were injured in November 2000 while handling explosives at the Stabilisation Force's (SFOR) Camp Bedrock. The victims, members of the Marine Corps EOD team, were all reported
to be in stable condition following the incident.

Two UK companies awarded $6 million mine
countermeasure contracts
The UK firms Hunting Engineering of Ampthill, Bedfordshire, and Ultra Electronics of High Wycombe, Bucks, were each
awarded $6 million contracts in November 2000 to develop AP
and AT mine countermeasure technologies. Under the MOD Mine
Detection, Neutralization and Route Marking System (Minder)
program, the companies are expected to develop a system combining ground penetrating radar, ultra wide band radar, thermal
imaging detectors, metal detectors and chemical systems for explosives detection. The Minder system is designed for operational
use and can also be used in peacekeeping and peace-support.

U.N. forces dear one-third of Lebanon
1,520 explosive devices were cleared from southern Lebanon
in 2000 by U.N. specialist forces. In a zone formerly occupied by
Israel, which withdrew in May 2000, 130,000 mines still remain
as remnants of the occupation. Since the withdrawal, 64 Lebanese
civilians have been killed or injured by mines.

Mine removal delayed in northern Iraq

Harris sings for landmine victims
After visits to heavily mine-affected areas of Vietnam and
Cambodia, country singer and Grammy Award winner Emmylou
Harris decided in 2000 to form ConcertS for a Landmine Free
World, a singer-songwriter benefit tour featuring Harris, Steve
Earle, Mary Chapin Carpenter and others. The tour, presented by
the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), featured
concerts in Ottawa, Toronto, Burlington, Vt., and Somerville,
Maine, in an attempt to raise awareness of the global landmine
problem.

Three killed, two injured in landmine blast on Tajik-Uzbek
border
Two men were killed and three injured recently while trying
to illegally cross the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan border. Some 20 civilians have been killed trying to cross the border since Uzbek border guards laid mines in August 2000. The mines were reportedly
laid to prevent Islamic rebels from fleeing Uzbekistan for Afghanistan without procuring visas.
Compiled from wire reports.

